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Abstract 
The development of suitable explicit representations of knowledge that 
can be manipulated by general purpose inference mechanisms has always 
been central to Artificial Intell~ence (AI). However, there has been a 
distinct lack of rigorous formalisms in the literature that can be used 
to model domain knowledge associated with the everyday physical world. 
If AI is to succeed in buildtng automata that can function reasonably 
well in unstructured physical domainS, the developllent and utility of such 
formalisms IlUSt be secured. 
This thesis describes a first order axiomatic theory that can be used 
to encode much topological and metrical information that arises in our 
everyday dealings with the physical world. The formalism is notable for 
the minimal assUJllptions required in order to 11ft up a very general 
framework that can cover the representation of much intuitive spatial and 
temporal knowledge. The basic ontology assumes regions that can be 
either spatial or temporal and over which a set of relations and 
functions are defined. The resulting partitioning of these abstract 
spaces, allow complex relationships between objects and the description of 
processes to be formally represented. This also provides a useful 
foundation to control the proliferation of inference commonly associated 
with mechanised logiCS. Empirical information extracted from the domain 
is added and mapped to these basic structures showing how further 
control of inference can be secured. 
The representational power of the formalism and computational 
tractability of the general methodology proposed is substantiated using 
two non-trivial dOllain problems - modelling phagocytosis and exocytosis 
of uni-eellular organisms, and Ilodelling processes arising during the 
cycle of operations of a force pump. 
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• ... There are an indefinite number of purely abstract sCiences, with their 
laws, their regularities, and their cOllplexities of theorems - all as yet 
undeveloped. We can hardly avoid the conclusion that Nature in her 
procedures illustrates many such sciences. We are blind to such 
illustrations because we are ignorant of the type of regularities to look 
for. In such cases, we may dimly sense a sort of fallillarity attached to 
novel cirCUlistances. without any notion of how to proceed in the analysis 
of the vague feeling." 
A.N. Whitehead 
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Qlapter 1: Analysing the Flllliliar 
1.1 General introduction to and outline of the thesis 
Artificial Intelligence (AI> has long sought computationally efficient and 
expressive ways to represent non-trivial domain knowledge in a formal 
framework. However. despite the aportance given to the develOpHnt of 
formal theories that can be used to encode rich domain knowledge 
associated with the everyday (commonsense) world. few worked exaaples 
have appeared in the literature. 
This thesis motivates and describes a sorted first-order axiOliatic 
theory that can be used to model intuitive spatial and temporal knowledge 
associated with the everyday world. The theory concentrates upon the 
explicit representation of topological information, although geaaetricel 
and metrical information is also used. The theory is notable for the 
minimal set of assUJlptions required in order to 11ft up a coaprehenslve 
theory that can be used to describe non-trivial model~ probLea& 
The ontological primitives of the theory include a set of region. 
which are interpreted so that they support either a spatial or temporal 
reading. A set of functions and relations are then defined on these 
regions. This enables complex spatial relationships betWea'l physical 
objects to be formally described. as well as providing the besi. for 
describing physical processes by specifying particular sequences of state 
descriptions that change over time. 
The theory gives rise to various abstract structurea: in particular, a 
set of monadic predicates encoding taxonomic information is factored out 
and embedded 1n a special sort lat tice, 8S are sets of Maher-arity 
predicates which are embedded in a relational lattice. Th ... and other 
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structures are highl~hted and factored out to show how the proliferation 
of inference commonly associated with automated reasoning programs can 
be more effectively controlled in an automated reasoning setting. Means 
to secure further control of inference is also secured by abstract~ out 
empirical information from the modelled domain and using this to put 
contratnts on these basic structures. 
Although a d~ct ~plementat1on of the theory using a mechanised 
sorted logic is envisaged, special attention is given to the theoretical 
separation made between the formal theory and different ways the theory 
might be used or ~plemented. 
The thesis falls into three main parts. The first part analyses the 
place of commonsense knowledge in AI research and concludes with a 
working methodology. The second pert describes the formal theory. while 
the final part concentrates upon iaplementational questions - suggest~ 
efficient ways of controlling inference using a resolution-based 
implementation of the theory. 
The chapter out line is as follows. Chapter 1 (being the rest of this 
chapter) introduces and motivates the subject of comllon sense knowledge 
within AI research. A separate chapter (Chapter 1) caliper .. and 
contrasts related work. Chapter 7 assumes solle familterity of the formal 
contribution of this thesis and should be read with this in m1nd. In 
Chapter 2 the bulk of the formal theory is covered in detaiL Each 
relation, function and property 1s forllally def1ned, and where appropriate 
discussed and illustrated with intuitive examples. This is extended in 
Chapter 3 where physical objects, states and events and the description 
of processes are introduced. The representational power of the theory is 
illustrated in Chapter • where two non-trivial aodelling problems are 
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tackled. Chapter 5 discusses ~plementstionsl matters, while Chapter 6 
considers ontological and epietemologlcal questlons raised by the theory 
and working methodology. A critical survey of related work appears in 
Chapter 7, while Chapter 8 discusses future work and summarises the main 
contributions of the thesis. Notes on the text, a bibliography and 
appendices are included. Appendix A 18 a glossary of specially defined 
symbols used in the thesis, while appendices B and C cover all the 
listings of proofs cited in the text. In the interest. of space, full 
listings of the inference steps used in each proof is not given. This is 
reserved for the most interestins theorellS only. In this case. a 
resolution-baaed proof strategy is used. The rest of the theorems are 
simply relegated to a list of axioms and definitions which together with 
the negation of the theorea to be proved, are sufficient to secure the 
stated theorell (again using a refutation-baeed proof strategy). 
1.2 The need to encode caaaonsenae knowledp in prosraaa 
It has long been maintained that if AI is to succeed in building 
machines that exhibit intelligent behaviour, their prograas must encode 
lsrge amounte of collmonsense knowledge of the world [Hobbs et al 1985 
pl-ll, or at the very least mU8t be seen to share our COlllJlon knowledge 
and assumptions (Forbus 1988a p 1971. Exactly what this couonsen •• 
knowledge consists of remains to be examined, as doeB the justification 
behind this assumption. However, the general view is that without solie 
means of encoding general knowledge of the everyday world in computer 
programs, we will have to be content with the limited use of theBe in 
specialist appUcations only (Forbus 1988a pI97]. 
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The motivation for 1Dlparting very general knowledge of the world to 
programs can be identified with limitations encountered in the 
development of Expert Systems, and in the parallel development of 
Qualitative Physics. Cohn [Cohn 1989 pp180-821 discusses some of the 
common problems encountered. For example, expert system programs 
designed to do diagnosis seem inadequate when used to make predictions 
or tutor. Moreover, they seaD unable to solve (what we identify as) 
Simpler versions of the type of problem the program was originally 
designed to solve. Typically these programs have their knowledge 
implicitly represented as a set of shallow (or "compiled-) rules, with no 
interactive Deans to demonstrate or justify why a conclusion was reached. 
Given comparable tasks. human beings can give reasonable answers to 
general problems, whether or not they have special18t knowledge, whereas 
programs unable to reason frOID first prinCiples, cannot. 
In Qualitative Physics a similar trend can be seen. Traditional 
methods of problem solving using numerical lIodelling are claimed to be 
inadequate when precise numerical information is mis.inS. a model cannot 
be prov1cled, or where it is apessible to specify inittal condition.. In 
Ilany realistic settings some or all of these factors slllply cannot be 
given or derived, yet in the face of such limitations human beings still 
seem able to make useful inferences about the modelled domain. In 
general, in the literature, such observations are used to argue that we 
are better advised to consider qualitative or symboliC representatIons in 
models rather than using standard quantitative modelling techniques. Two 
main thrusts are evident here. The first is grounded in the notion of 
cognitive validity, since it is argued that a qualitative representation 
better approx1Dlates the way we habitually describe and reason about the 
world, and the second appeals to more effective ways to encode and 
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process information in a computational setting then that associated with 
numerical modelling methods. 
1.3 Soae history 
The idea that AI should consider the need to impart common sense to 
programs is not new. In fact it cen be traced to the very beginnings of 
AI with lohn McCarthy's classic paper "Programs with Common Sense" 
(McCarthy 1959]. Renewed interest appeared in the form of the 
Commonsense Summer workshop [Hobbs et a1 1985], and in a collection of 
articles devoted to the formal treatment of commonsense theories of the 
world (Hobbs and Moore eds. 19851. More recently, continuing interest in 
the subject has given rise to Davis's £1990] book on the representation of 
commonsense knowledge, and the initiation and development of the 
ambitious eye project [Guba and Lenat 1990, Lenat et al 1986 and Lenat et 
al 1990] with ita central a1m of codifying and using efficient meana to 
reason with large amounts of general knowledge of the world. Hobbs 
(Hobbs et al 1985 pl-1S] (concluding on the results of the Commonsense 
Summer workshop> remained optimistic about the general enterprise of 
enCoding commonsense knowledge, but aore recently, and particularly 
following the controversy centred on Patrick Hayes' Naive Physics 
prograame [Levesque 19871, it must be said that the general view emerging 
is that the task of encoding commonsense knowledge is proving far more 
difficult than at first conceived. The difficulties encountered in the 
Cyc project [Guha and Lena\ 1990J provide further justification for this 
pOint. 
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1.3.1 Natve Physics 
An influential attempt to st1Jlulate research workers into building large 
scale formal theories that encoded commonsense knowledge appeared in 
Hayes' CHayes 1979,1985a.1985bl Naive Physics prograae. Hayes argued 
that one should concentrate upon the task of building large scale formal 
theories berore considering how such a theory might be implemented. He 
envi8aged this programme would proceed by first of all identify~ and 
then linking together various sub-theories. This would include detailed 
knowledge about the nature of e.g. objects, substances, shape, space, 
movellent and tille. 
The Naive Physics programme embodied the assumption that human 
beings rely upon a aore general (hence "naive-) view of the world than 
that found in current developed bodies of science. For example, we do 
not require knowledge of fluid dynamics in order to handle or reason 
about liquids in most everyday situations. Although in practice the 
modelling misht well encode 80me non-naive concepts at Its theoretical 
core, it was 1Ilportant that the theory reflected this assUlled body of 
knowledge garnered froll our everyday experiences. The same assumption 
applied to reasoning - -obvious" deductions were to coincide with -short 
proofs-. 
Hayes argued that a move had to be Ilade away froll the staple 
domains and sparse axiomatic theories which had dominated earlier AI 
research. In part this had been identified with a premature pressure to 
demonstrate the worth of some approach by holding aloft a working 
program. Simple domains had the virtue of helping to avoid the serious 
problem of uncontrolled inference using standard interpreters and extant 
automated theorem provers, but equally the modelling suffered. Hayes 
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argued that implementational pressures should not detract from a good 
working methodology. In its place a call was made to first of all 
concentrate upon the task of building large scale formal theories, and 
then having done this, devise algorithms or heuristics to exploit 
anticipated structures that would be naturally embedded in any rich 
formal theory of the world. 
Hayes argued that a formal theory should support a clean semantics, 
and in this respect advocated the use of f1rat order logic <F'OL) as a 
representational language. FaL also had the virtue of support~ a well 
understood proof and model theory. The model theory worked well by 
helping to shape the theory. Hayes argued that it was all too easy to 
develop a sparse axiomat1eation that supported too many unintended 
Ilodels. To over cOile this problem. alternative models were constantly 
considered. and ways suggested thellselves to constrain the intended Ilodel 
by suggesting additional axioms which when added to the theory, would 
eliminate contenders. Hayes argued that a rich theory had to be both 
broad <1.e. have enough concept tokens to cover what one needed to say) 
and dense (I.e. support enough inferential links between the formal 
expressions supported by the theory>. In practise the theory builder 
would eventually find that he or she would have enough forlla~d 
concept. to describe the chosen domain - what Hayes referred to as 
conceptual closure. Identifying this was taken as a measure of succes., 
though it was deemed unlikely that complete closure could be actually 
achieved. 
Despite the fact that Hayes' Naive Physics programme originally 
received much interest among AI researchers, few papers appeared in the 
literature based on Hayes' original contributions. Thi. trend probably 
led McDermott to the conclusion that the whole progrl!lllme <being 
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cnaracteristic of what he identified as "logicism"> was unlikely to 
succeed. The main problem according to McDerllott was the central 
assumption that deductive reasoning was deemed sufficient to model and 
reason about the dOllain. McDerllott's paper appeared at the centre of a 
Uvely forum, but the respondents seemed divided on many points [Levesque 
1987]. 
1.3.2 Qualitative Physics 
In contrast to Naive Physics, Qualitative Physics (QP) seeas to have 
generated much published material, and at the tille of writing the 8ubject 
1s still burgeoning (see e.g. Weld and De Kleer 1990, and Struss and 
Faltings 1991>. At best I can only outline its central characteriatics 
here. Later in Chapter 8 I will discuss the different approaches in more 
detail. 
Like Naive PhYSiCS, Qualitative Physics takes the physical world aa 
its domain. Its adherents a~ to provide the aeans to effectively 
represent and reason about the world that captures both the ooamonsen .. 
knowledge of the person on the street and the tacit knowledge used by 
both engineers and scientists (Forbus 1988b p2391. In contrast to the 
Naive Physics programme, QP places emphasis on how inferences are drawn 
and thus more attention is given to prograll development. The motivation 
for developing Qualitative Physics has already been sketched out abov •. 
Forbue [1988a p1981 characterises Qualitative Phyeics as ~v~ to 
do with reasoning about continuous properties via discrete ebstractions". 
Thia is preferred to the general comparison made where the tenm 
"qualitative" is associated with a non-numerical approach to modelling, 
since according to Forbus the tera "symbolic" aerves the salle purpose 
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[Forbus 1988a pl98). QP uses finite sets of d1screte symbols for 
modelling dynam1cal systems: for example, the signs "+", "0" and "-- are 
frequently used wh1ch reflect the important observaUon that important 
changes of state arise when certain s~s of phys1cal magnitude change. 
The path of a projectile travelling up, then down is a case in point, as 
ls the pred1ction of what w1ll happen if the taperatore of a liquid 
continues to rise [Forbus 1988a pI98). Qualitative Physics does not 
necessarily.seek to supplant trad1tional methods of numer1cal modell~ 
but recognises the value for combining the two in a complellentary role. 
1.,( Knowledge of the COIIIIonsenae world 
Despite the fact that the addition of cOllllonsense knowledge to prograae 
is generally regarded as an 1aportant problela that needs to be solved, it 
is notable that little work in the literature see •• to be done 
establiShing exactly what cOllaonsense consists of. Indeed g1ven the 
points discussed below, it would seell that the paucity of work 18 a 
direct consequence of this, since if anything it is difficult to eatabUah 
exactly what can or should be excluded from a program. In other words 
the theoretical underpinning remains weak fro. the fact that cOllllonaense 
knowledge 1s taken to be too inclusive. 
Research with co_onsense as the central subject Ilat tar can be split into 
two distinct but complellentary strands: lIodell1og commonsense knowledge 
and modelling COJllllonsense reasoning, although the distinction is easily 
conrlsted. For example, Forbus [Forbus 1988a p197) correctly point. out 
the somewhat loose contrasts made between comllonsense rsasoning and 
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"expert reasoning". He also criticizes the inadequate characterisation of 
commonsense reasoning with default or nonmonotonic reasoning, since such 
modes of' reasoning also appear in many areas of expertise. However, he 
himself merges the two by characterising commonsense reasoning by the 
domain it 1s applied to. In this case this is said to cover the physical, 
social and mental world [Forbus 1988a p197-1981. But here it is difficult 
to see exactly what knowledge Forbus intends to excluda 
While one can agree with Forbus that default and nonmonotonic 
reasoning is not a defining property of coauaonsense reasoning, one can 
still separate out commonsense knowledge froll the reasoning cOliponent. 
Modelling commonsense knowledge brings ontolos1cal questions to the fore. 
That 18 to say, it draws attention to the set of entities aS8umed by a 
theory which cannot be el1minated or analysed out. And, 1I0reover, by 
expressing cOllmonsense knowledge in the fora of a theory (where by 
"theory", here I mean nothing 1I0re than a set of' declarative eentenc .. 
closed under implication), we also have the means to check the sufficiency 
of the ontology and the conditions built into the theory by exaaining the 
theories' formal consequences. That everyday reasoning involve. all 
manner of inference, e.g. deduction, abduction (i.e. reasoning to the best 
explanation) and induction is beside the point if one is interested in 
cod1fy1n8 knowledge Whether that knowledge takes the form of sillple 
know how or knowing that sollething i8 the case, in either case the 
ontology muat be f!rat made clear. 
1.4.2 Quu-acterlsfDg ro •• auense knowledp 
If COlillonsense knowledge can be clearly isolated froll other bodies of 
knowledge we have of the everyday world, it must be very general in 
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nature. But exactly what that knowledge consists of seems difficult to 
state, despite 1ts seemingly obvious nature once articulated. 
For Hobbs [Hobbs and Moore 1985 pxi-xUl, and Forbus [Forbus 1988a 
p198) commonsense knowledge covers a large body of material drawn from 
the physical, psychological and social world. To illustrate the scope of 
this knowledge Hobbs uses the exmple of a robot journeying between 
buildings to get salad and a sandwich from a refectory, and asks hiDIself 
what that robot would have to know in order to carry out the task. It 
would reqUire knowledge about location, shape, motion and causality in the 
recognition of bu1ldings, offices, elevators and elevator buttons. The 
robot would need eome concept of itself (e.g. comparative notions of size) 
in order to negotiate doorway. or staircases. Outside the building it 
would encounter paths and lawns, and would need to correctly 1dentify the 
former for ease of travel and avoid difficulties arising froa 
prescriptions Il8de by humans about not travelling across the grass. 
Inside the refectory, 1t would need to !mow how to deal with flexible 
material (lettuce), and certain tools (salad tongs>, about the handling of 
liquids and viscosity (salad dressings) and the iIIportance of monetary 
transactions. 
Given a central aim of AI i8 to eventually produce programs capable 
of giving rise to flexible intelligent behaviour, the enomous scope and 
importance of effectively encoding such knowledge becomes quickly 
apparent. But equally this could be taken to indicate the sheer 
difficulty imposed by and the practical impoSSibility of succeeding in 
such a project [Hobbs in Hobbs and Moore 1985 pxlll. Unfortunately, the 
explicit identification of commonsense !mow ledge with such large body 
body of knowledge does 11ttle when 1t comes down to the actual process 
of knowing what to encode in a machine's program. In this respect it is 
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useful examining sOlie common assullptions and misconceptions to be found 
in the literaturej this at least suggests a way forward by constraining 
the subject matter. 
1.'.2.1 'lbe problea posed by f_1lJartty. 
Perhaps the most difficult problem met when trying to understand exactly 
what cOllllonsense consists of, is saply breaking through the element of 
familiarity we habitually associate with commonsense knowledge. 
Paradoxically, it is the element of familiarity itself that is the problell. 
That much cOllmonsense knowledge is falliliar, does not make it any 
the easier to develop a theory that yields a set of plausible 
consequences. As Whitehead noticed in the quote with which this thesis 
begins, the very air of familiarity about a subject frequently makes it 
very difficult to know how to proceed in the analysis. It is all too easy 
to assume that if something 1& familiar and not requiring much 
deliberation or sustained thought (typically said to be "intuitive"), that 
the subject matter or process involved is Simple in nature, or can be 
adequately characterised using everyday concepts. Marr [Marr 1982 p30) 
gives a good example of this; pointing out how the simplicity of the act 
of see~ had lIisled Gibson to vastly underate the cOllplexity of visual 
information proceas~ ataply required in order to detect physical 
invariants. The very same difficulty arises when building a theory said 
to encode commonsense knowledge, since in spite of the familiarity of the 
subject matter, it is not at all obvious what invariants extracted from 
the environment are lIost likely to be exploited, what processes act on 
theil, and how these link in with our articulated responses to the world. 
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Although it i& 1aportant to choose a good working ontology, care 1s 
needed not to assume that the ontology of some proposed theory actually 
uncovers the same set of entities 'posited by the brain' which accounts 
for us having a particular body of knowledge of the world. In this 
respect Hayes [Hayes 1985b p21 footnote] was correct to emphasize that 
while he used non-intuitive mathematical concepts in his theory of space, 
it was the match between the formal theory and the world that mattered. 
One should not reject a theory as inappropriate Simply on the grounds 
that one has difficulty has in understanding its central concepts. To do 
so is to already a88ume that whatever underlies commonsense is slaple in 
nature, but if anything the opposite is more l1kely to be true. 
A second problea characterising common sense atella from the simple 
convict1on that commonsense knOWledge can be readily identified as a 
coherent body of knowledge shared among large groups of people. 
Although one can agree with Hobbs [Hobbs and Moore 1985 px1l that any 
"reasonsbly sophisticated intelligent agent" must have a certain min1mUII 
of ·core knowledg.· to aake its way around the world, it 18 not at all 
clear what this core actually consists of. nor is it as ubiqu1tous as 
Hobbs seema to 8USSaat. Take for instance the not unreasonable 
assumpUon that commonsen •• knowledge i8 intuitive, and that anything 
that 1s considered an affront to intuition 18 thereby excluded. Han 
[Newman 1956 p1976) points out that not only does intuitive knowledge 
change with tiDe, at any ooe time it differs acr088 different groups of 
people. For example, the hypothesis that the Earth WllS spherical waa 
once considered un intuitive, but is taken as a given now. While the 
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notion of bodies having weight is commonly held, and the notion of 
1nterUa less so, this changes if one is an engineer or a physicist where 
regular use of such concepts lIIake them equally fallliliar hence intuitive. 
Indeed it i8 difficult to see how one can clearly maintain the purported 
distinction between commonsense knowledge, and that culled from the 
sciences despite the fact that this seems collllllonly believed. 
1 ..... 2.3 Letting the tara "naive" do too auch work 
There is no clear reason why we should assume that a theory of 
commonsense will be any the simpler in structure, or will require less 
work to refine than those currently used in science and philosophy. In 
this respect, Ily COlleague Ian Gent once remarked that no scientist ever 
1ntentionally starts out to build a complicated theory to account for 
some state of affaire, where a simple one would do. So why should we 
expect a naive physical theory will turn out any the silllpler and more 
tractable in practice. Despite the underlying attraction naive theories 
might hold for SOlle, it would be unreasonable to expect a noUcable 
difference in complexity between a comprehensive COlllllonaen.. theory and 
any other scientific theory. This being 80 it would be difficult slapl)' 
justifying on these grounds why a co •• onsense theory will Ilore naturally 
find itself at the core of a prograa instead of the latter. 
Unfortunately, the ubiquity of the terll "naive" in AI literature, •. g. 
"naive phYSiCS", "naive botany" and naive meteorology" [see •. g. Hobbs in 
Hobbs and Moore 1985 pxiv, and Legrenzi and Sonino 1991l does little to 
clarify exactly what "naive" covers. Some 8eelll s~ply content to 
characterise "naive" in terms of "what ordinary people know", prefixing 
the term to the name of any scientific discipline as though th:1e 
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demarcates a viable research area (Legrenzi and Sonino 1991]. If 
anything, we would be better advised to recognise the danger of muddying 
the research topic by overu.e of a term. How then should "naive" be 
characterised? Halmos [Halmos 1960) in his book 'Naive Set Theory', 
provides a simple but sufficient characterisation of the term. For 
Halmos, the term "naive" is justified by using an informal language and 
notation, but on the condition that the subject matter is formaltzable. 
For Halllos geometry is naive if it proceeds on the paper-folding kind of 
intuition alone. This use of the term "naive" agrees with Hayes' implicit 
use of the salle term and this seeas perfectly adequate. Thus a naive 
theory of comllon sense knowledge should be formaluable, but should aim 
to proceed froll some simple intuitions, for example, that bodies occupy 
space, and that no two distinct bodies can occupy the 88l1e place at the 
same twe. 
1.'.2.' To what extent should a ~ theory reflect currwlt 
bodies of scientific knowl.edp? 
There 1& sOl1e evidence (see e.g. Gentner and Stevena 1983) that a 
significant number of people tend to give Aristoteltan or at least pre-
Newtonian explanatione to account for physical events. Such observations 
have been used in AI and Cognitive Science to Ilotivate research to 
uncover and codify this class of pre-scientific beUef., with the view of 
incorporating this knowledge into progralls. However, evan assUlling a 
significant number of peoples' beliefs do indeed cohere Ilore with a pre-
Newtonian world view, there Is no reason why the commonality of such 
beliefs should be used as the basis of some knowledge base in a program. 
Belief certainly 1& a necessary condition for having knowledse, but not 
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sufficient. We would do well to make sure that our progrus actually 
embody a model that give rise to sound predictions grounded in the world. 
A program driven machine that ellbodied en archaic physics .ight be 
viewed as sharing a forll of life with us, but would require extensive 
defaults to be of general use and considered "safe", Moreover, given the 
body of scientific knowledge that has already been developed and used. it 
would be advisable to seek ways to incorporate this into our progralU 
then seek an altttrnative physics. and encode that. 
A common distinction drawn in the literature between an 
"engineering" and a "psychological" approach to knowledge acquisition lIay 
well be thought appropriate here. i.e. whether we are ailling to lIodel the 
world as described by acience, or non scienUsts' beUefs about the world, 
The idea that this distinction can be effectively maintained, and that 
psychological validity can be smply put aside for en engineering solution 
when developing a theory of co.monsense knowledge is a aistaken po8ition. 
Firstly. the lIotivation to develop e.g. Naive Physics. made en lIlpllclt 
appeal to the psychology of the human being, l.e. identifying the lacunna 
with the lack of cOllmonsense knowledge. Secondly, it 18 all too eeay to 
adopt an engineering solution when facing problems asaoc:iated with 
program. using large knowledge base. e.g. efficient retrieval of 
information, or uncontrolled inference in automated theoru proving. 
Psychological validity of a theory lIay well indicate that the assumed 
model is unwleldly, end mask the distinct posslbl1Uty that the human 
beings may well use sparse <as opposed to rich) .ental modele and exploit 
fast and shallow chains of inference when solving proble ••. 
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1.'.2.5 Do we include the paradoxical into a co.aooaense theory of the 
world? 
Another difficulty characterising commonsense knowledge is that the 
paradoxical will most cartainly be associated with falsehoods, and not 
readily incorporated into some proposed theory. But very often reflection 
on sOlie original stateaent will reveal that we were mistaken. Take for 
instance a naive theory of aotion for rolling wheels, which aight say 
that whenever a wheel rolla forward every part of that wheel will do so 
too. This is intuitive, but in fact it is not true of all rolling wheels. 
Kasner and Newaan CNeWilan 1956 p194lJ give an example where at any 
instant of tille, a railway engine never 1I0ves entirely in the direction in 
which the train pulls. The paradox arises froll the slmple fact that a 
point on the flange of a 1I0Ving railway engine wbeel traces out a curtate 
cycloid curve which !DO"" back on ltself, rather like the greek letter "('. 
In other words, a part of the wheel flange which Ue. below the top of 
the rail, will 1I0ve in the opposlte direction to the general direction 
assumed by the moving wheel. Althougb this fact is clearly unintuitiv., 
it is difficult to aee how a useful theory of aotion for rolling wheels 
could be stated without incorporating tha paradoxical. Thus, once again 
the "naive" elellent reveale complexity at ita core. Given a desiderata 
where formal naive theories should be both broad end denae, it become. 
difficult to see how unintuitive concepts and the paradoxical can, or 
indeed should be avoided. 
A common assumption underpinning much research work in AI, i. to endorse 
a posltion known in philosoph)' as SOlipsism. To endorse sol1pslB11 
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(literally 'only-oneself-ism') is to hold the view that nothing exists 
outside one's mind, or that nothing such can be known [Lacey 1976). 
In AI, solipsism appears in the tendancy to incorporate not only the 
means to reason about the world in a program, but also to want to encode 
a very rich sy.bolle model or theory of the world in that prograll too. 
In other words the prograll and the machine running it 18 taken to be a 
world unto itself. Sol1peism not only appears in the general view that 
intel~ent machines can be effectively driven by programs that have 
little or no recourse to either artificel sensory or perceptual 
mechanisms, its influence can be seen in the aotivation behind, and the 
the COllllon d1atincUon drawn in expert system literature between "deep" 
and "shallow" knowledge .entioned earlier. 
The motivation {or the distinction made between "shallow" and "deep" 
knOWledge [see e.g. Bonissone and Valavanis 1985] draws off the 8alle set 
of difficultie8 found in expert .yetea developllent di8cussed earlier. In 
this case co.piled knowledge is identified as "shallow" knowledge and 
"deep" knowledge as a complementary body of ver'l general knowledge 
associated with the problem dOllain. The term "deep· refers to the fact, 
that for us th1a knowledge i. rarely lIade explicit in our dealing. with 
the world. According to Hobbs [Hobbs and Moore 19851, the provision of 
deep knowledge in a prograa allows aachin •• to function effectively in an 
unstructured enviroruaent; and that th1e knowledge is clearly "deep", 18 
supported by the use of protocol-based questionnaires and the general 
difficulty people have in eliciting such fundamental material. But 8uch 
findings support a Simpler explanation. 
In the first case, I would argue that it is neither necesaary nor 
always desirable to posit a complex lIodel or theory to account for 
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complex behaviour. That I can consistently catch a ball does not require 
me to have Newton's laws of motion encoded in lIy physiology, and 
similarly for the progru of a machine. For example, pattern recognition, 
the detection of aotion end 'textural explosion' lIay well be sufficient 
properties extracted froa the external world to track a ball and initiate 
a successful cateb. Secondly, lIuch stated cOlDllonsense knowledge takes 
the form of rule-of-the-thumb know how, of what happens when SOIIething 
else happens, and that is all. The idea that hUllan beings must have 
complex mental aodels or large bodies of ~deep knowledge- to account for 
flexible intelligent behaviour can be identified with a fallureto 
recognise probleaa stelUlling from en uncritical acceptence of 
representational theories of mind which can be recognised underpinning 
Iluch research work in AI. 
1.5. Standing bedc eatabl1ahtng a worIdng .. tbodology 
Having estabUshed directions in which we do not want to go, how then 
should one proceed? Below I outline a working methodology. 
1.5.1 The use of '!rat ordar J.os1c. 
First order logic <FOL) 18 chosen as the representation language for the 
following reaaat.. In the first instence logic can be effectively used to 
model a domain. It is iaportent that eny proposed theory be capable of 
being expressed in a formal frallework, since without this foundation we 
have no reliable aethod to establish either the appropriateneas of a 
given ontology or the content of the theory in term. of its consequence 
class of deductions. Admittedly, certain kinde of inference associated 
with commonsense reasoning do not fall neatly into the deductive lIould, 
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but it 1& 1JIportant to stress that th1& 1s a point about modelling modes 
of reason1ng rather than modelling dOllain knowledge associated with the 
everyday world. These different aodes of reasoning actually presuppose a 
way of describing and ordering 8uch domain knowledge, and for this 
deduction seems perfectly adequate. Despite the criticism FOL receives 
from the standpoint of captur~ the variou8 modes of reasoning human 
be~8 use. it. central role in aodelling domain knowledge still remains 
very much in evidence. 
Following Hayes £1979,1985a] FOL 1& chosen for its well understood 
proof and ~el theory. FOL supports a clean semantics, a condition 
deemed essential if the formal theory is taken to describe a theory of 
the world. As Hayes [1985a] correctly points out, without a clean 
semantics we have no way to say what the foraal 1nscriptions of a theory 
actually denote or what extension a predicate has, hence no way to say 
that the formalism is a foraa11sll of anything. Non standard syntectical 
formal expreSSions, e.g. "cousins (x> = children (siblings (parents (x>))" 
CGuha and Lenat 1990], and (paradoxically> "roughly <height <Bill» = tallish" 
CHayes 1985b], require expl1cit reedings to be first given in the 
metalanguage that interpret the set of object level expressions used. 
Failure to recogniae the IIlportance of this point can easily result in a 
l1uddied analya1&. An example of this can be seen in Hobbs et a1 [1985 1-
9] where we find the assertion: "When we tlrlte an axiom of the for. 
(Vx) p (x) ::I q (x), we really IIIetm an axlOlll of the form 
(Vx) p(x) 1\ ~ab(X) :t q(X),,1 - .y ital1cs. 
An 1JIportant point raised by Hayes (and judging by the repetition one 
not fully appreciated, e.g. Hayes 1977>, is that representational languages 
can be implemented in a varlety of way.. For example a frame 
representation language <aee Minsky 1975), may well have desireable 
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retrieval operations, but this is a point about implementation and does 
not touch the question of representation. Minsky developed Frames aa an 
alternative representational languase to FOC, howeyer depite the 
popularity FralDe8 has enjoyed, Hayes U985cJ has argued quite forcibly 
that Frames offers no real increase of expressiye power nor modes of 
reasoning over that which it was assumed to replace. To criticise FOL as 
a representational language because e.g. current implementations of 
axlomatic theories incur problems of computational cost with. the com.on 
problea of generating large search spaces, smply miss88 the pOint. 
A third reason for choosing FOI.. is that the formal theory can be 
better compared with other theories. Again this is to adopt another 
recom.endation by Hayes £1985a], using FOL es a reference language into 
which other representational formalisms should be capable of being 
translated. 
FOL is also chosen from a computational standpoint. There is a well 
researched body of literature devoted to automated reasoning using FOL as 
the representational language. Thus implementing a first order theory ia 
a relatiyely stra~htforward matter, even though (a8 argued above) the 
taplementation of a theory need not be restricted to a resolution based 
automated reasoning setting, for example. Having the theory exprened in 
FOL allows for machine assisted deyelopment and testing of the theory, 
desplte the fact one may well see how to factor out information, so that 
computationally expenslve procedures in a simple resolutlon baaed 
implementation of the theory might well benefit using hybrid reaeoning or 
other less expensive techniques. <This is covered in more detail in 
Chapter 5.> 
- 21 -
Although FOL is semi-deCidable, it is preferred to h~her-order (and 
nonmonotonic) logics currently used in AI which are characteristically 
undecidable. Higher order logics gain in expressiveness, but when 
automated suffer fro. meo.plete inference strategies. This immediately 
reduces the attractiveness of using an autollated logic for theory 
development. 
A lIechanised sorted logic is actually used to describe and implement 
the general theory. The advantages of using sorted aa opposed to 
unsorted computational logics are well known in automated reasonfnS 
literature. These are only briefly mentioned here. Firstly, sorted logic. 
yield a more compact notation that their unsorted counterpart. uking the 
fOnDal theory generally easier to read [Cohn 1989a]. Secondly, given a 
theory rich in taxonoaic infonDaUon, mechanised sorted logics used to 
implement the theory tend to score in terll. of efficiency over their 
mechanised unsorted counterparts - see Cohn [1989a] for a review of 
relevant work. Froa the standpoint of developing the conceptual 
apparatus of the theory, the use of a sorted logic 1a not .... ntial, but 
the added requireaent of declaring what sorta con.tants, function. and 
predicates are defined on, sU88ests a third advantaga. Using a sorted 
logic helps to constrain one's thinking and thereby reduce the rtak of 
introducing spurious information into the developing theory [Cohn 1 989a). 
Finally, by expressing knowledge in an axiollatic framework, the 
prillitivity of certain concepts and a minimal set of axioms is made 
explicit. A formal theory sporting few prillitives and axiolls frequently 
comcides with the need for long chains of deductive inference in order 
to secure a chosen theorell. However, such austerity can extend beyond 
aesthetic satisfaction in having reduced the theory to a lIinimull set of 
conditions. For exuple the theory might be of use to a Cognitive 
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Scientist looking for a lIinimal set of entities or conditione required in 
IS particular theoretical construction of the world. An austere forllal 
theory describing, for exallple, the ways in which objects tend to be 
related 1n space, can be used to constrain and direct research for 
physical correlates of the theory in tenas of brain functioning. While 
the set of primitive concepta supported by a theory lIay not be 
necessarily encoded in perception, the sufficiency of the theory to 
generate a plausible ae~ of consequences at least suggests a fruitful 
line of enquiry. Indeed without BOlle theory to direct the research no 
method to interpret any set of data will be forthcolling. 
This ellphasis on ontological reduction within a theory is in direct 
contrast to that suggested by Hayea in the Naive Physics progr8ll1l. who 
argued for the use of a prolix ontology [Hayes 1985a), However, it lIust 
be said that Hayes' recollUllendation that a rich theory should be both 
broad and dense, _akes it very unlikely that a consistent formal theory 
using a prolix naive ontology will be forthcolling. While Hay.s i. correct 
to emphasise the theoretical importance of breadth, density and conceptual 
closure 1n a theory [Hayes 1985a p15], the dense web of inferential 
connections within any formal theory put. severe delland. on the theory 
<and theory builder!>, particularly if that theory i. to have the .cope 
which Naive Physics de_ands. 
1.5.2 The need to rep-eeent aDd exploit topo1ag1cal 1nf~tiGD. 
There is good reason to encode topological information into any theory 
used to describe the relationships between objects in spece, and 
descriptions of states and eventa in tille. In fact, lIuch inforllatton used 
in our everyday dealings with the world appears to exploit topological 
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rather than lIetrical or geoll.trical information (Barr 1964]. Saying 
whether sOllething i. inside or outside another thing, or whether some 
1l0llent is before, after, or during another period of time uses topological 
in forJla tion, certainly no (atated) aetrical or geoaetrical information. 
Geometrical and aetrical CClIlatraints faposed by the 8ize and shape of 
objects, and physical contraints, for axe.pte rigidity and the degree of 
deforaabUity, aay well be expected to appear in any rich theory of the 
world, put given the ilIportance of selecting out useful invariants in a 
changing world, there is good reason to concentrate upon a theory that 
captures topolqgical inforaation, since such properties reaain relatively 
stable over sufficiently long periods of tille. Aa with QP where the 
interpreted sfans .+., "0" and "-" have proved particularly useful in 
Ilodelling physical system .. and where changes in stans locate points 
where interestma things happen, so to with certain topological 
relationships holding between objects, as when one object is outside 
another object and then later inside that object as part of the process 
of ingestion. 
5.3 Concentrattna upon perceptual tnlaraatiOD 
Given the broad spectrull of Imowledge frequently aseoc1ated with COlUlon 
sense and the difficulty identify~ exactly what ODSmonsense covers or 
at the very least, what it should cover, it 11 useful concentrating upon 
descriptions of the world that are grounded in perception. If co •• on 
sense knowledge 1& to be sufficiently robust over t1ae and at the 
foundation of many of our belief. about the world, it 1s well to f1r8t 
consider tha prtaitive basis for such beliefs and use that in a foraal 
theory. The relationship between topological and perceptual informatlon 
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can be easily wedded together, since we have direct experience of, for 
exaaple spatial relaUonships between bodies ell bedded in space that 
exhibit vary~ degrees of connectivity. Moreover, by concentrating upon 
perceptual knowledge <in this case describing the arrangement of bodies 
in space>, it 1e easier to see how one can begfn to build a rigorous 
theory using few pr1aiUve notions, rather than seekfng to build a theory 
of the selle riSour, fncorporatfng aany hiSh level descriptions thought to 
embody commonsense noUons. 
It is to be expected that such a working .ethodology wUl naturally 
find an overlap with extent aathematical concepts and theorie.. Rather 
then avo1dfng such foundation. (because the underlying concepts are in 
meny cases non-naive), the overlap should be chupioned on at least two 
accounts. Finltly, that .. thellaUcs provides a rich source of well 
understood abstract aodele and theories that have been, and are stUl 
used with great success in describing end explaining aspects of the 
phys1cal world. And secondly, that by working with sufficiently abstract, 
and non-na1ve concepts, the ontOlogy of the theory wUI be sufficiently 
'removed' froa its interpreted correlates in the everday world, to allow 
the falliler to be broached and analysed out. 
6 Su_ary 
In summary then, I argue that the better understanding and codification 
of commonsense and commonsense knowledge must be secured if machin .. 
are to be able to share a form of 11fe with us. Earlier attempts to 
derive useful theories of collaonsense knowledge have suffered fro. a 
general lack of analysis of exactly what commonsense consists of. This 
has led either to a vague characterisation of commonsense w1th the result 
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that commonsense knowledge is readily aaaociated with a too large body of 
knowledge, or a too rtsid adherence to representational theories of the 
mind and sOlipsism. Taken together both have led to a common belief that 
a program must contain an extensive amount of this very general 
knowledge. together with the means to reason about it. 
I argue that a formal theory 18 uaeful since it htshlighta a 
particular ontolOSY. and that by using a reductionistic approach, that the 
end result can be better tested in tenas of cognitive validity. The 
concentration upon perceptual information and topological concepts is 
argued to be a fruitful approach. Given the emphasis of FOL for 
Ilodelling and theory refineaent, th:l8 does not mean that a direct 
implementation of the theory in an autollated reasoning Betting follows. 
Various ways to 1Ilpleaent a theory may be suggested, e.g. in the use of 
hybrid reason~ techniques where variOU8 parts of a theory are factored 
out and assigned to spec:1al1at procedures, or using other structures that 
have useful cOllputational properties, e.g. planar graphS. Indeed the 
worth of a theory lIlay be sillply in its demonstration of the adequacy of 
its ontology and conditions to derive a set of plausible consequences. 
In the following chapter I describe the foraal theory that 11 •• at 
the centre of this th .. :l8. The theory :l8 expr ••• ed in FOL. and 
concentrat •• upon the expllcit representation of topological information. 
The correspondence between this information and that given iIIllediately in 
perception i. developed throughout the thes1a and drawn together in 
chapter 6 where ontological and epistemological questions raised by the 
theory are discussed. 
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o.pt.. 2: The 8aaic: FOf'II8lfsa 
2.1: Introduction 
The general theory outlined below is expressed in full firat order 
predicate logic. It extends the conceptual apparatus outlined in Clarke's 
C1981,19851 calculus of individuals and uses Cohn's [1983,1987) lIany sorted 
logic LLAMA. The syntax of the general formal language is given in 
section 2.3 and the sort/type notation used in lJ..AMA in section 2.'. For 
readers unfamiliar with sorted logica, and in particular with the logic 
LLAMA, introductory lIaterial ia also given in section 2.'. This ia covered 
in 1I0re detail in Chapter 5. A complete description of IJ..AMA is given in 
Cohn [1983,1987). 
2.2: Prel1af.nartaa (for Chapter 2) 
The reader i8 assumed to be falliliar with general first order predicate 
logic. Some falliliartty with concepts drawn frail ganeral topology, and 
with parUal orders and lattices 1& also assumed, but this is fairly 
elellentary. A good introductory text to lattice theory 1& Rutherford 
(1965). Further introductory material relating lattices to sorted logics, 
and their general application in automated reasoning can be found in Cohn 
[1987,1989). 
2.3: The alphabet and syntax of the gelleral forMl Janpag& 
The expressions of the general formal language are strings (of finite 
length) of sYllbols wh1ch are classif1ed as follows: 
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1) a set of tndividual variable symbols typically denoted by the Lower case 
letters froa 'u' through to 'z' with or without numerical suffixes. 
11) a set of tndividual constant symbols [IJ typically denoted by lower 
case letters froa 'a' through to It' with or w1thout numerical suffixes. 
lii) a set of n-place function symbolS typically denoted by strings of 
lower case letters, e.g. 'sum', 'compl'. These tnclude a set of n-place 
skolelll function symbols with nUllerical suffixes, for which the letter If' 
1s reserved: i.e. 'fl, f2, fS, ... , fn'. 
lv) a set of n-pIace predicate symbols either denoted by strtnge of upper 
case letters, e.g. 'C', 'DC', 'POntr, V_INSIDE, or by str1ng8 of lower ca._ 
letters prefixed by an upper case letter, e.g. 'Open', 'AtOll'. In both cases, 
the strings may include an underscore symbol, e.g. W_INSIDE. 
v) a set of Boolean connective symbOls: .~. (not), '1\' (and), 'v' (or), 
,~, (materially implies>, ' .... ' (if and only if>. 
vi) the two quantifier symbols: 'V' (for all) and '3' (for solie). In 
addition two other related symbols are used: a lletaltnguisUc descriptive 
operator'" (the unique) [I) and the E-ahriek operator '3" (there is 
exactly one) [I). 
vU) a set of punctuation markers: paired square bracket. '[I and '1', open 
brackets '(' and I)' , and the comma ',' as a tena separator. 
viii) a set of additional aetaUnguistic aymbols: ':def.' (ia defined to be 
eqUivalent to) and '=def.' (is defined to be identical to). The former 
symbol denotes a deftned equivalence between well formed formulae, the 
latter between terma. In general. Greek letters are reaerved for 
Iletavariables. 
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DEFDlrrION: TerlJs are defined recursively as follows: 
1) an individual constant 1s a term. 
U) an individual variable is a terll. 
U1) if a is an n-place function symbol. and xl •... xn terms. then a(xl .... xn) 
is a term. 
iv) no other express10n ls a term. 
DEF1KnION: AtolJs (1.e. atollic formulae) are defined as follows: if • 18 an 
n-place predicate symbol. and xl ..... xn teras. then tCxl ..... xn) i8 an ato •. 
No other expression is an atom. 
DEFDflTION: a variable 0: occurtns in a formula • ls bound if it lies within 
the scope of a quantifier using that variable. i.e. if either 110:[.1 or 
301[,], or it lies within the scope of the 3! syabol. 1.e. 3!o:[.h otherwise 
it 1s free. 
DEFlNrrION: well-for.ed fONJulae (wffs) are defined recursively" follows: 
1) an atom ls a wff. 
11) If • is a wff then -, is a wff. 
11) If • and , are wH's. then [. v ,). r. " ,l, [ ... ,] and [. +-+ ,] are 
wff's. As is standard practice, where no danger of aab1guity arise., the 
outermost pair of brackets of a wff may be dropped. 
111> If • is a wff and 0: a free variable in ., then Ida: [.], 3a [. ) and 3to: [.] 
are wff' •. 
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DEFINITION: If , is an atoll then both, and .. , are literal.. ,is a 
positive literal and .. , a negative literal. 
DEFINrrION: a clause is e finite disjunction of literals: ttl. null clause ls 
a diSjunction of 2ero literals, a unit clause a disjunction of one literal. 
2.': A brief introduction to ~ted logics end the logic u.AMA 
In an unsorted or one-sorted logic, the universe or domain of discourse 
ranges over a single set of hOllogeneous entities. Further partitioning of 
this set is done by introducing a set of monadic predicate symbols into 
the formal language that are used to denote specific homogeneous subsets 
of domain. Further information about the relationship between theae 
subsets, e.g. whether they are disjoint, or overlap, or whether one is a 
subset of the other, 1s then expressed in the logic by incorporating the 
predicate symbols into a set of axioms which define the theory. 
Unlike an unsorted logic, a sorted or many-sorted logic takes as its 
starting point a universe of discourse that ranges over a heterogeneous 
rather than a homogeneous set of entities. The homogeneous subsets of 
th18 set are celled sorts. Sorted logics differ fro. their unsorted 
counterparts by explicitly representing this and other sortal inforllation 
embedded in the forllalised theory. In teras of the sorts, a set S of sort 
symbols are first of all specified. Each sort in the theory is then 
denoted by a unique sort symbol. In 8 ,simple sorted lo,gic such as that 
used by Enderton [Enderton 1972] the set of sort symbols smply denote a 
set of pairwise disjoint sorts, but in other sorted logics commonly used in 
AI, additional structure embedded in S also allows sorts to overlap or 
include one another. The usual technique 18 to add a binary subsort 
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symbol '~' to the formal language that iIlposes a partial ordering on pairs 
of sort symbols. The interpretation of ~ is taken to be set inclusion. 
Given the subsort relation is defined so that one sort can be a subsort of 
itself, an additional binary symbol 'e:' is added, where tl ~ 't2 and 'tl;e't2 
and where c is interpreted as proper inclusion. 
In the sorted logic ~, the sort structure takes the fora of a 
complete Boolean lattice Le. In addition to the binary subaort symbol, a 
further set ~r binary lattice theoretic operators are explicitly 
represented in the formal languagei these are the least upper bound <lub), 
greatest lower bound (glb) and compleaentation operators which are denoted 
by the symbols 'u','n' and '\' respectively. Two other symbols: 'T' (top) 
and Ii' (bottom) complete the set of lattice theoretic operators; the sort 
T is that sort of which every sort is a subsort and the sort i that sort 
which is a subsort of of every sort. The set theoretic interpretation of 
S identifies T with the universe of discourse, i with the empty set, (; 
with set inclusion, U as set union, n as set intersection, and \ as set 
negation (or relative complement), Any expression that i8 of sort .1 i& 
interpreted as "nonsense- and 18 classified as ill-sorted in the logic. 
Although LLAMA's sort structure is a complete Boolean lattice, 
typically only a rew of the nodes will be occupied by explicitly nailed 
sort symbols declared by the user. The remaining nodes of the lattice are 
n8Jlled implicitly, end are constructed and maintained internally by LLAMA's 
sort algorithm using the lattice theoretic operators on combinations of 
the named nodes. In practise, all the user of the logic needs to do, is to 
identify the set of pairwise mutually exclusive set of base sort nodes 
that provide a cover for .i, and indicate where in the sort hierarchy the 
other named sort symbols are to be found. 
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In addition to lJ..AMA's sort lattice", which encodes the subsort 
relationships between the non-logical sort symbols of the theory, another 
special Boolean sort lattice L. is also used. The L. lattice has as its 
elements the four sort symbols UU (top>, TT. fF and BE (bottom>. The 
interpretations of these sort symbols are fixed as "either true or false", 
"true". "false" and "nonsenSical" respectively. 
LLAMA uses a set of sorting functions which are defined on the set of 
constants, functions and predicates supported by the theory to separate 
out well-sorted and ill-sorted terlls and formulae. The well-sorted 
expressions of the logic are interpreted as meaningful and the ill-sorted 
elCpressions as supporting no sense, or meaningless. The declarations are 
set up as follows: 
The sort/type notatim of l.1.AJIA 
Metavariables for sort symbols are denoted here and throughout this thesis 
by the set of symbols {d ..... 'tn, tntl}. 
sort 'tl c:: ~ means sort d is a (strict) subsort of '(2. The sorting 
functions of LLAMA already referred to are declared by means of type 
declarations. Thus, type a:'t means constant symbol a is well-sorted and of 
sort 't, type a<d .... , 'tn):'tll+1 means function symbol a 1s well-sorted when 
its argument sorts are d, .... 'tn with 'tntl as the result sort, and type 
a ('tl, .... 'tn):m+1 lIeans predicate symbol a is well-sorted when defined on 
argument sorts d .... , 'tll, and where 'tn+1 is any element (except EE) of the 
spedal sort lattice ... i.e. UU. 17 or FF. 
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LLAMA differs from most sorted logics by having the quantifiers 
unsorted. The main reason for thls 18 an increase in the expressiveness 
of the ~ic by allowing functions and predicates to range over different 
combinations of argument sorts. A simple sorted logic supporting 
restricted quantification Ce.g. Enderton, 1972) requires each variable to be 
associated with a unique sort, and consequently disallows any function or 
predicate to range over several distinct argument sorts. With LLAMA 
sortal restrictions on variables are derived tDplictly from the argument 
positions of functions and predicates they occur in. Each non-logical 
symbol ls accompanied with a sorting function which describes how the 
result sort varies with the given argument sorts. This facility allows ad 
hoc polyaorph1c functions and predicates to be handled by the 10glc, i.e. 
allowing more than one argument sort declaration to be made for function 
and predlcate symbolS arising within a given formalism. This formal 
feature is in keeping with the manner in which nouns and verbs acquire 
different meanings in natural languages (usually separated out by context) 
and enables compact expressions to be made in the formal language. 
A set of sort eDvironments is associated with every wff which 
specifies the combinations of sorts on variables for which the wff 18 well 
sorted. These are calculated using the sorting functions of the consituent 
non logical symbols. 
LLAMA also allows the sort of a given term to be more general than 
the sort of the argument position where it occurs. This means wffs such 
as O(prod(a,a),a) (in the theory to be described) remain well sorted even 
though the sort of the term prod(a,a) is more general (or higher in the 
sort lattlce) than that declared by the sorting function for the predlcate 
O. This is called overlapPin8 (Cohn, 1983,1987]. 
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Each named sort symbol has a unary predicate assigned to it called a 
sort predicate (and by Cohn, a "characteristic predicate")j literals formed 
froll these predicates are correspondingly called sort literals (Cohn's 
·characteristic literals·). The name of each sort symbol is used in the 
corresponding sort literal: e.g. the sort symbol 'REGION' appears in the 
sort literal REGION (x). 
With respect to theorem proving in lLAMA, the explicit use of the 
Boolean sort lattice allows the detection and deletion of some sets of 
formulae without invoking general inference rules. Clauses with a sort 
environment evaluated as EE Cillsorted) are ~ored by the deductive 
machinery since they cannot support any interpretation in the domain, and 
are subsequently deleted in the proof run. S1Dilarl)'. clauses with an 
environment evaluated as TT <"true·) forces the whole clause to be 
tautologous: the whole clause can be deleted in the proof run since it 
cannot lead to the desired refutation. Clauses supporting a sort 
environment evaluated as FF ("false") in the proof run indicates a desired 
contradiction. This follows because the variables in the logic are 
universally quantified. Thus tbe desired refutation can sometimes be 
found by virtue of the sortal inforllation only. In general however this 
will not be found for any interesting theorem where the sort environment 
for most of the clauses in the refutation set is evaluated as W <"either 
true or false"), and requires normal inference on clauses to detect the 
contradiction. 
In general sorted logics derive their computational power over 
unsorted logics by reducing the search space generated using general 
purpose inference for an unsorted logic in several ways. The notion of 
well-sortedness partitions wH'. of an unsorted logic into those which are 
ill-sorted (and hence el1minable) and those which are well-sorted to which 
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general purpose inference can be applied. Secondly, sortal information is 
separated out and is assigned to be used by special purpose inference 
machinery which does not get processed by the more general purpose first 
order rules of inference. In practice, the siJIple expedient of partitioning 
a theory into the sort theory and that which contains more general formule 
is more likely to make inference in a theory more efficient (see e.g. 
Abrams and Frisch 1991>. Finally, sorted logics gain in terms of 
efficiency over unsorted logiCS, by exploiting sort information to allow 
partial functions to appear in the representational language used. 
2.5: Pedasog1c c:omreIlt1ona 
The following conventions have been adopted to assist the reader when 
reading the formaliam. Sortal declarations for new constants, functions 
and predicates in a definition or axiom, will immediately follow the 
definition. Since the formalism includes a large number of potential 
sorts, these will be gradually introduced as the formalism is develOped. 
In general, an indication of the range of sorts associated with terms 
embedded in axioms, theorems or lemmas cited in the text are made 
explicit. For this, the notation xl, ... xn:~ is used, meaning terms xl, ... xn 
are of sort~. For example, in the following theorem: 
(T5) 'Ixyz[ [P(x,,> " PCy,z>] ... PCx,z)] 
x,y,z:,;, where 't t {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
the variables x,y and z can be either of sort SPATIAL or PERIOD. (Strictly 
speaking, of course it is generally incorrect to talk of the sorta of 
variables, since llAMA does not sort variables explicitly. A literal may 
be well-sorted for different combinations of sorts mapped to the literals' 
individual component terms.) In the case of syntactically complex 
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theorems, or where paraphrasing better captures the intended meaning, an 
informal reading is also given, e.g. 
I:Ixyz[C(X,y,z) ~-+ ~[P(u,z) -+ C(xl u,yl u)]] 
x,y:PHYSOB, z:PERIOD, u:MOMENT, xl u,yl u:SPATIAL 
(in words: Physical objects x and 'I connect at or throughout period z, iff 
the spaces they occupy connect for every moment of z.) 
In the interest of brevity, where axioms and theorems are naturally 
grouped together in the text, and where the range of em~ded sort. 
associated with terms are invariant, these are declared globally and 
immediately follow the list given, e.g. 
(T29) I:Ixy[--EC(x,y> ....... [C<x,y> ....... O(x,y>]] 
(T30) I:Ixy[--3z[EC(z,x> -+ [P<x,y> ~-+ I:Iu[O(u,x> -+ o (u,y>]] ]] 
(T31> Vx[NTP(x,x) ......... 3y[EC(y,x>J] 
(132) Vxyz[[NTP<X,y> " C(z,x)] -+ O<z,y>] 
x,y,z,u:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
The formalism provides a formal distinction between monadic predicate 
symbols that are sort symbols, and those monadic predicate symbols that 
are not. A subset of the sort symbols embedded in 1. which 11e 
immediately above i, are the base sorts of the formalised theory. These 
base sorts correspond to a set of monadic predicates in the theory whose 
extensions are treated as pairwise disjoint sets. In contrast the 
primitive sorts of the theory correspond to the set of sort syabola which 
11e immediately below T. Sort predicate symbols are distinguished by the 
use of strings composed (with the possible addition of underscore symbols) 
entirely of upper case letters, e.g. 'REGION', and 'POINT' used in the sort 
literals REGION (x) and POINT <x>. In contrast. monadic predicate s)'llbols 
which are not sort symbols are strings composed of lower case letters 
prefixed by a single upper case letter Cagain with the possible addition 
of underscore symbols). e.g. 'Open' and 'Atom' in the literals Open (x) and 
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Atoll (x). Normally only the non-sort 1I0nadic predicate symbols are 
explicitly represented in wH's, but sort literals also appear in defining 
axioms, e.g. 
(A7) Yxy [NULL <prod (x,y» ... ~ DR (x,y>] 
x,y:'t, 't € {SPATIAL,PERIOD}, 
prod (x,y):,; U NULL, ,; E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
Normally, monadic predicates arising in an unsorted axiomatisation are 
treated as sort predicates in U..AMA, and are thereby 'absorbed' into the 
sortal machinery. However, there ere several reasons why only sOlie 
monadic predicates are treated as sort predicates in this formalism. 
Presently formulated LLAMA requires a complete Boolean lattice encoding 
the sortal relationships between the sorts embedded ,in a formal theory. 
This means any translation of an unsorted theory to its sorted counterpart 
can only be done when the sort relationships have been hitherto 
established. The formalism supports many monadic predicates, over 20 of 
which are specialisations of the sort REGION alone. However, the task of 
extracting all the potential sorts and establishing their mutual 
relationships in a complete sort lattice that could be supported by the 
formalism is a non-triVial task, and has not been done. 1b1e is discu .. ed 
further in Chapter 5. However, it should be pointed out that even given 
complete knowledge of the sort lattice, a large number of potential sorte 
supported by the forllalisa would require long listings of the sort 
declarations for the functions and predicates used. This alone would 
detract from the general readabUity of the formalislI. In view of these 
l1ain pOints, a l1inimal sort lattice using 13 named sorts (of which 9 are 
base sorts) is actually used to describe the general theory. As a final 
comment, the reader lIay be wondering why, given these difficulties, the 
formal theory has not been expressed as an unsorted theory. There are 
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three main reasons. The first is that the set of def1ning axioms become 
significantly longer, and in many cases, simply prove very difficult to 
scan and read. The second is that listed proofs become significantly 
longer with much of the proof simply serving to restrict the sorts before 
the interesting part of the theorem is addressed. Again, this is discussed 
further in section 5. Finally, by relaxing the logic to an unsorted one, 
the standard difficulty met by incorporating improper or partial functions 
into the theory reappears. 
Numbered definitions, axioms, theorems/lemaas and conjectured theorells 
are respectively indicated with the prefixes • (I) ... )', • <A ... )', • <T ... )' and 
, (C ... )'. Proofs of all the theorems are asse.bled in appendiCes S and C. 
2.6: n. <amiaaI> sort lattice 1. 
The pr1JlJitive sorts of the theory cover sets of null objects, region., 
pOints, physical objects (or bodies) and numbersj these are denoted by the 
sort symbols 'NULL', 'REGION', 'POINT', 'PHYSOS' and 'NUMBER' respectively. As 
ontological primitives of the theory, no sort 18 taken to be reducible to 
another. This is reflected in the relative position of the prillit1ve sort 
symbols in the sort lat tice where the corresponding sort symbolS are 
pairwise disjoint and immediately below T. Apart from regions (perhaps) 
and null objects, no explanation of the intended meaning of theae named 
sorts need be given. Regions are simply viewed 8S either the spaces that 
could be conceivably be occupied by a physical body <being a region of 
space), or durations of tille over which some conceivable state of affairs 
or an event could obtain or occur. The sort NULL is added for convenience 
and simply appears either to allow arbitrary Boolean combinaUoos of 
regions to be expressed as functions in the formalism, in particular where 
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two regions do not overlap and have no region as their intersection, or 
where physical objects pass out of existence. 
I shall start the analysis by concentrating upon the sort REGION. 
These regions lIlay be thought to be potentially infinite in nwaber and 
capable of any degree of overlap (or mutual penetration) with other 
regions. Depending upon the general ontology selected, regions ceo either 
be spatial: denoted by the sort symbol 'SPATIAL' or temporal. denoted by 
ttie sort sYllbol 'PERIOD'. The sorts SPATIAL and PERIOD are disjOint. 
Informally, each spatial and teaporal region coincides with a set of points 
and is contained in one of two special regions called the spaUal universe 
(denoted by the constant Us, of sort SPATIAL_UNIVERSE) and period universe 
(denoted by the constant UTI of sort PERIOD_UNIVERSE>. Spatial reglons 
which are not identical with Us are assigned to the sort 
SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE. Periods are split into 1Il0000ents (the sort. 
MOMENT) and intervals (the sort INTERVAL). Intervals are further divided 
into the period universe <described above) and those intervals that are not 
the period universe: the sort INTERVAL \PER IOD_UNIVERSE. The sort hierarchy 
described here (and declared immediately below) is illustrated in Figure 1. 
sort NUU.. c: T 
sort REGION c: T 
sort POINT c: T 
sort PHYSOB c: T 
sort NUMBER c: T 
sort SPATIAL c: REGION 
scrt PERIOD c: REGION 
scrt SPATIAL_UNIVERSE c: SPATIAL 
sort [SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE] c: SPATIAL 
scrt MOMENT c: PERIOD 
sort INTERVAL c: PERIOD 
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sort PERIOD_UNIVERSE c: INTERVAL 
sort [INTERVAL\PERIOO_UNIVERSE] c: INTERVAL 
For reasons of brevity, disjointness between sorts, e.g. 
sort [REGION n POINT] = J.. is not declared but is implicitly assumed by 
default unless otherwise inferrable. The same principle applies to 
functions and predicates e.g. type sua (POINT,POINT):J.. and 
type C(POIN7,REGION):EE, where ill-sortedness is not explicitly stated. 
The sorting functions for the sort predicates are globally defined as 
follows: 
type ~ (~):TT 
type ~(T\~):FF 
e.g. type REGION (REGION):TT 
type REGION (T\REGION):FF 
- CO -
T 
~ 
SPATIAL IIN~V AL S~U M p61u POINT 
.L 
Key: SU abbreviates SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
S\SU .. 
M .. 
PU .. 
I\PU .. 
SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
MOMENT 
PERIOD_UNIVERSE 
DNTERVAL\PERIOD_UNIVERSE 
Figure 1: The sort lattice 1. ~ftn1ns the pos1tions of the sort &,-bola in 
the sort hierarchy used in the text. 
2.7: The aereo1og1cal relaU0Il8 
The word "mereological" used above, cOlles from a Greek root meaning part. 
The theory known as mereology [Lesniewski 1927-1931) reformulated as The 
Calculus of Individuals (Leonard and Goodman 1940) makes explicit use of 
the part whole relation. In Clarke's theory, a much weaker relation of 
befn& connected with is used from which the relation of part to whole is 
defined. However, Clarke still uses the term mereologlcal when discussing 
these relations. I also follow this convention. 
In order to help guide the desired intuition needed to understand this 
formalism, I follow Clarke'S example [Clarke 1981, p.205J by prOViding 
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intuitive interpretations for a sufficient number of relations given below. 
Clarke [1981] suggests that his basic variables be construed as ranging 
over spatia-temporal regions and any points deemed to coincide with a 
region to be spatio-temporal points. However I depart slightly froll this 
by separating out that part of the formalism that can be given either a 
spatial or temporal interpretation. In most cases context will indicate 
the nature of the ontology being assumed, but unless indicated otherwise 
the reader is adVised to read these relations in the light of a purely 
spat ial reading. 
Two primitive relations are introduced: 'C (x,y)' read as 'x connects 
with y' and 'B <x,y>' read as 'x is (temporally> before y'. In terms of pOints 
incident in regions, C (x,y> holds when two regions connect; of the incident 
points contained in both regions, at least one point is shared. Similarly 
B <x,y> holds between two regions when one region is (temporally> before 
the other and no incident point 1s shared [t]. 
A set of axioms governing the meaning of these relations is given 
below: 
<Al> Vx C<X,x> 
(A2) Vxy[C<x,y> ... C<y,x>] 
(A3> Vxy['Iz[C(z,x) ~ C(z,y>] ... EQUAL<x,y>] 
(A4) Vx -B (x,x) 
(A5) Vxyz[ [B<x,y) 1\ B<y,z>] ... B<x,z>] 
(A6) Vxy[B(x,y> ... ('Izu[P(z,x) 1\ P(u,Y>] ... B(z,u)]] 
type C (SPATIAL,SPATIAL):UU [S) 
type C (PERIOD,PERlOO>:UU 
type B <PERIOD,PERlOO):UU 
C (x,y> is totally reflexive and symmetrical, B <x,y> irreflexive, 
transitive <and by implication asymmetrical>. The relations P<x,y> and 
EQUAL (x,y> which are defined in terms of the primitive relation C are dealt 
with below. 
C(x,y> covers all cases of connection between regions from external 
contact ('touching') to all instances of mutual penetration including mutual 
total overlap or identity. Figure 2 illustrates the intended meaning of 
C(x,y> with pairs of (topolo.gically> closed regions that satisfy the 
relation. 
Ff.8ure 2: Pairs of connected spatial regionS. 
A basic set of mereological relations are defined and interpreted as 
follows: 'OC(x,y)' is read as 'x 18 disconnected from y','P(x,y)' as 'x is a 
part of y', 'EQUAL<x,f)' 8S 'x 1s identical w1th f', 'PP(x,f)' 8S 'x is 8 
proper part of y', '0 (x,y)' as 'x overlaps y' and 'DR (x,y)' as 'x is discrete 
from y': 
(Dt) DC (x,y> Edef. ..c (x,f> 
(D2> P(x,y) Edef. ¥z[C(z,x) ~ C(z,y>] 
(03) EQUAL (x,y) Edef. P (x,y> 1\ P (y,x> 
(D4-) PP(x,y> Ede£. P(x,y> 1\ ~P(Ytx> 
(D5) O(x,y> Eder. 3z[P(z.x> 1\ P(z,y>] 
(DS) DR(x,y> Edef. .. O(x.y> 
(D7) PO(x,y> Edef. O(x,y> 1\ "P<X,y> 1\ "P(y,x) 
type ~ ('t,'t):UU, where 't ~ {SPATIAL,PERIOD} and ~ E {OC,P,EQUAL,PP,O,DR,PO}. 
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Excepting the equality relation: EQUAL (x,y>, the sortal declarations for 
the relations OC, P, PP, 0, DR and PO defined above are identical to those 
declared for C. It should be pointed out that although the equality 
relation is defined on regions here, EQUAL is a polymorphic predicate: the 
sortal declarations being as follows: 
type EQUAL(~,1:>:UU 
type EQUALCd.t2>:FF, where 'tl,1:2 E 5 and 'tl n 't2 ~ .J. 
DC <X,y) 1s understood to lIean that x and y share no incident point in 
common, P(x,y> when all the points incident in x ere incident in y, 
EQUALex,y> when x and y share identical pOints, and PP(x,y> when all the 
points incident in x are incident in y, but not vice versa, O(x,y> when x 
and y share a comaon interior point, DR {x,y> when either x and y share no 
incident point in cOlUDon or share a point in cOlllJllon but share no interior 
points {i.e. when x and y share only boundary points in common>, and 
PO<x,y> when x and y share a common interior point, but not that every 
point incident in x is incident in y (and vice versa>. 
The axioms imply that DC<x,y> is irreflexlve ITl> and symmetric <T2>: 
CTt> Yx ... DC (x,x> 
(T2) Yxy[OCCx,y> ... OCCy,x>] 
x,Y:'t, '( E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
P{x,y> is totally refleXive CT3>, antiBymmetric CT4> and transit1ve CT5): 
(T3) Yx P(x,x) 
(f4> Yx[ [PCx,y> 1\ PCy,x>] ... EQUAL(x,y>] 
(1'5) Yxyz[[P<X,y> 1\ P(y.z>] ~ P(x,z)], 
x,y:'t. 1: ( {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
EQUAL(x,y) totally reflexive <TS>, symmetrical <T7> and transitive <TS): 
(TS) Yx EQUAL(x,x) 
(T7) Yxy[EQUAL(x,y> ... EQUAL<y,x>] 
- « -
(T8> Ifxyz[EQUAL<X,y> 1\ EQUAL<y,z>] ..., EQUAL(x,z)}, 
x,y:'t, 't E S 
PP <X,y> irreflexive <1'9>, aSYllUletrical <T10) and transitive <Tl1>: 
(T9) Ifx ... PP(x,x) 
(TI0) \hcy[pP(x,y> ..., -PPCy,x>] 
(Tll) Ifxyz[[PP(x,y> 1\ PP(y,z>] ..., PP(X,Z)J, 
x,y:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
O(x,y> totally reflexive <T12) and symmetrical <T13): 
<TI2) lix O(x,x) 
<TI3) lixy[O<x,y> -+ O<y,x>], 
x,y:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
DR <X,y) irreflexive <T14} and symmetrical <TIS}: 
(T14) ~ -DR{x,x) 
(TI5) 'dxy[DR(x,y> ..., DR{y,x)J, 
x,y:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
and PO(x,y> irreflexive <T16> and symlletrical <T17): 
(TI6) ~ -PO<X,x) 
(Tl7) lixy(PO(x,y) -+ PO{y,x>]. 
x,,:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
Note is drawn to the fact that DC (x,y> implies DR (x,,> but not vice-
versa: two regions may be discrete yet can be disconnected or connected at 
their boundaries only. It is also worth emphasizing here that by overlap 
(and by iIIplication, connection) we are not capturing the physical relation 
of covering, neither in the case of surface contact between objects, or 
optically as in the case when one object occludes another. The intended 
meaning of overlap is one of varying degrees of mutual penetration 
between regions rll, Similarly, care is needed with the intended meaning 
given to the part/whole relaUon for BOlle nuances of 'part' do not coincide 
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with the meaning of part as captured in the formalism. In the case of an 
amoeba that engulfs a food particle, for that food to be part of the 
amoeba as dictated by the formalism, that food must assume the same 
relationship to the amoeba as the amoebal nucleus does to the whole [7]. 
If on the other hand by 'part' one construes this to mean containment, then 
additional formal machinery is required to capture this relation (covered 
in section 2.14). The important point being made here 18 that by 'part' I 
do not mean the let ter notion. 
The distinction Clarke draws between connecting and overlapping 
regions enables a set of relations to be defined that are not commonly 
associated with calculi of individuals, e.g. Eberle <1970>. 'EC(x,y>' i. read 
as 'x is externally connected with y', 'TP(x,y>' as 'x is a tangential part 
of y', NTP(x,y>' as 'x is a nontangent1a1 part of yl, TPP(x,y> read as IX is a 
tangential proper part of y' and 'NTPP (x,y>' read as IX is a nontangenUal 
proper part of y': 
(D8) EC(x,y> sdef. C(x,y> 1\ "O<x,y> 
(D9> TPCK,y> :def. P(x,y> 1\ 3z[EC(z,x) 1\ EC (z,y>] 
<DIO) NTP(x,y> sdef. P(x,y> 1\ .. 3z[EC(z,x) 1\ EC(z,y>] 
<Dll> TPP (x,y> sdef. TP (x,y> 1\ -P (y,x) 
<D12> NTPP(x,y> sdef. NTP(x,y> 1\ "P(y,x) 
type • ('t,'t}:UU, where 't E <SPATIAL,PERIOD} and • £ {EC,TP,NTP,TPP,NTPP} 
<Again, the sortal declarations for EC, TP, NTP, TPP and NTPP are identical 
to that declared for C.} EC(x,y> is understood to mean that when x and y 
share a point in comllon, they do not share any interior points, TP(x,y} 
when all the points incident in x are incident in y and som. other region 
z exists such that x, y and z share a point in common but share no 
interior points in COllllon, and NTP(x,y} when all the points incident in x 
are incident in y and no region z ex1sts sharing • cOllUlon boundary point 
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with both x and y. The intuittve semantics for the rest of the 
mereologteal relations 1s dispensed with at this point owing to the 
linguistic demand made on the reeder (and Buthor!). 
The following theorems ariae: EC (x,y) is irreflexive <T1B) and 
symmetrical <'f19): 
<T1S > ~x ... EC <x,x) 
(T19) ~xy(EC(x,y) ~ EC(y,x>1, 
x,Y:1:, 1: E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
TP(x,y) weakly reflexive [al (T20) end entisymmetric (1'21>: 
<T20) ~xy[TP(x,y> ~ TP(x,x>] 
(T2U ~xy[[TP(x,y) 1\ TP<y,x)] ~ EQUAL(x,y>], 
x,Y:1:, 1: E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
NTP (x,y> 1s anUsymmetr1c <T22) end transitive <T23): 
(T22) ~xy[NTP(x,y> 1\ NTP<y,x>] ~ EQUAL(x,y>] 
<T23) ~XY2[[NTP<x,y)" NTP<y,z>] ~ NTP(x,z>], 
x,y,z,:1:, 1: E {SPATIAL,PERlOO} 
TPP(x,y> irreflexive crU) and asymmetrical <T25): 
(T24) ~x ... TPP (x,x) 
(T25) ~xy[TPP<X,y> ~ "TPP<y,x>], 
x,Y:1:, 1: E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
and NTPP<X,y> 1rreflexlve cr26), asymmetrical <T27) and transttive <T28): 
<T26) ~x .. NTPP (x,x) 
(T27) Vxy [NTPP <x,y> ~ -NTPP<y,x>] 
(T2S) ~xY2[[NTPP(x,y) " NTPP<y,z>] -+ NTPP<X,z>] 
X,y,2:1:, 1: , {SPATIAL, PERIOD }. 
A substantial list of stipulated theorems involving Jlost of the 
defined relations defined above can be found in Clerke (1981), although 
Clarke does not concentrate upon the forme I properties of his defined 
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relations as is done here. The exceptions in the set defined so far are 
the relations PO, TPP, and NTPP which are new. Of the theorems given by 
Clarke, a few important ones are given immediately below and are briefly 
discussed immediately following: 
(T29) \fxy[~EC(x,y> ..... [C<x.y> ..... O(x,y>J] 
(T30) \fxy[~3z[EC(z,x> -. [P<x,y> .. -. Yu[O(u,x> -. O(u,y)] 11] 
(T3l> \fx[NTP(x,x> ..... ~3y[EC(y.x>] J 
(T32) \fxyz[[NTP(x,y> 1\ C(z,x>] -. O(z,y>] 
x,y,z,u:1:, 1: E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
Theorems <T29) and (T30) are aingled out by Clarke since they show the 
relationship between his and the classical calculus of individuals of 
Leonard and Goodman [1940]. With the absence of external connectedness 
in the domain Clarke's calculus collapses to the classical onei the 
relations C and 0 become indistinguishable as do DC and DR, P and NTP, PP 
and NTPP, and EQUAL and NTPI (defined below> (.]. Given the topological 
interpretation, the regions become open, which means that connection 
between regions iIlpl1es the regions overlap - i.e. if a point is shared in 
common, a region is also shared in COIIUIlon. Theorem (131) often proves 
puzzling at the first reading, but once it is understood that any region 
that 1s a nontangentlal part of itself is an open region, it become. 
apparent that boundary connection with that region CllMot be made. 
Finally with theorem <T32), once we recognise that a nontangential part of 
a region i8 part of the interior of that region, again connection of a 
region with part of the interior of a region implies regtonal overlapping. 
A set of configurations satisfying a subset of the defined relations 
(together with the relation TPI<x,y> defined below) is given in Figure 3. 
For reasons of clarity the regions depleted include their boundaries, 
although the formalism supports both open and closed regions. An 
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additional assumption adopted here is that each paired set of regions are 
deemed to be embedded in another region that acts as the externally 
connecting region z in order that the tangential relations be satisfied. 
The existence of this reglon 1s ensured by a closure operator (defined in 
section 2.9) and axiom <AS) Yx EC (cl(x),cl<compl<x») - described in section 
2.S and 2.9. 
Eight additional relations are added: 'TPHx,y)' read as 'x 1s the 
identity tangential part of y', 'NTPI(x,y)' as 'x 1s the identity 
nontangential part of y'. Every nonsymmetrical mereological relation has 
an inverse: P-l (x,y), pp-l (x,y>, rp-l (x,y), lfI'p-l (x,y), TPp-l (x,y) and 
NTPP-' (x,y>. The inverse relations are named using a standard notation, 
but it is worthwhile point~ out here that they also admit intuitive 
names e.g. p-l (x,y> could equally be characterised as 'E<y,x)' read as 'y 
extends over x' [I 0). 
<D13> TPI<x,y> :der. TP<X,y> " P<y,x) 
(D14) NTPI(x,y> :der. NTP(x,y> " P(y,x) 
(DI5) P-' (x,y) s:def. P (y,x) 
<D16) PP-' (x,y) :def. PPCy,x> 
<D17) TP-' (x,y> s:def. TP(y,x) 
<D18) N'J'p-' (x,y) sdef. NTP(y,x> 
<D19) tpp-, (x,y) :def. TPP(y,x) 
<D20) NTPP-' (x,y> :der. NTPP<y,x> 
type eC't,d:UU, where't , <SPATIAL,PERIOD) and e' {TPI,NTPI,P-l,PP-', 
rp-' ,NTP-' ,TPP-',NTPP-' } 
Relations TPICx,y) and NTPICx.y) are weakly reflexive <T55) <T56). 
symmetrlcal (1'57) <1'56) and trans1tive <T59} <T60): 
(1'33> Vxy[TPI(X,y) .. TPICx,x)] 
(1'34) Vxy[NTPICx,y) .. NTPIex,x)] 
(T35) Vxy[TPIOc.y> .. TPHy,x>] 
CT36) Vxy[NTPI<x,y> .. NTPIey,x)] 
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(T37) IIxYZ[[TPI<x,y> 1\ TPICy,z>1 -+ TPI<x,z)1 
(T38) IIxyz [[NTPICx,y> 1\ tlJ'PI<y,z) J -+ NTPI<x,z) 1. 
x,y,z:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
Figure 3 illustrates how the above set of relations can be embedded 
into a lattice, which is named Le. The weakest and most general relations 
are directly linked to T end the strongest to i which are interpreted as 
tautOlogy and contradiction respectively. Theorems that define the 
structure in lattice Lc are given in appendix C. A virtue of this calculus 
is that intuitive names for meny relations are relatively easy to find. 
The underlying significance of this point in relation to questions of 
cognitive validity of this approach to Naive Physics is dealt with in 
Chapter 6. 
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DC(x.),) ECa,),) PO"',y) TPP(x.y) NTPP(x,yJ TPP-ICx.)') NTPP-I(x,),) TPI"'.y) 
80j(;)®®®®8 ®¥"eI 
Ftaure 3: The relational lattice Lc defining tbe relatiY8 poelt1cns of the 
set of dyadic relations defined soleI), in teras of the pr1alt1ve relation 
C<x,y>. The set of configurations show peirs of closed regions that 
<excepting the relation NTPI<Xlty» satisfy the set of base relations that 
11e immediately above J.. The relation NTPI<x,y> is satisfied when x and y 
are open regions. 
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2.8 tbe Boolean part 
It has been pointed out by Leonard and Goodman (1940], Tarski [1956] and 
others that the linguistic domain of a classical calculus of individuals 
can be characterised as a Boolean a~bra with the null element removed 
[II 1. Clarke's calculus follows this pattern excepting that the distinction 
made between the relations C and 0 <and subsequent introduction of the 
relations Ee, TP and NTP missing in the classical calculus> suggests that 
the linguistic domain of hie calculus is a closure algebra with the null 
element and boundary elements relloved [Clarke 1981 p.216l. For this 
reason, Clarke refers to the set of Boolean and topological operators 
outlined in his calculus as "quasi-Boolean" and "quasi-topological-
respectively. 
Unlike Clarke, the sort NULL is introduced so that all the Boolean 
functions in the sorted logic can be made total on regions. The decision 
to depart from the traditional position (la) and actually import a new sort 
into the dOlllain functioning not unl1Jce the null individual is Justified as 
follows. In the first place although the explicit use of a sorted logic 
allows one to 'remove' some of the existential preconditions that aris. in 
many of Clarke'. theorems without introducing the sort NULL, this cannot be 
maintained for all the Boolean functions defined on regions. For example 
in Clarke'S calculus [Clarke 1981 p210) <allowing for notational changes) 
we find the theor&lll: 
Vx [3y[EQUAL (y,compl<x»] ~ -.EQUAL(y,a*>]] 
which states that the complement y of region x exists if and only if that 
region is not the universal region a*. By simply restricting the 
complement function so that it 1& well-sorted only when defined on regions 
that are not the universal region, the existential condition is not 
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required. However, sortal restrictions alone cannot deal with the fact 
that, for example, discOMected regions have a null intersection. In 
Clarke's axiomaUaation this restriction is lIlet by treating intersection 
Uke complellentation whIch requires an existential precondition to hold -
in this case that the regions overlap. But this move complicates his 
proofs. 
While it is possible to use a RusseIIian theory of descriptions 
[Russell 1905], to eU.1nate descriptive fWlctions contextually in terms of 
relations, identity and quantifiers (thereby resolving the problem of non-
existence for certain values of functions>, this solution is not adopted. 
Any ontological gain ustng the theory of descriptions, .ust be offset 
against the fact that one's notation becolles correspondingly complex, and 
with it the related question of the computational cost incurred [ .. ]. 
Instead, pure functor notation is chosen to represent descriptive 
functions. This is more compact and perspicuous than relational notation 
and is in keeping with the motivetion to use a sorted logic and reduce the 
search space during .echanised inference. But the use of functor notation 
in classical treatments of f1ret order logic requires the introduction of 
an object into the doaain that acts as the null object to cope with 
1Ilproper functions [U]. I meet this requirement by the following 
strategy. Three sorts REGION, NULL and NUll U REGION are first of all 
used as result aorts for the sorting functions declared for the set of 
improper Boolean functions; these depend upon whether the Boolean 
composition yields a region, no region, or possibly either respectively. 
(However, note that no function or predicate allows NULL as an argument 
sort, so that the sort NULL has a secondary role in relation to the sort 
REGION.) Although these sort symbols are disjoint, overlapp1n8 is used 80 
that wUs with related improper functions as argullents become well sorted, 
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e.g. the wff O(prod(a,s>,a), as do the set of definlng ax10ms that link tbe 
two sorts, 1n this case the ax1om: <A7> lhcy[NUU.<prod(x,y» +-+ DR<x,y>j. 
This dec1&ion allows functor notation to be used, the ontological 
dist1nction between the sorts REGION and NULL to be preserved, yet allows 
a def1ning axiom for NULL 1n terms of regions. A similarity of this 
solution with Scott's (1967) \ analysis 1& worth not1ngi in Scott's case 
improper descrIptions are given a value outside the domain; in th1s theory 
improper descriptions relating to regions are given a value outside the 
given sort doma1n. Ontological objections to a null object (or the sort 
null) still stand [lSl (albeit to a lesser extent), but its use is 
motivated by pragmaUc conven1ence. 
Clarke introduces analogues of most of the standard operatora 
characterised in a Boolean algebra: the universal reg10n and the sum, 
complementation and 1ntersection of regions. The un1versal region added 
as a single def1ned constant 1n Clarke's calculus (reme.bering that 1n 
Clarke'S calculus the domain is over spatio-temporal regions> splits into 
two constants in this formalism: correspond1ng to the spatial and temporal 
universe respectively. A further difference arises with with the addlt1an 
of the difference operator and the sort HUU... The function 'sum ex,y>' 1e 
read as 'the SWI of x and y', 'cOllpl<X)' as 'the co.pleaent of x', 'Uta' a8 
'the spatial universe', 'UT' as 'the period universe', 'prod (x,y>' as 'the 
product (i.e. the 1ntersection) of x and y', 'diU (x,y)' as 'the difference 
(or relative complement) between x and y'. The sort pred1cate 'NUU.Cx>' is 
read as 'x is null'. The Booleans are defined immediately following and 
then dlscusse4i 
(D21> sum(x,y) =def. 1Z[b'u[CCu,z) +-+ (C(z,x) v C(z,y>11J 
<D22> compl<x> =def. ,y[lfz[C<Z,y) +-+ -P(z,x>J] 
<023a) u. =def. 1X{\fy[C<y,x>] J 
<023b) UT =def. 1X[\fy[C(y,x>]J 
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(024) prod(x,y) =def.1Z[¥U[C<U,z) +-+ 3Y[P(V,x) 1\ P(v,y> 1\ C(u,v>]]] ["1 
(025) dUf<x,y) =def.lz[Vu[C(u,z) +-+ C(u,prodex,compl<y»)J) [u] 
<026> SPATIAL_UNIVERSECx) :def. EQUALCx,Us> 
(027) PERIOD_UNIVERSE(x) :def. EQUAL(x,uT) 
type SWI C't,'t):'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
type compI CSPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE):SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
type compl<SPATIAL_UNIVERSE):NULL (17) 
type u.:SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
type uT:PERIOD_UNIVERSE 
type prod (t,'t>:'t U NULL, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
type d1ffC'Cl,'C2kr2 U NlR.L, d = SPATIAL, 't2 :: SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UHIVERSE 
(A7) 'ncy[NULL(procl{x,y» +-+ DRex,y>] 
x,y:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD}. 
prodCx,y):t U HUU.. t E {SPATIAL,PERlOO} 
Any regton returned by the complement operator compl ex) contains all the 
points incident in the universal region .... not incident in x ['.]. Thi. 
inforaal characterisation is Justified by the following theor .. : 
<T39) Yx[-C(COllpl<X),X>} 
x,compl(x):SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UN1VERSE 
1.e. spatial region x and ita complement have no incident points in cOlDIDon. 
It may be thought (pace the discussion above) that a null region can 
equated with the null element in a Boolean algebra and that e.g. coapI Cx) 
be defined on both Us and a new constant ns Cacting as the null spatial 
region), 80 that EQUAL (compH .... >,,.>. But given the definitions for tbe 
Boolean part of the foraalism, this cannot be done without falling into an 
illJllediate contradiction: e.g. given Us defined to be that spatial region 
that connects with every spatial region in the domain, and compHu.> now 
returning the spatial region ne, then C(co.pl( .... ), .... ) follows froll the 
definition of Us. But by theorea (139) <with the sortal restriction. 
suitably weakened) -C(coapl<u.),Us) equally follows - contradiction. This 
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result not only provides a syntactic justification for declar~ the sortal 
restrictions for compleaentation as given above and making the sort. 
REGION and NULL disjoint, it also justifies the intuitive sellantics for the 
null region (were it to exist> having no incident point and hence cannot 
connect with any region. 
It should be pointed out that the above problem cannot be eli.inated 
with the removal of either Us or uT as defined constanta. Within the 
formalism arbitrary naaes can be used to generate the contradition, e.g. 
the term sum(a,compl<a» once admitted in the foraa11s. <being well-sorted) 
leads to tbe contradiction. The tena SUIl (a,cOllplCa» 1& of course identical 
to us. hence the derived contradiction - thus complex) requires the 
restrict ion. 
Definition <024> given for prod (x,y> corrects that which appears in 
Randell and Cohn [1989b) and Clarke [1981] for which counterexamples have 
been found. Axio. <A7) now replaces the def1nition for Null(x) used in 
Randell and Cohn [1989a,b,cl. The definition for prod<X,y> <024> and axioll 
(A7> link~ the sort literal NULL(x) implies that intersecting regions 
must overlap, and that regions that do not overlap have a null product. 
The character1sation of NUll. (x) as a monadic predicate designating II 
class of objects rather than a unit class, is intentionaL In the early 
development of this theory null was conceived as a constant of the dOllain 
which denoted a sinSular object that contained no incident point.. An 
early definition of null was forllulated aa follows: 
NUlL (x) :def. 3fx EQUAL<X,n) 
Vxy(EQUALCprod(x,,),n) ~ OC<x,y>] 
But problems arose when considering the product of regions satisfying the 
EC relation. Forc~ prod (x,y) to have the sortal declarations: 
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type prod {'(,'t):'t U NULL, '( ( {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
lIeant that the result sort for the product of any pair of regions 
sstisfying the EC relation would be REGION. But given the intuitive 
semantics of product in ter .. s of sets of paints, this 1s turn lIeant that a 
single point, a set of unrelated points, partial boundaries, boundaries, 
part surfaces, and surfaces could all clusify as lIleabans of the sort 
REGION. This in tum opened up a set of cOllplications. With points 
construed as regiona, and resions havtns parts, then if two objects Ee, e.g. 
EC (a,b) (sharing a point in cOlllllon) they have a part in COlllllon. But 
£C(a,b) iIIplies "'OCe,b) (by the definition of EC) and -O(a,b) implies 
"3z[P(z,s) 1\ P(z,b>J (by the definition of 0) - contradiction. 
Originally points were explicitly introduced into the ontology to meet 
the problem o{ inversion discussed in section 2.U·, and in terlls of 
prod (x,,> the result sort was consequently expanded aa follows. In this 
Case a new sort BOUNDARY (conceived to be pairwise disjoint with the sort. 
REGION, POINT and NUlL) was added: 
type prod('t,'t):'t U POINT U BOUNDARY U HULL, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
This was eventually replaced with the declaration: 
type prod ('t,'t):'t U POINT U POINT* U HULL 
PO~ covered those cases of regions whose product was simply a set of 
pointe which did not constitute a region proper, e.g a boundary or a face 
of a S80metrical figure. 
The definition for prod (x,f> now assumed this forll: 
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prod(x,y> =def. 1Z[OC(X,y)'" EQUAL(z,n) A 
EC(x,y) ... [3!u[POINT(u) A IN(u,x) A INeu,y)] v 
3vw[POINTev) A POINTCw) A -EQUAL (v,w) A 
IN(v,X) A IN(v,y> A INCw,X) A 
IN (,y)] ~-+ Po1nt*(z)] A 
'dx' [oex,y> ~ 3y'[P(y',x) A PCy',y) 1\ C (x',y')] 
Thus the product of two disconnected regions would be n (the null object), 
for two externally connected regions either a single point, a boundary or 
severa! 'unrelated' points, or a region for the overlapping case. The 
increase in the complexity of the ontology also required the introduction 
of a new relation INex,y> linking points to the formaHsm, and the addition 
of a new sort POINT declared to be pairwise disjoint with REGION. The 
latter decision to make points a distinct sort froll region countered the 
problem mentioned above raised if points are equated with regions. But 
the increase in the complexity of the ontology resulted in a proliferation 
of sorts to cover the intermediate set of entities aentioned. This cast 
doubts on the gains to be had in teras of the practical expressiveness of 
the theory and the computational overheads anticipated. Given these 
conSiderations, null was relaxed fraa its status as an individual constant 
and the ontology Simplified. The product of two regions was consequently 
defined to be null iff those regions were discrete. Thi •• sens two 
reg10ns that EC have a null product, even though on the point 
interpretation, points are shared. Discrete regions can share points in 
common, what they do not share is a region. 
The standard definition for the boundary of a region Cas a region) 
cannot be set up in this theory. The usual definition found in general 
topology, i .•. 
bound (x) =def. prod (el (x>,cl <COIDpl ex» 
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requires cl (x) (reed as 'the (topological> closure of x') Ilnd cl <compi <x» 
(read as 'the closure of the complement of x') to overlap <hence share a 
part in co •• on) - see section 2.9 for clarification of these topological 
concept.. If thia definition were sanctioned 1 .•. allowing for the overlap 
between dCx) and cICco.pl<X», the formalisBI including the ax1olll: 
(AS) Yx[EC(cl<x),cl<compl<x»») (described below) would become inconsistent. 
The proof i. trivial. Taking boundaries aa regions, then bound (x) would be 
part of cl<x), and bound (x) would also be part of Cl<COlIpl<X». But this 
implies O(cl<x),cl<compl<x»), which in turn implies ~EC (cl<x),Cl<collpl<X») -
contradiction. This leaves axioll <AS) in question. But given that this 
axioll guarantees the existence of an externally connected region for any 
non-open region; and ensures that the tangential part relations are 
satisified in the intended BOdel, its excision cannot be made. The 
addition of the axiom: <AS) Yx EC(cl(x),cl<coapl<x»), forces the following 
1Ilportant theorem.: 
(TolO) Yx PP{1nt (x),cl<x» 
croll> Yx~3y[P(y,cl<X» 1\ "'O<y,int(x»] 
<Tol2) Yxy [ ... 0 (y,int <x> ... P <y,cl<compl ex») ] 
x,y,int (x),cl<x),compl (x),cl (compl (x»: SPATIAL 
froll which one can see (by Tol2) that any reglon discrete from the interior 
of a region ia pushed out into the closure of the complement of that 
region. Thus although the interior of a reglon 1s a proper part of the 
closure of that region cr.O), there is no other proper part remaining aa 
part of the closure cr. 1 ). Thus boundaries cannot be regions. QED . 
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2.9 The topological pert 
The distinction Clarke draws between the relation C and 0 and SUbsequent 
introduction of the defined relations EC, TP and NiP enables a set of 
standard topological operators to be defined. This feature is missing in 
the claSSical calculus of indiViduals [Leonard and Goodllan 1940). A 
topological interpretation can be given for the classical calculus of 
indivduals, but it turns out that all the regions would be open ('t) and 
w1th it the loss of lIany useful relations derived froll the relation £C. 
In general topology, an open region is classified as any region that 
does not contain any of 1ts boundary points, and a closed region, one that 
does. Some regions are constructable that are neither open nor closed. 
which I nalle clopen regions. The interior of a region x is the Ilaximal 
open region y that is included in x. If region x and its interior y are 
identical, x is open. The closure of a reglon x takes the interior of x 
and includes its boundary too. If then. region x and its closure are 
identical. then x is closed. 
The functions: ,tnt (x)' read as 'the interior of x'. 'cl<x)' read as 'the 
closure of x', 'ext (x)' read as 'the exterior of x' and the predicates 
'Open<X)' read as 'x 18 open', 'Closed(x)' as 'x is closed' are defined by 
Clarke. the predicate 'Clopen (x)' read as 'x is neither open nor closed' is 
added: 
(028) tnt(x) =def. 1Y[VZ[C(z.y) ~ 3u[lfJ'P(u.x) A CU.u>]]] 
(029) cl(x) =def. ,y[Vz[C(z,y) ~ 3u[~C(u,int(compl<x») A C(Z.u)]]] 
(030) ext (x) =def. 'y['I%[C(Z,1) ~ 3u[NTP(U,COllpl<x» A C(%,u>]]] 
(031) Open lx) :def. EQUAL ltnt (x),x) 
<032> Closed (x) :def. EQUAL (cl<x).x) 
(033) Clopen (x) :def. ~Open <x) 1\ ~Closed (x) 
type int ('[):'[, '[ « {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
type ex('[):'[, ex « {cl,ext}, '[ E {SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE} 
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type Of ('t):NUU.., a £ {el,ext}, 't = SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
type Open {'t):UU, 't £ {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
type ~('t>:UU, ~ £ {Closed,Clopen}, 't E {SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE:} 
It 1& useful to bear in mind that the definitional schema: 
,<x> :der. '1)'[lIz[C(z,y>.- 3w[~<X) 1\ C(z.w>]]] 
used in these definitions (and for prod (x,y» can be informally thought of 
as taking the SUll fusion of all the regions that satisfy the metalogical 
predicate ., and lIapping the region so formed to region ,ex>. It is also 
useful to realise that the following wff's: 
Ifxy[C(y,tnt (x> ~ 3zlNTP(z,x> 1\ C<y,z>j J 
\fx[P(tntcx),x) 1\ \tf[NTPCy,x) ~ PCy,1nt (x)]J 
are in actual fact fonaally equivalent. A little reflection on this can 
help in the understanding of these particular definitions. 
Informally, the (topological> interior of 8 region x coincides with the 
set of points incident in x which are not incident in the boundary of x, 
while the elosure of region x includes that set of boundary points. The 
exterior of a region x comprises the set of points that coincide with the 
complement of the closure of x. Note that the exterior of a region is not 
necessarily ident1cal to the complement of a region: the exterior of a 
region 1& always open, while the complement of a region x can be either 
open or closed depending on whether x itself is respectively closed or 
open. 
As discussed in the last section, this formalism does not support a 
boundary region. However it must be remembered that regions still have 
boundaries; what is denied is an explicit characterisation of them within 
the (ormalism, hence their existence can only be inferred lIIplicity frail 
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the role they play in the intuitive semantics used to interpret the formal 
theory. 
Within this formalism the predicates Open, Closed and Clopen are 
exhaustive and pairwise disjoint. This is forced by the addition of the 
following axiom: 
<A8) 'Ix [EC(cl<x),cl<compl <x»]. 
x,cICx>,coapl(x),c!CcOllplCx»:SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNlVERSE 
<T43) 'Ix [Open <x) v Closed<x) v Clopen(x>] 
<T 44) 'Ix [Open (x) ~ -CI06ed (x)] 
<T45) 'Ix[ClosecHx) ~ ~Clopen<x)] 
<T 46 ) 'Ix [Open ex) ~ ~Clopen (x) ) 
(T47) 'lx3y [EC (clCx>,y» 
x,y,cI (x),compl (x),el <compl (x»:SPATIAL \sPATIAL_IJUVERSE 
Intultively one can think of ax loa <AB> expressing the fact that every 
region is embedded and completely surrounded by another region, both of 
which make up the whole of space, rather like a fish in an aquarium 
surrounded by water. 
In general topology both the topological space X and the null .et • 
are defined to be both open and closed. However in this formalism the 
universal regions u. and UT are open only, while the sort NUU. Is false 
defined on the sort REGION, e.g.: 
<T4-a ) Open <Ue) 
u.: SPATIAL_UN IVERSE. 
While open regions have no regions that are in external contact with them; 
in contrast, closed or clopen reglons do: 
<T49) 'Ix[Open<x) ~~ ~3y[EC(y,x>JJ 
x,y:'(, 't £ {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
<T50) 'Ix [Closed (x> ~ 3y[EC(y,x)]] 
x:SPATIAL\SPATlAL_UNIVERSE, y:SPATlAL 
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(T51> ~[Clopen(x> .. 3y[EC(y,x>JJ 
x:SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, y:SPATIAL 
In Clarke £1981 p.213, and 1985 note 4 p74l we find the following axioll: 
Vx[3y[NTP(y,x) 1\ Yzu[ [[C(z,x) .. O<z,x)] f\ [C(u,x) .. o(u,x>)) .. 
'Iv [C (v,prod (x,y» .... 0 (z,prod ex,y»] J 
The first conjunct ensures every region has a nontangential part Gand 
hence has an interior>, the second that the product of two open regions i. 
open [lel. I add this -axio.: 
<1.9) Yx(3y(NTPCy,x) f\ Yzu(([C(z,x) .... O(z,x)] f\ [ecu,x) .... OCu,y>J] .. 
Yv[C(v,prodCx,y» .. O(z,prod(x,y>] 
e1ther x,y,z,u,v:SPATIAL, prod (x,y): SPATIAL U NULL, or 
x,y.z,u,v:PERIOO. prod (x.y>:PERIOD U NULL 
Separated and Conneded regions are definable in the formalisll. Clarke 
introduces the relation 'SEPARATED Cx.y>' read as 'x 1s separated fro. y' and 
the pred1cate 'ConnectedCx)' read as 'x 18 connected'. The predicate 
'Disconnected (x)' as 'x is disconnected' is new: 
(034) SEPARATED(x,y> =def. "C(clCx),y> f\ "CCK,cl<y» 
(035) Connected CK> =<fef. "3yz [EQUAL (SUII (y,z>,x> f\ Separated (y.Z)] 
(036) Disconnected (x>= def. ..Connected Cx) 
type SEPARATED ('t,'t):UU, 't '" SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
type Connected <SPATIAL):UU 
type Disconnected ('t>:UU, 't = SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
A region 18 connected 1f it cannot be divided into two exhaustive 
separated parts. This f~ature of the foraalisa illustrates that regions do 
not have to be construed as continuou8 or connected in the topological 
sense - although this has been ~plic1tly BSBU.ed in the exallpl.. used to 
illustrate the meaning of the relations and functions. While the classical 
calculus of individuals equally allows for scattered and continuous 
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individuals, Clarke's calculus defines these properties in relation to a 
topology. 
The classical calculus of individuals has been used in the formal 
treatment of mass term extensions, e.g. by Moravcs1k (discussed in 
Pelletier 1974). Mass teras e.g. 'water' and 'flour' <relating to stuffs) 
unlike count teras e.g. 'cup' and 'cootainer' <relating to things) are often 
said to divide their reference. Mereology comes in by sanctioning 
indiViduals that may be discontinuous, e.g. all bodies of water e.g. drope, 
puddles, pools, lakes and eo on are regarded as part of one watery 
individual. The possibility of using both continuous and discontinuous 
regions as the basis for aodell1ng 8tuffs as well as things, raises several 
questions concerning the individuation of such objects and the adequacy of 
a formal semantics describing them. The issues involved are complex and 
are 8ubsequently relegated to Chapter 6. However it i8 worth pointing out 
that there i8 no apriori reason why individuals must be continuous. 
One other topological concept i8 introduced and then defined - that of 
a quasi-manifold. A manifold proper (in 3-space) is a connected surface 
such that for each point incident in the surface, all the pointe 
sufficiently near to the indexed point form a set topologically equivalent 
to an open disk. The definition ensures that any region that has point 
connected parts is not a manifold, e.g. in the case where two cones share a 
common vertex point, and where the two cones are regarded as a single 
object. A quasi-manifold i8 defined as a region that has a connected 
interior, remembering that a quasi-manifold need not be a manifold. 
'Manifold (x)' read as 'x is a (quasi-) manifold' is defined as follows: 
(037) Manifold <x) :def. Connected (int (x» 
type Manifold <SPATIAL):UU 
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Suppose then, that two regiona externally connect. The definition of a 
quasi-manifold if true for that conflguration, ensures that the composite 
region must be at leaat edge connected <in 2-space) or share a 'fused' 
surface (in 3-space). 
In Randell and Cohn [1989b,c] a set of functions are defined that take 
the Boolean complementation and difference operators and map these to 
their respective closure. This i. not reproduced herej instead 
composition of functions is used, e.g. cl (compl (x» as the closure of the 
complement of x. 
2.10 Ala.. 
An atoll :la a region that haa no proper part.: the only part an atom haa ia 
itself. Every region cootains an atoa: 
<D38) AtOl8(x) :der. Yy[P(y,x) ~ EQUAL(y,x)] 
type Atom (t):UU, t E (SPATIAL.PERIOD} 
<AIO) ~(Atom(y) " P(y,x)] 
x,Y:'t, 't r {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
Neither the classical calculus of individuals nor Clark.'s calculus contain 
atomic individuals. But atOilic calculi of individuals do exist, e.g. Eberle 
[1970] . 
If atoll. are denied an interior they can either be disconnected, 
externally cOMect or be identicaL If as has been done, int (x) I. defined 
on atoms, and atolls thereby allowed to have an interior, they become open 
regions. Pa1ra of atolls are either disconnected, or connected and 
identical: 
<1'52) IIx[Atoll(x) ~ Open (x)] 
x:'t, 't ( {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
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<1'53) Vxy[[Atollex> 1\ Atolley> 1\ Cex,y>1 ... EQUAL(x,y>1 
x:'t, 't € {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
The following additional theorems concerning atoms are provable: 
<1'54) Yxy[[Atoa(x) 1\ P<x,y)] ... NTP(x,y>1 
x,Y:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
(in words: every atomic part of a region is a nontangenUal part) 
<1'55) Vxy[OCx,y) ..... 3z[Atoll<Z} 1\ P(z,x) 1\ P(z,y>]] 
x,y,z:'t, 't € {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
ein words: regions overlap if and only if an atom is shared in cOlllDon) 
(1'56) \'xyz[cez,1nt<x> ..... 3u(Atom(u) 1\ P(u,x) 1\ C(u,z»] 
x,y,z,u,int (x>:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
<in words: a region z i. connected with the interior of a region x if and 
only if z connect. with an atom of x> 
(1'57) Yxy[EQUALex,y> ... ¥z[Atoaez) ... [pez,x> ...... pez,y>]]] 
x,y.z:'t. 't • {SPATIAL,PERlOO) 
(in words: regions are 1dentical only if they have the same ataas as 
parts.) [II) 
Defin~ interiors over atoms produces an interesting deductive result. 
for although two regions lIay externally connect, none of their constituent 
atoms externally connect: 
(C58) Vxy[EC(x.y> ... Vzu[[Atoa(z) 1\ Atolleu) 1\ P(z,x) 1\ P(u,y>] ... ~EC(z,u>JJ 
x,y,z,U!'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD} 
This forllal result cast. SOli. light an the naive conundrum of how if 
(phys1cal> atoms are construed as points with fields (topologically open?>, 
and atolls make up objects, how is that objects cOllprised of these atOll. 
touch? A similar conundruJI arises when physical objects are simply 
construed as sets of point. without a topological structure defined on 
them. The formalism supporting open atoms illustrates what may be seen 
as an fnfoMlllll fallacy at work, namely the fallacy of composition. This is 
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the mistake to assulle that all the properties of parts of a whole must 
belong to that whole. 
2.11 Cloaures 01 .ta.a. 
The closure of an atoll 18 a closed atoll. 'C_Atom (x)' is read as 'x 1s a 
closed atoa': 
<D39) C_Atoll(x> :def. 3y[Atoa<y> 1\ EQUAL<cl<),>,x» 
type C_Atoll <SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE):UU 
Closed atoms are not atoll. ~ the way closed regions are regions. Atoms 
are open regions but their closures are not. Care is needed that the 
linguistic readtns assigned to 'C_Atoll (x)' does not mislead one ~to 
thinking otherwise. 
Closed atolls and atoms cannot partially overlap, although closed atoms 
unlike atoa. can externally connect. If two closed atoms overlap they 
become identical: 
<C59> Yxy[[C_Atoe(x> 1\ C_Atoll<y>] ... [ocex.y> v EC<x.y> v EQUAL<x,y>J] 
<T6O> Yxy([C_Atom(x> 1\ C_Atoll<y> 1\ o<x.y)] ~ EQUAL(x.y>] 
x,)':'t, 't = SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
AtOllS and their closures are .. ployed in definitions that pick out 
'surfaces' of non-atomic regions. This is covered in section 2.18. 
2.12 Proper regions end atOll etr1Dgs 
Intuitively, a proper region is any region x that consists of a cluster of 
atolls that coapletely pack around a nuclear one, all of which are part of 
x. This is defined fO".811)' 8S a region x that has some atoJl y as part 
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such that the closure of y is not connected to the closure of the 
compleaent of x. 'Proper _Res ion <x}' is read as 'x is a proper regton': 
(040) Proper_Resion<x) :def. 3y[Ato .. <y) 1\ P<y,K) 1\ ~C(cl<y),cl<compl<x»)] 
type Proper _Region <SPATIAL):UU 
Proper resions exclude regtons that are atomic, or are composed of 
strings of atoms, although a proper region can have strings of atom. that 
extend out from the main body of the region. Strings of atoms <or atom 
strings) are defined as follows, 'String <x)' is read as 'x is a string of 
atolls': 
<D41> StrinS<x) :def. 3yz(Atom<y) 1\ Atom(z) " 
P <y,x) " P (z,x) " ~EqU81<y,Z} 1\ 
"U [pp (u,x) ~ C <cl(u),cHcompl<x»)] J 
type Strlog <SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE):UU 
Atom strings are composed of at least two atoms whose closures are 
connected. Isolated atOlls are not the limiting case of an atom string. 
2.13 Pomta 
Some modelled domains do not require points to be explicitly represented. 
However it ia instructive to provisionally include polota 10 tha genaral 
ontology in order to see what advantages and disadvantagea arise with 
their introduction. 
Clarke [1985] identifies three common methods by which points are 
defined: nesting definitions <identifying points with 11mitinS case. of set. 
of nested individuals), algebraic definitions <e.g. the use of Boolean rings 
or distributive lattices> and atomic definltlona which take basic 
individuals and dafines points aa atollic parts, 1.e. individuals having only 
themselves as parts. Clarke actually adopts the second option but he 
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expands his ontology to include the explicit representation of sets of 
regions as well as indivldual reglons to construct hls definition. 
Of the three common aethods clted above, we can lmmediately exclude 
the notion of identifying points with atomlc reglons 10 this theory. The 
proof is straightforward. Atoms are defined as regions that have no parts 
other than theaselves, i.e. they have no proper parts. But given the role 
of pOints in providing the intuitive semantics for the defined relations, 
if atoms are identlfied with points, two externally connecting regions x 
and y sharing a boundary point in common must share an atom in common. 
But since atolls are regions, a region is shared between x and y; which 
given the definition for part entails the regions overlap. But this 
lmmediately introduces a contradiction, for externally connecttng regions 
do not overlap <by definition). Were the quantifiers to range over open 
regions only, the difficulty cited would d1aaolve in part. Open regions 
that connect, overlap and overlapping regions share an atoll in COlillon. 
Thus far so good. The forllal result lIeshes with the intuitive seaantic8 
provided by the model. But now points becolle open regions and as such 
f 
have interiors. This is a less agreeable result given that the primitivity 
typically associated with the concept of a point requires it to have 
pOSitional qualities only. That aside this move cannot be sanctioned. 
Restricting the domain to open regions only only serves to collapae 
Clarke's calculus to the traditional calculus of individuals, and in so 
doing one immediately looses the advantage gained by using the weaker 
relation C. 
An alternative lIethod of introducing points can be done by aaking 
pOints a primitive ontological category in the theory - which is in fact 
done with the introduction of the sort POINT. Following Clarke, points are 
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linked to regions by introducing a new relation of incidence: 'm (x,y)' read 
as 'x i8 incident 10 y' as follows: 
type IN (POINT,'t):UU, 't E {SPATIAL,PERlOO} 
The following axiolls are needed: 
<All) Yxy[c<x,y> +-+ 3z[IH<z,x> " IN(z,y>)] 
x,y:'t, 't € {SPATIAL,PERlOO}, z:POINT 
<in words: two regions connect if and only if they share an incident 
polot.> 
and, 
(A12> Yxy[PCx,y> -+ Yz[lH(z,x) -+ IN(z,y>}] 
x,Y:'t, 't ( <SPATIAL,PERlOO}, z:POINT 
(in words: region x is part of region y only 1£ every point incident in x 
Is incident in y> 
Added to the eztent foraal1sll, the following theorell. ari •• : 
(T61) Yx3y[IH(y,x)] 
x:'t, 't E {SPATIAL.PERIOD}, y:POINT 
(in words: every region has an incident point> 
<162) Yxy(OC(x,y> +-+ -3z[m(z,x> " lH(Z,y>]] 
x.y:'t. 't € {SPATIAL,PERIOD}. z:POINT 
<in words: reg ton. x and yare disconnected if and only if they share no 
incident point in COllmon) 
(T63> Yxy[O(x,y> +-+ 3z[INCz,1nt<x» " IN(z,int<y»]] 
x,Y:'t, 't E {SPAT IAL,PER IOD }. z:POINT 
(in words: regions x and y overlap 1(( their exists an interior point 
shared 10 cOlDllon.) 
<T64} Yxy(P(x,y> +-+ Yz(INCz,x) -+ IN (z,y» ) 
x,Y:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD}, z:POINT 
(in words: region x is a part of region 'I if and only if every point in x 
Is a point of y> 
(T65) Vxy[Yz[lN(z,x> +-+ INCz,y>] +-+ EQUAL(x,y>] 
x,Y:'t, 't € {SPATIAL,PERIOD}, z:POINT 
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(in words: regions x and yare identical :if and only 1£ every point 
incident in x is incident in y and vice versa.) 
(C66> 'Ixy(EC(x,y> ~ 3z(IN(z,x) " IN(z,y>] " 
... 3u(IN (u,int (x» " !N(u,tnt (y»]] 
x,Y:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,PERIOD}, z,u:PODff 
(in words: regions x and y externally connect if and only if they share an 
incident point in cOlllDon but share no inter10r point in co_on.) 
The reader is invited to confirm that the above theoreas mirror the 
intuitive _emantics used to interpret the aereological relations. 
2.14 'Ibe surrowMl relations 
The surround relations are motivated as follows. If one considers the set 
of configurations depicted in Figure 3 for the proper pert relations aa 
nested circles and not diacs, they could be filled and then described in at 
least two ways. In the first case the inner circle could be filled to lIake 
a region, and then the other circle filled so as to make the inner a part 
of the outer. But equally the outer annulus or 'crescent' could be filled 
so that the inner is surrounded by the other. The latter case depict. the 
surround relation where neither 1& a pert of the other - see Figure 4. 
This dist1nction is characterised between tbe relation of the nucleus of an 
amoeba to the whole organism, and the relation between the alloeba and 
some perticle of food it has just enveloped. 
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Figure 4-: Surround enalogues of the proper part relations 
Because some notion of containment is being considered here, it seems 
possible to define a surround analogue of the relation NTPP (x,y), since 
clearly the relation between x and y is asymmetrical in the intended model. 
However the same cannot be said for the surround analogue of the relation 
TPP (x,y), which using the mereological relations only, is impossible to 
define so that only intended models are allowed. Given no metric or 'size' 
is being assumed here, the relation TPP (x,y) is satisfied by all the 
configurations depicted in Figure 5j from which it should be apparent that 
either region can be the surround of the other. 
Figure 5: Configurations satisfying the relation TPP(x,y). In each case 
region y represents the whole figure and x the proper part. 
There are several strategies that can be used to curtail the problem 
posed by inversion. The first makes use of points. In this case the 
degree of boundary connection between the surrounded and surrounding 
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region is restricted to a single point. Then, having defined this relation 
a stronger relation for the TPP <x.y> relation is defined - again 
restr1ct f.ng the tangential connection to a s1n8le pOint. Thus we get two 
relations such that one is the clear surround analogue of the other. This 
strategy was made use of in Randell and Cohn [1989b] and is repeated 
below: 'NTS<X,y>' is read as 'x is the nontangenttal surround of "I', 
'TPPp(x,y>' read a. 'x is a boundary point connected tangential proper part 
of y' and 'TSp (x,y>' read aa 'x 1a tangentially surrounded by y Cat a 
poinU': 
<D42) NTS <x,y> sdef. 3% [NTPP Cx,z) " EQUAL <y,prod Ccl<compl<x»,z»] 
<D43) TS<X,y) :def. 3z[TPP<X,z) " EQUALCy,prodCcl<compl<X»,z»] 
(D44) TPPP(x.y> :def. PP(x,"I> " 3z[ECCz.x) " EC(z,y>] 1\ 
3Iu[INCu,x> " INCu,y> " IN(u,z»)) 
(D45) TSpCx,y> sdef. 3z[TPPCx,z> " EQUALCy,prodCclCcollpl<x»,z» 1\ 
3fu[INCu,x> 1\ INCu,y> 1\ IN(u,z)JJ 
type ~ ('t,'t):UU, 't = SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, • E {NTS,TS,TPPP,TSp} 
In Randell end Cohn Cl989cJ points ceased to be explicitly represented 
in the forae1i8lllj this resulted in a corresponding change in the above 
definitions. The role of points were replaced with atoms. Here an 
1aplic1t notion of 'size' appeared in the intended model, 1. •. equating 
spatial atoas with the spaces assumed by physical atoas. Without this 
restriction (and with no explicit use of a metric> atoa. can of course 
assume any size, and the problem of inversion simply reappeera. The 
readings of the set of relations given below are not given but should be 
readily understood: 
(D46) rPPaex,y) :def. PPCx,y) " 3z[[ECCz,x> " ECCz,y>] 1\ 
3hJ[C_.UoIlCu) 1\ P(u,x) 1\ 
P(u,y) " EC(u,z>]J 
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(047) TSa (x,y) 5def. 3z [TPP (x,z) 1\ EQUAL (y,prod (cl (compl<x»,z) /\ 
3!u[C_Atom(u) 1\ P(u,x) 1\ P(u,y> 1\ EC(u,z)] J 
type e('t,'t):UU, 't = SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, e E {TPPa,TSa} 
Whatever way one aay wish to defined these relations, a correspondence is 
set up between the proper part relations and their surround duals. This 
enables a rewrite rule to be used so that dual descriptions can be given 
for a given model - either in terms of proper part to whole, or one region 
being surrounded by another. The use of this feature is discussed in 
secUon 5.2 where two alternative descriptions of a lIodel are given. 
2.15: Inside and outa1de 
We often talk about objects being inside or outside other objects, e.g. 
water might be said to be inside a cup or a dangerous anillal put inside a 
cage with U8 outs1de it! These relations occur 80 frequently in everyday 
discourse, that it would seem very desirable to include them in any theory 
that aills to capture fundamental properties of space. 
Despite their intuitive lIeanings, the relations of betng inside and 
outside are difficult to define. One difficulty is that the function of 
certain objects have a clear bearing on what is then characterised as an 
objects inside or outside - see Figure 6. 
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inside or x 
Figure 6: Probleaa characterising the inaide of an otiject. Here for 
example, the inside of container x with respect to ball y can be seen to 
vary according to its orientation in space. 
Despite such difficulties, we can begin to characterise the inside or 
outside of an object, or one object being inside or outside another by 
introducing and using the concept of a convex hull (or convex cover). 
Intuitively, the convex hull of a body describes the region of space 
that is generated by completely enclosing that body in a taught 'cling 
f11m' membrane. In 2-space this would be akin to isolating that region of 
space described by a rubber band stretched to fit around some given 
figure. Formally, the convex hull is usually defined to be the smallest 
convex set of points that encloses a given set of points [Ill. 
Although the convex hull can be applied to a heterogeneous set of 
pOints, or (using the ontology of regions) a set of regions, the function 
is actually restricted in this theory to individual connected ("one piece") 
regions. An object x is then said to be inside object y iff x and yare 
discrete and x 1s part of the convex hull of y. Conversely, object x is 
outside object y iff x and the convex hull of y are discrete. The function 
'conv(x)' is read as 'the convex hull of x', 'INSIDEex,y>' as 'x is inside y', 
and 'OUTSIDE (x,y>' as 'x is outside y': 
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(048) INSIDE<X,y> :Edef. P(x,conv(y» 1\ DR(x,y) [as] 
(049) OlFl'SIDE(x,y> :Edef. DR(x,conv(y» [U] 
type INSIDE ('tl,'t1>:UU 
type OUTSIDE (tt, 't 1>:UU 
type conv('tl>:'tl 
type cony ('(2 ):NULL 
where: 1:1 = SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, "C2 = SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
Using these definitions, other specialisations can be defined which capture 
the notion of one region either being wholly outside another, or partly 
inside, or being just inside or wholly inside. 'W_OUTSIDE(x,y)' is read as 
'x is wholly outside y', 'J_ourSIDEClC,y)' read as 'x is just outside y', 
'P _INSIDE (x,y)' as 'x is partially inside y', 'J_INSIDE<x,y)' as 'x is just 
inside y' and 'W_INSIDE(x,y)' as "X is wholly inside y': 
<050> W_OUTSIDE(x,y) :def. OC(x,con(y» 
<051> I_OUTSIDEClC,y> :Edef. EC(x,conv(y» 
(052) P_INSIDE(x,y) :Edef. POClC.con(y» 1\ DRClC,y> [II] 
(053) I_INS1DEClC.y> :der. INSIDE (x,y> 1\ TP(x,conv (y» 
<054> W_INSIDEClC,y> :def. INSIDEClC,y> 1\ N1'P(x,conv(y» 
type t('t,"C):UU, 't € {SPATIAL\sPATIAL_UNIVERSE}, 
t € {W_Ol1l'SlDE,I_OUTSIDE,P _INS1DE,J'_INSIDE,W_INSIDE} 
Figure 7 below depicts pairs of spatial regions that satisfy this set of 
defined relations together with a partial lattice that indicates how the 
defined relations would be embedded in a larger relational lattice that 
would also include the set of relations embedded in lattice I.e (compare 
with Figure 3). 
Although omitted here, further specialisations of all these defined 
relations (with the exception of W_OUTSIDE> can be constructed. For 
example, given that regions x and y are discrete, x and y Can either 
externally connect or be disconnected. Also omitted are the set of inverse 
relations, and the additional relations that are generated when the set is 
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embedded in a relational lattice as was done for the set of relations 
defined solely in terms of the primitive relation C. 
W _OUTSIDECx.yJ J_OOTSIDECx.y' P JNSIDECx.yJ JJNSIDECx.y) W _INSlDE(x.yJ 
@0~0@@@ 
Figure 7: Partial lattice for the :inside and outside relations. The set of 
configuratIons satIsfy the set of base relations that lie immediately above 
.1. The dot ted lines indicate the extent of the convex hull in each ca ••. 
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As suggested above, in addition to relations, the concept of being 
inside and outside also appear as descriptions, Le. when one talks about 
the inside or outside of a particular object. These appear as functions in 
this theory: 'inside (x)' and outside (x)' are read as 'the inside of x' and 
'the outside of x' respectively. The definitions are as follows: 
(055) inside(x) =def. ,y[liz[C(z,y) f-~ 3w(INSIDE(w,x) 1\ C(z,w»)JJ 
(056) outside(K) =def. 'y[ltz[C(z ,y) E-~ 3w(OUTSIDE(w,x) 1\ C(z,w>]]) 
type inside (tD:t1 U NULL, 
type inside (t2 ):NULL 
type outside('tl):'tl 
type outside ('t2):NULL 
where: 't1 = SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, 't2 
outslde(xl iosfde(x) 
Figure 8: The inside and outside of 8 region 
As the convex hull function is primitive, it needs to be axiomatised. 
However, before this is done, some other axioms and definitions are given 
'Convex (x)' is read as 'x is convex' : 
(057) Convex (x) :def. EQUAL (conv (x),x) 
type Convex (SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE):UU 
(A13) IIx (Convex (x> ~ ConnectedCx )] 
(A14) IIxy[C(x,y) ~ C(x,conv(y») 
(A15) IIxyz[[P(x,conv(y» 1\ P (y,conv(z»] ~ p(x,conv(z»] 
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(Al6) ~XY[P(x,conv(y» /I. P(y,conv<x»] ~ O(x,y>] 
(Al7) Yx EQUAL (conv{x>,conv (conv (x») 
x,y,z:SPATIAL 
The axioms imply that OOIDE(x,y) 1s irreflexive <T67), asymmetric <T68) and 
(with the condition that all the objects are pairwise discrete) transitive 
<T67) Yx -DrSIDE(x,x> 
<T68) ~ [INSIDE (x,y> ~ -INSIDE(y,x>] 
(T69) ~z[[DR<X,y> /I. DR<y,z) /I. DR(x,z) /I. INSIDE{x,y> " INSIDE(y,z>] ~ 
INSIDE {x,z>] 
x,y,z:SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
while OUTSIDE (x,y> is irreflexive <T70): 
(T70) ~x -OlTJ'SIDE(x,x) 
x: SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
The following sample set of theorems are provable: 
<T71J Vxy[INSlDE(x,y) 4-+ [LINSIDE<x,y> v W_INSIDE(x,y>J 
(T72) Vxy[otrrSIDE{x,y> 4-+ [J_OUTSIDEex,y> v W_OO1'SIDE<X,y>] 
(T73) Yxy[INSIDE(x,y> ~ -oorSIDE(x,y>] 
<T74> Yxy [INSIDE (x, y) ... - P _INSIDE <X, y] 
<T75) Yxy[IHSIDEex,y>'" P(x,ins1de<y»J 
(T76) ~xy [OlTJ'SIDE(x,y> ~ P<x,outs1de(y»] 
(T77) Yx P(x,conv(x» 
x.y,inside(y>, outside (y),conv (x): SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
2.16: eoo.ex1ty and concarity 
A figure in 2-space is called convex if it wholly contains the line 
segment that joins any two points incident in that figure. Similarly a 
body in 3-space 1s called convex if it wholly contains the line segment 
that joins any two points incident in that body. Convexity arose in the 
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previous section - section 2.15 - where the convex hull function was 
introduced. 
In order to capture the dual property of concavity, it is not 
sufficient to simply define this property as the negation of being convex. 
If a body is convex, that body has in addition to a surface of positive 
curvature the additional property of being simply connected, I.e. having no 
holes. This property is a pr1ait1ve property in this formalism, and is 
covered in the next section. Suffice to say, the definition for a concave 
body, in the sense of a body having an outer surface of part negative 
curvature must incorporate the condition that the body is sUDply connected. 
'Concave (x)' is read as 'x is concave': 
<D58) Concave (x) edef. Simply _Connected (x) /I. ~Convex (x) 
type Concave (SPATIAL/SPATIAL_UNIVERSE>:UU 
Additional axioms are added: 
(Al8) Convex(x) ~ Simply_Connected(x) 
(Al9) 'dx [SiJlply_Connected (x) ~ Connected (x) J 
x: SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
The last axiom smplifies the theory by restricting convex bodies to "one 
piece" regions, and stailerly by implication the same holds for concave 
regions. 
2.17: Hollow, a:laply and ault1ply connected regions 
Hollow regions are easily defined within the formalism given disconnected 
regions. 'Hollow (x)' read as 'x is hollow' is defined as: 
(059) Hollow (x) :def. Disconnected (compl (x» 
type Hollow (SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE):UU 
- 80 -
By way of examples, in 2-space an annulus is hollow, and in 3-epace a soap 
bubble. In order to distinguish between the case where the body has some 
region of space completely surrounded by material (as in the case of the 
soap bubble), and the case where the body is said to have a hole, but 
where that hole 1s not coapletely surrounded by aaterial (e.g. a torus) we 
introduce the property of smple connectedness. 
A region x is simply connected iff every closed loop incident in x can 
be shrunk to a point-also incident in x. If the region has a hole 
(although strictly speaking the hole is a property of the surrounding 
space) this operation cannot succeed - the act of shrinking a class of 
closed loops incident in that region would require them to pass through 
the boundary of the region. Regions satisfying the latter condition are 
said to be multiply connected. As an everyday example of simple 
connectedness, a potter initially etas to produce e well worked lump of 
Clay with no air pockets - such an object is is siaply connected. 
Subsequent pulling or compacting the clay will not alter this property, 
providing the potter by working the clay does not join any part. of the 
surface. SiDple connectedness is assumed as a priaitive property: 
'Simply_Connected(x)' 1s read as 'x is simply connected'. The dual property 
of being multiply connected (i.e. having at least one hole) is defined 
immediately below. 'Multiply_Connected ex)' 1s read as 'x is multiply 
connected': 
<D60) Multiply_Connectedex) :def. ConnectedCx) 1\ -Simply_Connected(x) 
type Multiply_Connected(SPATlAL~ATIAL_UNIVERSE}'UU 
It is cOllaon to distinguish between Jlultiply connected objects in 
terms of the ainimum nuaber of cuts that are required to convert the. 
into simply connected objecte. For example an object with one 'hole' 
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requires one cut to .ake it s1Jlply connected, and an object with two holes, 
two cuts. In general. if n-l non-intersecting cuts froll boundary to 
boundary are needed to convert a given multiply connected object into a 
simply connected object, the object is said to be n-tuply connected 
[Cournat and Robbins, in NeWlllan ed 1956 p587-588). By regarding the 'cut' 
as a region, n-tuply connected objects are readily defined - only one is 
given here: 'Doubly_Connected (x)' read as 'x is doubly connected': 
<O6!> Doubly_Connected (x) :def. Multiply_Connected Cx) 1\ 
3YrS~ply_Connected(y) 1\ 
PP <y,x) 1\ Simply_Connected <diff (x,y»] 
type Doubly _Connected (SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE):UU 
Being hollow is a sufficient condition for being multiply connected, 
but not necessary, e.g. the prototypical soUd torus is multiply connected 
but not hollow. Filters or chambered vessels can be construed as n-tuply 
connected objects. 
2.18: ModeUJna 8Irf.cea 
Outside geometry proper, surfaces of everyday objects are often talked of 
as part of the outside aspect of a body as though the surface has 
materiality in the way the bodies they are surfaces of obviously do. We 
find it perfectly sensible to talk about touching such bodies, and in order 
to bring attention to the outward aspect we find it expedient to taUt 
about surfaces of such objects which can also be touched. Intuitively this 
characterisation of a surface is qUite unlike that ascribed to gao.etrical 
bodies embedded in 3-space. For one thing the relation of touchiftl i8 
clearly a phys1cal concept which has no proper use in geometry, for 
another the notion of mater1ality associated with the surface of a 
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physical object (e.g. we find it perfectly sensible to talk about staining 
the surface of a piece of wood) has no correlate with the geometrical 
concept of a surface hav1n8 volumetric extension in 3-space. 
While mathematics provides many useful structures and models by which 
aspects of the everyday world can be modelled, it is all too easy to 
forget the abstraction aade. An example of the difficulty that can arise 
when a tensioo in the ontology of a theory is set up, can be seen in 
Hayes's [1985b] complex ontology of directed surfaces, which are 
introduced in order to make sense of wetted surfaces. 
The outside (in the sense of the outside aspect) of a physical body is 
characteriaed by a function in this theory that picks out the outermost 
layer of atoms or 'skin' of that region of space the body occupies, and is 
so named: 'skin (x)' is read aa 'the skin of x': 
(062) skinCx) =def. ,y['h[C(z,y>.-. 3u[C.-AtomCu) 1\ peu,x) 1\ 
C (cl<U),Cl<COllpl<X») 1\ 
C(z,u>)J ] 
type skin (,; ):'t U NULL, ,; = SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
The function skin (x) is not defined directly on physical objects. but 
indirectly by mapping bodies to the regions of space they occupy. This is 
discussed in more detail in section 3.4. 
2.19: Defining a nest of spheres 
Many physical phenollena obey the inverse square law, e.g. the variation in 
amplitude of a radial wave propogattng across the surface of a pond, or 
the drop in the level of lllUllination of a surface aa the distance between 
a constant light source and that surface varies. The geometrical basis 
for describing such phenomena is rooted in the construction of a nest of 
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solid spheres Cor balls) sharing a common centre. The relaUve distance 
between 'shells' of the set can then be exploited to provide a basis from 
which estimates of the intensity of some energy source radiating through 
the nest can be made. 
A primitive Ilonadic predicate symbol 'Ball' to the formal language; the 
denotation of which 1s a set of spher1cal solids (in the geometrical sense 
of the term "solid">. Using this primitive in the theory, a sphere and a 
nest is constructed. 
Apart froa notational differences (and the explicit introduction of the 
Ilonadic predicate 'SallCx)'), the following set of definitions are identical 
to those that appear in Tarski's [Tarski 1956] ax1omatisation of solid body 
geometry [I' J. The distinction between the terms "ball" and "sphere" used 
below mirror the common usease in mathematics: by a ball I mean a 
spherical so11d. while a sphere is surface only in tbe manner of a shell. 
'EXT_T~NTex,y)' is read as <ball) x is externally tangential to 
(ball) y', 'INT_TANGENTCx,y)' as 'Cball> x 1s internally tangent to (ball) y', 
'EXT_DIAMETR(x,y,z)' as '<ball) x and (ball> y are externally diametrical to 
(ball> z', 'INT _DIAMETR ex,y,z)' as ' <ball> x and (ball> yare internally 
diametrical to <ball> z', and 'CONCENT _PART (xty)' as '(ball> x 1s a concentric 
part of <ball> y': 
<003> EXT_TANGENTex,y) 5def. SallClc) " Ball(y) 1\ 
Yzu[[SallCz) " Ball(u) " P<X,z) " P(x,u) " 
~OCztY> " ~O(uIY>] ~ [P(z,u) v P(utz)]] 
CD64> INT_TANGENTCxty) 5def. Ballex) " BallCy> 1\ PP<X,y> 1\ 
Yzu[[P(x,z> " P(u,x) " P(z,y) 1\ P(u,y>] ~ 
[P(z,u) v P(u,z>]] 
<065) EXT_DrAMETRex,y,z) 5def. Ball<x) 1\ Ball(y) 1\ Ball<z) 1\ 
EXTERNALLY_TANGENT(x,z) 1\ EXT_TANGENT(y,z) " 
~v[ [Ball<u) " Ball(v) 1\ ~O(u,z) 1\ ~O(v,z) 1\ 
P(x,u) " P(y,v)] ~ ~O(u,v)] 
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<D66> !NT _DIAMETR<x,y,z) ::def. Ball<x) 1\ Ball{y> 1\ Ba11(z> 1\ 
INCTAHGEHT(x,z> 1\ lNl'_TANGENT(y,z> 1\ 
'luv([Bal1(u> 1\ Ball{v) 1\ ~o(u,z) 1\ ~o{v,z> 1\ 
EXT_TANGENT(x,u) 1\ EXT_TANGENTCy,v)] ~ 
.. 0 <x,y>] 
<067) CONCENT_PART(x,y) :def. BaIHx) 1\ 8811(y> 1\ 
[EQUALCx,y> v 
[pPCx,y> 1\ Vzu((Ball(z> 1\ Ball(u) 1\ 
EXT _DIAMETR (z, u,x) 1\ 
OO_TANGENT(z,y> 1\ 
OO_TAHG£NT(u,y>J ~ 
INT_DIAMETR{z,u,y>JJ v 
[PP (y,x) 1\ 'izu [[Ball (z) 1\ Ball<u> 1\ 
EXT_DIAMETRCz,u,y) 1\ 
IHT_TANGENT{z,x) 1\ 
IHT_ TANGENT (u,x>J of 
!NT _DIAMETR(z,u,x)J J J 
(068) SPHERE (x) :def. 3y [Ball (y> 1\ EQUAL <x,skin <y»] 
type Ball <SPATIAL):UU 
type ~ {t,'t):UU, t = SPATIAL \sPATIAL_UNIVERSE, 
t ( {EXT_TANGENT,INT_TANGENT} 
type ~('t,'t,'t):UU, 1: = SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, 
t f {EXT_DIAMETR,INT_DIAMETR} 
type COH:ENT_PART(tl.t2):UU, 1:1 = SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, 1:2 '"' SPATIAL 
type SPHERE (SPATIAL \SPATAn._UNlVERSE):UU 
(AlO) \Ix [Ban (x) of Convex (x)] 
(Al1) Yx[Ba11(X> of 3y[CONCBNT_PART(y,x)]] 
(Al2) Yx[Ba11(X> of 3y(CONCENT_PART<X,y>] 
x,y:SPATIAL 
2.20: The .. tric pert end the relatloo of relative distance. 
While estimates of distance in everyday reasoning do involve units of 
measure, and in many cases take the form of tentative estimates, there 1s 
good reason to introduce a relation of relative distance into this theory. 
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As van Benthem points out [van Benthem 1982 Appendix Al. contextual 
comparative relations - of one thing being nearer to another thing than 
something else - not only has a certain naturalness about it. it turns out 
to be a powerful pr1Dit1ve relation, to use in a partial axiomatisation of 
Euclidean space. 
Following van Benthem. I add his ternary relation 'N(x,y,z)' read as 'y 
1s nearer to x than z' and give a set of defining axioms. First the 
sorting function for N(x,y,z): 
type N('tl,'t2,t3):UU, d,'t2,'t3 E {SPATIAL,POINT}, 
l.e. I allow measures between points, paints and regions or between 
regions. 
Next the set of defining axiolls: 
(A23) Vxyzu[ [N (x,y,z) 1\ N(x,z,u] 4 N(x,y,u)] 
<A24> Vxy -N(x,y,y) 
<A25) Yxyzu[N(x,y,z> 4 [H(x,y,u v H(x,u,z>l] 
x,y,z,u:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,POINT} 
Using the relation H, equldlstance is immediately definable, 'E (x,y,z) i. 
read as 'y is as near to x as z': 
(069) E(x,y.z) :def. -N<X,y,z) 1\ -N<X,z,y) 
type E(d,'t2,'t3):UU, 'tl,'t2,'t3 E {SPATIAL,POINT} 
van Benthem also adds the following set of axioms: the first simply states 
that x is closer to itself than any other y, while the last two axioms 
express triangle inequal1tes: 
<A26) Yxy[EQUAL(x,y> v C(cl<x>,cl<y» v N<x,x,y>]] [II] 
(A27) Yxyzu[ [N{x,y,z) 1\ H(z,x,y>] 4 N{y,x,z)] 
(A28) Vxyzu [ [£ (x,y ,z> 1\ E (z,x,y)] 4 E <y,x,z)] 
x,)"z,u:'t, 't E {SPATIAL,POINT} 
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With the introduction of the distance function 'd (x,y)', the constant '0' 
(zero) and the etandard set of ordering relations defined on 
numbers:"','<','~' and ')': 
type d ('tl,t2 ):NUM8ER, d,t2 f {SPATIAL,POINT) 
type O:NUM8ER 
type (<NUMBER,NUMBER):UU 
type < <NUMBER,NUMBER):UU 
type ~ CNUMBER,NUMBER):UU 
type > <NUMBER,NUMBER):UU 
and the axioll: 
<A29) 'tJxy d (x,ynO 
x,y:'t, t € {SPATIAL,POINT} 
one can 1Julediately define the following equivalences: 
(A30) 'dxyz[N(x,y,z) ~ [d(x,y> < d(x,z)]J 
<A31) 'tJxy[EQUAL(dex,y),O) .. -+ [EQUAL(x,y) v C(cl<x),cl<y» v IN(x,clCy» v 
IN (y,clCx»]J 
x,y.z:'t, 't € {SPATIAL,POINT}. 
The primitive relation 'x<y' is axlomatieed as: 
(A32) 'tJx ~x<x 
<A33) 'tJxyz[ [x<y 1\ y<z] -+ x<z) 
x,y,z:NUMBER, 
and the axioll: 
<A34) 'tJxy[EQUAL(x,y> v x<y v y>x]cuJ, 
x,y:NUMBER 
1s added. 
<D70) x~ :def. ~[x<y] 
<D7!) x>y :def. x~ , ~EQUAL (x,y> 
<D72) x(y :def. ~ [x>y] 
x,y:NUMBER 
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The standard set of axioms that define a metric space with the 
distance function i8 not given here. In particular the axiom: 
Vxyz[d (x.z>'[d (x,y>+d(y,z>JJ. and the function x+y, 1s missing. However, the 
constant 0 and a total ordering on (symbolic) numbers is all that is 
required to illustrate the formalism. 
2.21: 'nle teaporal part 
rnterval lo.gics for reasoning about action and time have been much 
researched e.g. Hamblin 1961,1911. Allen 1981.1984, Allen and Koomen 1983. 
Allen and Kautz 1985, and Allen and Hayes 1985,1981. This being so, the 
pure temporal part of the forllalisll is given much less attention in this 
thesis, than that part used to model space. 
For the temporal part of the theory. the ontology is restricted so 
that only open regions are admitted to the status of temporal regions. 
which we call periods. The justification for this is largely motivated by 
questions of ontological and technical stmplicity. Firstly, there is no 
illlJlledlate pracUcal gain to be made by allowing periods to be either open. 
closed or clopen. One can define the standard 13 lIutually exclusive and 
exhaustive interval relations (see e.g. Allen and Hayes 1985], in the theory 
by keeping periods open and adding to the theory a relation of precedence 
defined on pairs of periods. n81lely the relation S(x,,.> cited earlier en]. 
Secondly, by dividing periods into moments (understood to be arbitrarily 
sIDall periods of time - distinct froll points) and intervals, and 
stipulating that propositions are indexed to periods only. the set of 
IDoments can be made discrete and totally ordered, avoiding the classic 
problem of the "divided instant", since lDeeting periods do not have a 
shared boundary moment [at). 
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Using the precedence relation B, a set of definitions functioning as 
analogues to Allen's set of defined interval relations on pairs of periods 
are given. For reasons of the general familiarity of Allen's work in AI 
circles, I adopt Allen's set of naaes for the def1ned relations. First I 
repeat the set of defining axioms for the relation 'B (x,y)' read as 'x is 
before y', then give the definitions: 
(A4) \Ix "B(x,x) 
(A5) Yxyz[[B<x.y) 1\ S(y,z>] -+ S(x,z» 
(A6) Yxy[S(x.y> -+ Yzu[P(z,x) 1\ P(u,y» -+ B(Z,u>] 
(D73) MEETS(x,y) ::def. S(x.y) 1\ .. 3z[B<z,y) 1\ B<X,z» 
<D74) BEFORE(x,y) :der. B(x.y) 1\ 3z[B(z,y) 1\ B(x,z>] 
(D75) OVERLAPS<X,y> :def. PO(x,y> f\ 3z[P(z,x) " B(z,y>J 
(D76> Sl'ARTS(x,y> ::def. PP<X,y> 1\ 3z{MEETS(z,x> 1\ MEBTS(z.y>] 
(071) FINI9iES(x.y> =<1ef. PP<x,y> 1\ 3z[MEETS(x,z) 1\ MEETS(y,z» 
<D78} DURING(x,y> :der. PP<x,y> 1\ 3zu(PP(z,y> 1\ B(z,x> 1\ PP(u,y> 1\ B<X,u») 
<D79) S-' <X,y) :: def. "B<y,x> 
(D80) MEETS-' <x,y> :def. MEETS(y,x) 
(D81> SEFORE-' <X,y> =def. BEFORE <y,x> 
<D82) OVERLAPS-' <x,y> :def. OVERLAPS<y,x) 
(D83) Sl'ARTS-' (x,y> :def. STARTS(y,x> 
<DB4> FINISHES-' <X,y> :def. FINISHES(y,x> 
<DB5) DURING-I ex,y> ::def. DURING(y,x) 
<D3) EQUAL<x,y) :def. P(x,y> 1\ P(y,x> 
type ~ ("C,"C):UU, "C = PERIOD •• € (B,MEETS,BEFORE .... ,DURING-'} 
Several points are worth ralsing here. The fust is that thi. sat of 
interval relations is quite different to those developed by Clarke [Clarke 
1985J. A major difference is the transitivity of EQUAL, where the 
comparable relation used by Clarke, namely that of contemporaneous related 
spatio-temporal regions Is carefully defined to be non-transitive Ca'l, 
The second point is that unlike Allen's relationa, the above set of 
relations are not mutually exclusive. This surprising fact is made clearer 
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once it is realised that teaporal regions, 11ke their spatial counterpart. 
do not have to be connected <1.e. 10 one piece). Thus e.g. just because two 
intervals x and y are discrete, it does not follow that one must be before 
the other or vice versa - given EQUAL (sum (xl,x2),x), we could have B(xl,y> 
" 8 (y,x2) for exallple. Given an 1ntended model where all periods are 
individually connected, and with additional axioms reqUired to axiomatise a 
standard interval logiC, one would expect the above set of relations to 
becolle .utually exclusive and exhaustive for pairs of periods. This is 
discussed in more detail below. 
For the modell1n8 probleDs described 10 this thesis, only the 8 and 
MEETS relations are actually used. MEETS is irreflexive <T78), 
asymmetrical <T79) and intransitive <T80): 
<T78) Vx ~MEETS(x.x) 
<T79) Vxy[MEETS(x,y> .. MEETS<y,x» 
<T80> Vxyz[MEETS<X,y> " MEETS<y,z>] .. -MEETS(x,z>} 
x,y,z:PERIOO 
Periods are split 1oto aoments and 1otervals. Moments are aimply 
periods with no proper part., and intervals are periods that not mOilents: 
(086) MOMENT<x> :def. Vyz[[P(y,x) " P(z,x>] .. ~B<y,z>] 
<087> INTERVAL<X> Edef. PERlOO(X> " ~MOMENT<X> 
Together with the 1oformation encoded in the sort lattice Le. the 
following axiomatisatlon ensures every period has a mOllent as a part and 
that periods are open. Periods are either DOllents or intervals, and 
Doment. and intervals are periods. Moreover, the precedence relation B is 
connected when defined on mOllent., and the tille line is unbounded 
(infinite, assull1ng a metric) in both tellporal directions: 
<A35> Vx[PERlOO(x) .. (MOMENT<X> v INTERVAL(x»] 
(A36> Vx[PERlOO(x) .. OPENCx>] 
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<A37> Yxy[[MOMENT(x> " MOMENT(y>] ~ [EQUAL(x,y) v S(x,y> v B(y,x)]] 
(A38) ~x[MOMENT<X) -+ 3y[JOIENT(y> " MEETS(x,y>]] 
<A39) ~x[MOMENT<X) -+ 3y[MOMENT(y> " MEETS<y,x>]] 
x,y:PERIOD 
The following theorem_ are forthcOll1ng: 
<T8l> "'x[PERlOO(x) -+ 3y[MONENT(y> " pey,x>J] 
(C82> bIx[MOMENTex> .... lAtoaex) 1\ PERIODex>11 
x,y:PERIOD 
Although the ontology of Uae presented here is very similar to that 
of Allen and Hayes [1985,1987J material from carnap [1956) and Woodger 
[1937J was actually used when building the formalislI. One difference 
between this formalisll end that of Allen and Hayes. is that periods are 
explicitly axiollattsed as open regions. There is also a difference between 
the interpretationS given to both formalisms. While Allen and Hoy.s 
consider beginnings and mdings of their mOllenta [Allen and Hayes 1985, 
p531 J, moments within thts foraali.a are not construed as having 
beginnings and endings but rather that begin1ngs and endings are taken as 
DOmentSj and that IlOllalt. are only individuated with respect to other 
period. that aeet it and it aeets, not by points. 
Given the Ilodel of t1.ae used here i. discrete at the level of Ilollent., 
three temporal functions are added which generate the 1nitial and f1nal 
DOments for any interval and the next mOllent (in tiDe> for any period. 
Note that restrictions are needed for these functions, e.g. given a much 
richer sort structure, the function finalCx> would be only well sorted for 
pertods bounded above. '1ntt1alex>' is read as 'the initial moment of x, 
'final (x>, as 'the final aoaent of x' and 'next (x)' as 'the next mOllent (in 
time) after x': 
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(088) inittal(X> adef. 1)'[INTERVAL<x> f\ MOMENT(y> f\ PPCy,x> f\ 
.. 3z[MOMENT(z) f\ PPCz,x) f\ BCz,y>]] [SO) 
(089) final(X> =def. ,y[INTERVAL(x) 1\ MOMENT(y> 1\ PP(y,x> 1\ 
.. 3z[MOMENTCz) 1\ PP(z,x> 1\ 8(y,z>]] [It) 
(090) next(x) =def. ,y[PERlOO(X> 1\ MOMENTCy> 1\ MEETSCx,y>] [Sf) 
type initial CINTERVAL):MOMENT 
type final <INT'£RVAL):MOMENT 
type next <PERlOO>:MOMI:NI' 
Added to the axioms of the theory, theee definitions tmply each interval 
has as least two momentary parts (i.e. an initial and final moment). This 
choice i8 aotivated by a desire to provide a formal semantics for the 
intuitive teaporal locution ..... the next moaent ... ". 
Often states, event. and processes occur over periods of time that are 
punctuated by period8 of rest. For example, the activity described ae 
reeding a book is rarely done continuously without having soa. fora of 
break. In order to allow intervals to have this property, a new predicate 
and its dual are introduced then defined, 'Disconnected_Period (x)' i8 reed 
as 'x is a disconnected period' and 'Connected_Period <x)' 'x i8 a connected 
period': 
<091> Di8connectecCPerlod(x) =<fef. 3yz[EQUALCsum<y,z),x) 1\ BEFORE(y,z>] [Ill 
(092) Connected_PerlocUx> =def. Period (x) 1\ .. OisconnectecCPerlod (x) 
type Discoonected_Perlod <INTERV AL):UU 
type Connected_Period <PERlOO>:W 
The idee of allowing arbitrary unions of pertods and defining a set of 
interval relations defined on sets of disconnected (or "non-convex") 
periods has been explored by Ladkin Cl986a,bl. Ladkin £1986b) shows that 
an exhaustive enumeration of such relations is infeasible simply because 
the number of possible relations grows exponentially. For thi8 rea8on, 
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while a use is found for reasoning using disconnected periods, no attempt 
i8 made to construct a temporal lattice (in the manner of lattice Le> for 
an extended set of interval relations. 
A desirable result for this part of the theory would be to show that 
given all intervals are connected, then a model used to interpret the set 
of defining axioms of this theory, would also be a model in Allen'. 
interval logic. However. this must remain a conjecture. since no proof has 
been secured to show that with the condition that all periods are 
individually connected, the defined set of relations become mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive for pairs of periods. In other words. one would 
need to prove the follow~ set of .theorems': 
Ifxy [[Connected (x) 1\ Connected (y>] -t {O(x.y> ..... [8 (x.y> v 8- 1 <x,y>]]] 
Ifxy{[Connected(x) 1\ Connected<y>] -t (PO<x.y> +--+ [OVERLAPS(x,y> v 
OVERLAPS-' <x.y>]]] 
Vxy([Connected<x) 1\ Connected(y>] .. [pP(x.y> ..... [STARTS(x.y> v 
FINISHES<X.y> v 
DURING <x.y>] ]] 
Ifxy[[Connected(x> 1\ Connected<y>] .. [pp-I (x,y) +-+ [STARTS-I (x.y> v 
FINISHES-· (x.1> v 
DURING-' <x,y>]]] 
Ifxy[[Connected(x> 1\ Connected<y>] .. [MEETS(x.y> ....... DURING-I (x.y>]] 
where ••• means exactly one ltteral of the consequent is true. and where 
the ellipses ' ..... ' include the missing relations defined by ([)74) to «84) 
(including EQUAL> defined above. In other words exactly one relation will 
hold given the condition that intervals are connected. 
Finally. some ordering axiol1s are reqUired: the first states that if 
moment meets moments y and z, then y and z are 1dentical. Similarly for 
the second axiom: if moments x and y meet moment z. x and yare identical. 
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The last axiom states that for any two pairs of moments x and y. and z 
and u, either x aeets u <in which case they will be identical>, or x will 
be before and separated from u, and the same for z and y. 
(1.40) Vxyz[[MOMENT(x> 1\ MOMENT(y) 1\ MOMENT(z» -+ 
[MEETS(x,y> 1\ MEETS<X,z>J -+ EQUAL(y,z>J 
<1.41 > Vxy [ [MOMENT (x) 1\ MOMENT (y > 1\ MOMENT (z > J -+ 
[MEETS(x,z> 1\ MEETS(y,z>J -+ EQUAL<X,z>] 
(1.42> Vxyzu[MOMENT(X> 1\ MOMENT(y) 1\ MOMENT(z> 1\ MOMENT(u> 1\ 
MEETSex,y> 1\ MEETS(z,u>J -+ [MEETS(x,u> v_ BEFORE (x,u> v 
BEFORE (z, Y >] J 
x,y,z,u:MOMENT 
Finally, it must be pointed out that if a standard interval logic is all 
that is required, then this can be easily accomodated in this formaUsm. 
Given the defined MEETS relation one could iaport much of Allen and Hayes 
[1985,1987] axiomatisation into this theory. In this case, the sorting 
functions for the set of Boolean operators defined on regions would need 
strengthening: I.e. sum (x,y> and prod (x,y> would need to be restricted to 
spatial regions only, since without this restriction, arbitrary combinations 
of regions will be sanctioned, thus building in contradictory consequences. 
2.22: Sua.ary 
This chapter describes the bulk of the formal theory that i8 used to 
describe space and time. First the sorts of the theory were outlined then 
embedded in a sort lattice <L." then from the two primitive relaUons, C 
and B, a set of dyadiC relations were added and defined on the sort 
REGION. A subset of these relations were singled out and embedded in a 
relational latt1ce <I.e>. A set of constants and functions were added, and 
worked into a set of further definitions. In particular, the function 
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conv(x) was used to define a set of relations and functions that 
characterised notions of be~ inside and outside. 
So far no attention has been given to how physical bodies are to be 
integrated into the formal theory, and how states, events and processes 
are represented and reasoned with. This 1s the subject matter of the 
(ollowing chapter. 
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Chapter 3: ~ about physical doII8fna ovw t .. 
3.1: Introduct1Qll 
There is a considerable body of literature that has been written on the 
subject of time. For good introductory texts which concentrate upon the 
formal aspect of time, see Rescher and Urquhart [1971J and van Benthell 
[19821. In general, the tera "temporal logic" covers formal theoriee that 
include reasoning about states, events and processes, agency, planning and 
aspect, as well a8 being used in the formal 8pecification of programs (see 
e.g. the collection of articles in Gelton [1987]). 
This chapter focuses on the changing world and the formal aeans to 
describe it. Firstly, state8 of affairS, events and processes are 
introduced and then incorporated into the theory developed 80 far. 
Secondly, I show how physical bodie8 and their properties are assigned to 
spatial and temporal regions. Finally, I show how by exploiting aortal and 
other empirical information (abstracted out from the modelled dOllain), 
problems associated with temporally projected inference in the theory can 
be effectively constrained. 
3.2: States of affairs, events end procsss. 
States (of affairs) and events are characterised along the linea of Galton 
[Galton 19641. According to Galton [1984 p241, the distinction between a 
state and an event is decided by the way we choose to report happenings, 
rather than by what as a matter of fact goes on in the world. In th1a 
respect, states turn out to be reports that being true for eome period of 
time, continue to be true for any subpertod of that tille. Stat .. also 
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obtain at moments. are a_sureable. can be negated and are homogeneous. 
In contrast, events are unitary <in the sense that the specified event 
description does not remain true over any sub-period>. have individual 
occurences. can be counted and have no negation. 
Thus for example. a description of a relation between two bodies that 
preserves sOlie degree of topological invariancs over a period of tims can 
be associated with a state. while two temporally 11nked stat .. 
incorporating an explicit description of change in that topological 
property can be regarded as an event. In general, processes are assumed 
be a special Idnd of event. where the event can decomposed into a 
specified temporally ordered sequence of state descriptions. As Galton 
[Galton 1987 pI9'] concedes. it is unl1kely that every event can be Simply 
reduced into a sequence of states of the form: 'first 51. then 52 ..... then 
Sn'. However, many events can be effectively treated aa such. This 
decomposition of events (or processes) into state descriptions is 
subsequently adopted. 
To malee the distinctions aentioned above clearer, con8ider the 
concrete example of a working pump which has a piston r1aing and falltng 
in an inner chamber. To say the pump'. pi.ton i_ 10 contact with the wall 
of the inner chamber during some period of time, reports a _tate (since 
the relationship will remain constant over any sub period of that time in 
which the state obtains). In contrast, a cycle of the pump coincide. with 
the report of an event where althoush parts of the cycle may be identified 
as phases. the cycle cannot be correctly Baid to be true over any 
sUbperiad of time in which the event occurs. Given the fact that the 
rising of the piston can be also be construed .s a stat. (since again for 
any subperlod the rising continues to take place>. this leads to • 
distinction between states of change (as in the case where the pia ton i_ 
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said to be rising) and states of no change (as in the case where the 
plston is continually in in contact with the wall of the inner chamber). 
In general, reports of events are only mapped to intervals, while 
reports of states can be aapped to periods of any duration - 1.e. unlike 
events, states can clearly be momentary. An event cannot be captured at a 
Iloment <even though one can have aOllentary events e.g. a flash of light, 
and punctual events e.g. switching a light off>. Reports of events require 
some notion of completion to take place before one can identltify the 
event qua event. And given that an event entails a change in the truth 
value for solle proposition over tille, if moments are taken to be the 
llin1llal periods over which propositions are indexed, then the description 
of change having occurred lIust be related to an interval. 
The fact that one can have in addition to mOllentary atates, momentary 
and punctual events is explained by Gelton as follows. Consider time to 
be discrete. An event is moaentary if up to some moment in time 
proposition -, holds, for the next lIoment , holds, then -, holds for the 
following lIoment. In contrast, a punctual event arises if up to some 
Iloment in time -, holds then • holds at the next and following moment •. 
The momentary event occura within the interval containing the moment 
where , holds, but cannot be located at the moment , holds since 
additional information of the duration of the event is required before it. 
Ilomentary status can be decided. The moment where, holds is a momentary 
state on this analysis, but again 11ke the case of an event the duration of 
the description over an interval 1& required before it can be so described. 
Similarly given a punctual event the event cannot be described as such at 
any moment, but only within an interval. 
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A common source of difficulty and lingustic confusion appears to arise 
when indexing propositions to mOllents or points in time where change 
arises. Take the frequently cited case of a bell following a parabOlic 
path where it rises then falls. There is a teliPtation to say that that at 
the nadir of a ball's parabolic flight path, the ball is stationary; but at 
each aoment (whether understood to be periods, or points) the world can 
only be described atellporally. Loosely speaking one might say that no 
Change arises within a aOllent, but strictly speaking this is either 
vacuously true or meaningless. All one can say is that up to a particular 
moment in time the bell rises and after that moment the ball falls - one 
simply cannot say the bell is stationary at that or any lIoment, pace Allen 
and Hayes' cOllllent "... the ball is stationary only for a tn.e of zero 
duration, which in fact i8 the point where the ball is rising meets the 
interval in which it is falling." (Allen and Hayes 1987, p21 - my italics. 
A sillilar point arises when 1I0ments are taken as having duration, for 
again it is not correct to say "the bell ... rising meets the moment where 
it 18 stationary, which in turn meets the interval where it is falling" op 
cit. Unfortunately for Allen, the type of confusion identified here, 
reflects a failure to recognise the importance of maintaining a clear 
distinction between reports of states and events. This leads him into 
other semantic difficulties, as witnessed in the COllDlent "an event such as 
'remaloing 10 the same position' could never occur except at a time point'" 
(Allen 1981, pSl. 
While states and events seell to provide seem reasOIlebly clear 
identifying characteristics, processes straddle awkwerdly between the two. 
Agalo, one can characterise processes in the way we choose to describe the 
world. Consider the case where a protozoen surrounds and engulf. some 
item of food in order to digest it. This process 1s called phagocytosis. 
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Part of this proce.8 tnvolves another .ub-process where the protozoan 
engulfs the food. Now at one level of description this particular process 
could readily be described as a state of change, if the protozoan i. 
surrounding the food during sOlie period, it's still true to say it is 
surroundtng the food at some sub-period. But other named processes are 
not. For exaaple PMaocytosis is a case in point which has a unitary 
quality with identifiable sub-processes as phases. For this reason, 
although deftnitions of processes developed in this formalism are typically 
unpacked in terms of a specified sequence of state descriptions that 
change over the duration of the process, named processes are not formally 
identified with either states of affairs or events since in either case the 
referent can reaain the salle [all. 
The notion of a process is central to Forbus's Qualitative Process 
Theory <QPT) although it is difficult to see how Forbus's processes differ 
from events. Forbus [Hobbs and Moore 1985, p185l characterises processes 
as "soaething that causes changes through time" where the explicit 
description of processes operattng on a given state are said to facilitate 
a prediction of how situations will change over time. No formal analysis 
is offered, however. 1be Sole lIechanis. assumption used in QPT: that all 
changes in physical systems are caused directly or indirectly by process.s, 
clearly brings out the view that causation is an essential component, 
although without the clear distinction between processes and event., the 
Sole Mechanis. assumption looks rather uninforllative - 1 .•. only events 
bring about change. The explicit representation of causation 18 not 
covered in this theSiS, although Allen [1981] shows one method how 
causally l1nked events can be formally described using an interval logiC. 
The decision how best to index propositions to periods of time in a 
first order interval-based theory is a vexing one. The simplest strategy 
- 100 -
is to transform every n-place predicate of the theory into an n+l place 
predicate. In this case the extra term <marking the adverbial modifier) is 
used to index the period of time over which some state or event expressed 
in the predicate, obtains or occurs. Reichgelt [Reichgelt 1987] calls this 
the naive first order treatment of time. 
The advantage of the naive approach 1s s~plicity and a clear 
linguistic reading, e.g. 'Connects <X,y,z)' as ' x connects with y at or 
throughout period z, and 'Engulfs (x,y,z)' as 'x engulfS y during period z', 
for a description of a state and an event respectively. Against this 
approach is a certain lack of expressiveness. For example, one cannot 
explicitly state that in general, causes precede their effects, and 
changing ontologies over tille are not readily accomodated [see Reichgelt 
1987). 
In Allen's £1981,1984) theory, states, events and processes are 
reasoned about explicitly by using three distinguished relations, 
'Holds <p, t)', 'Occurs Ce, t)' alld 'Occurring (p, t)'. The relations 'Holds (p, t)' and 
'Occurs (e, t)' link what he calls "properties" and events to the tilles they 
obtain or endure for respectively, the latter links processes to the tills 
they are occurring for. In addition, he includes a set of functions: 
'and (p,q)', 'or (p,q)', 'notcp)', 'all(x,p)' and 'existCx,p)' which corresponding to 
the familiar logical operators, enable him to use his properties to nams 
complex logical expressions, e.g. 'Holds {and (p,q),t)'. 
A certain uneasiness concerning the semantic foundation of Allen'. 
formalism can be recognised in Turner (J 984, p87-88], Reichgelt [1981] and 
Shoham £1988, p39J. According to Allen, the holds relation binds 
·properties" to intervals of tille. However, given the intended linguistic 
reading, 'p' is menticned and 't' used. For this expression to be well-
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formed, the 'p' should be in quotation marks, i.e. Holds ("p",t). But this 
immediately requires some extension to the normal recursively defined set 
of formation rules used to construct wff in FOL. On the other hand, one 
cannot naively identify sentences with singular terms without incurring 
deep problems. Davidson £1984 pl9) (citing Frege> shows how if the 
meaning of a singular tara 1s identified with its reference, all sentences 
alike in truth value can be shown to be synonomous! 
It is possible to avoid such problemS" by noa:1nal1sing sentences, 
although Allen does not go this route. In this case, the 'p' functions as 
a genuine term and a place holder for the nominal1sed sentence, e.g. the 
nominal1sation of the (open) sentence 'x is connected with y' would be 'x's 
being connected with y'. By doing this, the wff 'Holds (c (x,y),z)' would now 
read as 'x's being cOMected with y holds throughout period z', which i. 
perfectly acceptable. The advantage of nominal1sation i8 a gain in 
expressiveness. For example, the means to talk explicitly about states, 
events and processes becoae available whereas before the distinctions were 
embedded in the lIeaning given to specific predicates. However, there are 
certain probl8118 gOing down this route. The first is that nominal1aed 
expressions frequently require complex paraphrasing, while the second 
Simply arises from the introduction of a new set of functional expres.ions 
into the formal language [II] 
In generel I use the naive first order theory of tille to demonstrate 
the theory. However, where it is eXpedient to talk about states, events 
and processes explicitly, I choose the nominal1sation route mentioned 
above. The latter part of the theory 1s developed as follows: 
Two additional primitive sort symbols 'STATE' and 'EVENT' are added to 
the sort lattice: 
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sort STATE c: T 
sort EVENT c: T, 
where the set of pr1m1tive sort symbols extend to the set: 
oruu.,REG ION,POINT ,PHYSOB,NUMBER,ST A TE,EVENT }. 
Next two relations are added to the formal language: 'OBTAINS <X,y)' 
read as 'x obtains throughout or at period y', and OCCURS <x,y>' aa 'x occurs 
during period y'. OCCURS<x,y> is identical to Allen's relation OCCURS (e,t), 
and the relation OBTAINS(x,y> is identical to Allen's relation HOLDS(p,t>, 
save for the nOllwl1sat ion of the sentence p. The sorting functions for 
these relations are: 
type OBTAINS <STATE,PERlOO):UU 
type OCCURS(EVENT,INTERVAL):UU 
Axiolls are then added that govern the intended meaning given for these 
relations: 
<A43) 'Ixy[OBTAINS(x,y> ..... 'Iz[P<z,y> .. OBTAINS<x,z>J] 
<1.44) 'Ix[3y[OBTAINS(x,y) ..... STATE (x)] 
(A45) '1xy[OCCURS(x,y> .. -3z[PP(z,y> 1\ OCCURS (x,z>] ] 
(1.46) '1xy[3y[OCCURS(x,y) ..... EVENT<X>] 
In Allen's [1984] theory, an additional relation appear8, namely 
'OCCURRING (p,t)'. Th1s relation is used to describe what he calls 
"processes·. For Allen, processes "refer to sOlie activity not involving a 
culmination or antic1pated result", while events "describe an activity that 
involves a product or outcome CAllen 1984 p132]. While processes and 
events are stipulated to be occurrences, Allen notes a problell with his 
axioll: 
'lett' [[OCCUR (e,t) , IN (t',t>] ..... OCCUR (e,t')] 
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(in words: if event e occurs during period t and t' 18 a sub-period, then e 
doesn't occur during t'). This fails to hold for processes, since someone 
said to be walking for a period of time miSht stop for a rest. In view of 
such difficulties, Allen separates out processes and uses the relation 
OCCURRING(p,t) with a set of defining axioms. 
Galton (1990) finds Allen's categorisation of proce.ses both wanting 
and unnecessary. Identifying narrow and broad sen ... of locutions such as 
-I am walking-, he argues that in the broad sense one can be said to be 
walking for a period of tille even though one miSht have a brief rest; 
while in the narrow sense -I am walking- is smply false if one considers 
the walk taJces place over the same period of tma. For Galton, Allen's 
-processes" can be grouped with Allen's properties. In ita place, Galton 
suggests two ways how reports of processes can be treated in an interval 
logiC. The first 18 an 1apl1cit categorisation which make. use of an 
extended set of the standard HOLDS and OCCURS relations, i.e. indexing 
reports of states and events to mOilents or intervals of tme, whUe the 
second (drawing off earlier work - see Galton 1984,1981) introducea 
special progreSSive operators defined on event •. 
A smple alternative way to tackle this problea is to make use of 
individual connected and disconnected periodS over which some at ate of 
affairs 1s said to obtain. Thus if the broad sense i& intended, then the 
period is disconnected. and if the narrow sense is 1ntended, then the 
period i. connected: 'OBTAINS.., <x,y)' and 'OBTAINs. (x,y)' are both read 
(ambiguously> as 'x obtains during y': 
<A47) 08TAIN~<X,y> :def. OBTAINS<X,y> 1\ CONNECTED_PERIOO(x) 
(A48) OBTAINS.<X,y> :def. OBTAINS<X,y> 1\ DISCONNECTED_PERlOO(x) 
type OBTAINs... <STATE,PERIOD):UU 
t ype OBTAINS. <ST A TE,INTERV AL>:UU 
- 104 -
3.3: Intesrattng a.p1rica1 .. d &pIIUal inforMUon 
The ontological distinction between physical objects and (spatial> regions 
and is made expl1cit in the formalisll by lIaking the sorts PHYSOB and 
REGION disjoint. However sOlie means must be provided which preserves this 
ontological distinction without un-necessarily duplicating properties and 
relations that are correctly ascribed to regions but seem equally 
applicable to physical entities. For example, in everyday discourse the 
relation of being inside makes &ense whether we are talking about water 
inside a cup, but equally in a geometrical context when talking about a 
partitioning of space. 
3.4: Mapping "plcal object. to ~ of space. 
Physical objects are mapped to ~ions by means of a transfer function 
'space (x,y)' (cf Hayes' [1985bJ one place transfer function 'space <X>') read 
as 'the space of x at Caoment) y'. This function either maps a physical 
object to the spatial region it occupies at a given lIoment, or is of sort 
NUll. if the physical object does not exiat at that moment: 
type space CPHYSOB,MOMENT):SPATIAL U NUU. 
For brevity and ease in reading the formalism an alternative syntax i8 now 
adopted: 'xl y' 18 now written instead of 'space (x,,)'. The use of this 
function has the following consequences that should be noted. Firstly, the 
wff Inside(waterl,cupl> becolles 1l1sorted given the normal interpretation 
for these terms; rather it should be Inside (waterl I t,cupll t>: the 
justification being that talk of being inside relates (in this instance) 
physical objects to a theory of apace with physical objects construed as 
though they are spatial regions. 
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Physical objects support a set of empirical properties which spatial 
objects do not, and spattal objects support a set of geometrical and 
topological properties which are strictly speaking not properties of 
physical objects. Within the formalisa the wff Hard <steel_balll) is well 
sorted, but the wff Hard (sldn (stee~balll») is not, because the predicate 
Hard used here does not apply to regions. It aight be thought that this 
complication can be rectified by s1mply introducing a new transfer function 
phys(x,y) that aapa an arbitrary spatial region x at a moment y to some 
physical object, but this is not feasible. G1ven the intended model where 
space contains a potential infinite number of regions with varying degrees 
of connectivity, spatial regions (now individuated in terms of a eet of co-
ordinated points) can aap to compositions of physical objects (eabedded in 
that space) which have no clear individuating characteristics, and a 
fortiori no clear nailed sortal categories. In view of this, the following 
18 done. Suppose (taking the above example) we want to attribute the 
propert y of hardness to the surface of a steel ball. then we express this 
fact as follows: 
Hard (a) 1\ ~t (EQUAL (al t,skin (steel_ballli t» J . 
r.e. one picks out the physical object in question supporting solie 
empirical property (in this example, object a) and relates it to 80lIl8 other 
physical object (steel_balll) by mapping both a and steel-balll to the 
space they occupy at a given moment in time, and then stipulating the 
spatial relationship between them (in this case an identity between the 
space occupied by a and the skin of the steel ball). The same technique 
is done for other spetial properties, e.g. to say (loosely speaking) that 
the interior of some object b 1s hard, this 1s expressed as (ollows: 
Hard(a) 1\ Itt[EQUAL(alt,int<blt»). 
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Again, in view of such complications it may also be thought that if 
the sort PHYSOB were simply stipulated to be a sub-sort of the sort 
REGION, where the sorts SPATIAL, PERIOD and PHYSOB were pairwise disjoint, 
the cited difficulty could be Jlet. But this introduces further 
complications. The compl1catlons arise once the sorting functions are 
relaxed so that expressions such as sum (cup,chair>, compl<chalr> and 
conv(cup> become legitlllate terms. What physical objects (or are they 
really regions of space?) are the denotations of these terms, and what are 
their respective sorts? No easy answer seems forthcoming. Indeed if we 
do allow such expressions to be well formed/sorted, then the result sorts 
for these terms, if they are to denote physical objects, cannot in general 
be anything more specific than PHYSOB, except perhaps in the trivial cas. 
Where an Identity has been hitherto established. For example, take the 
term sUJI(chairl,chair2). This cannot be of result sort CHAIR, unless of 
course both chairl and chair2 are identical. But equally, by the same 
argument we should allow swa(waterl,water2) to be of sort WATER, since we 
do tallc about distinct bodies of the salle material as one body ••. g. the 
blood inside our body, even though quantities may be separated as it 
passes through distinct challbera in the heart [U J. 
Given the ontological distinction that exists between physical objects 
and the spatial abstractions that are cOllmonly used to represent them, it 
1s of paramount importance to recognise that if an abstraction is made, 
that that abstraction is clearly kept in mind. For some dOJlains, reasoning 
about physical objects as though they are regions of space can be quite 
adequate; indeed, parsimony with respect to an abstraction is not only 
desireable in our everyday understanding and working with complex 
phenomena, it l1es at the very foundation of theory construction. However 
if some abstraction has been made, for example talking about physical 
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objects as though they are regions of spece, care must be exercised not to 
import properties into the domain that is not supported by the theory 
be~ described. Failure to keep the distinction not only disrupts the 
legitiJlacy of the theory, it can lead to a muddied ontology, e.g. Hayes' 
[1985bJ use of directed surfaces which can be wet. The difficulties 
described above, are of course exallple to this. With this in mind, spatial 
relations holding between physical objects are subsequently handled as 
follows. 
For the naive treatment of time, an abbreviat10nal schema 't(x,y,z)' is 
used here, which is understood to mean that x is in relation t to )' at or 
throughout period z': 
(093) t<x,y,z) :der. Yu[P(u,z) .. t<xlu,ylu>} 
type tCPHYSOB,PHYSOB,PERIOD):UU, t E {a: type aCSPATIAL,SPATIAL):UU} 
e.g. C<x,y,z) :def. Yu[P(u,z) .. C(xlt,ylt)j 
type C (PHYSOB,PHYSOB,MONENT>:UU, 
In contrast, with the re1fied approach the metalog1cal function ,<X.y) 
and relation t<X1 v,yl v) used below are taken to indicate that the function 
,<x,y) represents the nOllinal1sed (open) sentence t(xl v,yl v). Thus. in the 
exallple given below, the function c <X,y) ('x's being connected with y') 1. 
the nom1nal1sat1on of the open sentence C(x,),>. The metalogicel variable. 
indicate that the same principle extends to all other relations defined in 
the theory that support a spatial interpretation, e.g. p<x,y> with P(x,y>, 
and insideex,y) with INSIDE<X,y> and 80 on. 
(094) ,(x,),> =def. 1z[Yu[OBTAINS<z,u) ...... Yv[P(v,u) ... t<X1 v,)' I v>]JJ 
type • CPHYSOB,PHYSOB):STATE U NULL 
e.g. c<X,y> =def. 'IZ[~u[OBTA1NS<z,u) ...... Yv[P(v,u> -+ C<XI v,)' 1 v>] J] 
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type c (PHYSOB,PHYSOB):STATE U NULL 
type OBTAINS (STATE,PERIOD):UU 
One further variant of the reified approach needs to be mentioned 
here. Just as in the case where the OCCURS (x.y> relation is linked to the 
relation ~(l,y), e.g. OCCURS(e,t) " ENGULFS(x,y,e) - describing the event e 
where x engulfs y during period t, the same approach extends to the ease 
where the relations OBTA1NSex,y> and ~<%,x) are linked together, e.g. 
OBTAINS(s,t) " C(x,y,s), which describes the state s that obtains where x 
connects with y for period t. 
3.5: ~ about _pty regions of apace 
It is useful to be able to state explicitly that some region of space i. 
not occupied by any physical object in the domain over II particular period 
of time. For example we might want to be able to reason that for a given 
configuration of physical objects, another physical object can only occupy 
the place of another if the first Is moved froll the place that object 
presently occuples. This is easily done glven the addition of a new 
relation - 'Empty (x,y)' read as 'x is empty at or throughout y' (which i. 
functionally equivalent to Hayes' [1985b p.801 'Free <s>' predicate: 
<095> Ellpty(x,y> :def. Yz[P(z,y> ... -3u[O(ulz,x>] 
type Empty (Spatial,Period):UU 
Given spatial relations can now be indexed with a tellporal parameter, 
we could say that if the space occupied by a physical object at time tl i. 
not empty, but empty at t2, then it Is possible for another physical 
object to occupy it. Moreover one could easlly develop the formalislI to 
be able to infer that if the space occupied by a rigid physical object at 
time tl 1s not identical with the space occupied by that object at tt.e t2, 
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(and where tl and t2 are periods that meet> then that object has not 
moved. 
3.6: ~ about 1naeaatng and decreasms rat .. of ct.nse 
For increasing, decreasing and constancy measures over tiae, the reifled 
approach allows one to exploit the polymorphisisll of the logic. In th1e 
case another primitive sort is required, which is named MEASURE. In the 
following set of definitions the metalogical n-ary function ,(I) 18 
understood as being replaced with an appropriate function, e.g. 'p,..<X)' 
read as 'the pressure of x in millibars' and 'deM <x,y)' as 'the distance 
between x and y in centimeters'. The function 'at <, (x>, U' read as ',<x> at 
t' has the intended meaning that ,(x> holds at moment t. The symbols 
'<','>',"','~' and '=' carry their standard meaning. The relation 
'INCREASE (x,y>' is read as 'x increases over y', 'DECREASE(x,y>' read al 'x 
decreases over y' and 'CONSTANT (x,y>' as 'x is constant over y', Each 
function of the form ,(I) maps a set of specified physical objects to a ... 
history; e.g. in the case of teaperature of body x, the .-history i. x'. 
temperature/time curve, whUe the at CI,y) f\mcUon picks out a nWlvieal 
value of a set of measures for soma specified moment: 
(D96) INCREASE(,(I),y> sdef. at<,(I>,1nitial<y» < at<t(I),final(y> I\. 
Vzu[[P(z,y) I\. P(u,y> I\. B(z,u» .. 
at (,(I),z) , at (,(I>,u» 
(097) DECREASE<,<I),y) 5der. at(,(I>,init1al<y» > at(,(f),final<y) I\. 
Vzu[ [P(z,y> I\. P(u,y> I\. B(z,u>] .. 
at (,(I),z) ~ at(,(I),U>J 
(D98) CONSTANT(,(!),y> :def. Yzu[[P(z,y> I\. peu,y) I\. B(z,u>] .. 
at (,(I>,y) ;; at (,<I),y» 
type ~('tl,'t2):W, 'tl = MEASURE, 't2 :: INTERVAL, 
• ( {INCREASE,DECREASE,COHSTANT} 
type at <MEASURE,MOMENT):NUMBER 
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type p... CPHYSOB ):MEASURE 
type dcM CPHYSOB.PHYSOB):MEASURE 
In the non-retfied approach. dIfferent predicate variant. for INCREASE. 
DECREASE and CONSTANT lIu8t be used. depending on the type of measure 
being introduced. Each lleaeure function now take. an extra arguaent. e.g. 
PM. (x,y). (read as 'the presaure of x (in lIillibars) at lIoment y'). In 
general these lIeasure functions lIap physIcal bodies and mOlDent. to 
numbers. e.g, INCREASE_IN_PRESSURE <X,y) is defined as: 
(099) INCREASE_IlCPRESSURE<x.y) =def. p .... <x.init1alCy» < p .... <x.finalCy» " 
Yzu[ [P(z,y> II. P(u,y> II. B(z,u>] -+ 
p....(x,z) < p....(x,u) 
type INCREASE_IN_PRESSURE CPHYSOB.INTERV AL>:UU 
type Pt1. CPHYSOB.MOMENT):NUMBER 
3.7: Eztencl1ng the .ex."z), OBTADlSex.,> end 0CXUISex.,> relatlona. 
G1ven the forlDsl d1stinction lIade between lIollenta and intervals. we can 
easily extend the set of ternary relations of the fona • (x.y.z) 80 that 
body x can be said to be in relation • to body y at a llOIIent or within an 
interval or throughout an interval respectively (see Hamblin [1961] end 
Galton £19901>. In this case the definitions assume the followtns fOnD 
where "A" (x,y,z)' is understood to lIean that x 1& in relation t to y at 
moment z. 'tw -.., (x,y,z>' as x is in relation • to y within z, end "Th (x".z)' 
as x is in relation • to y throughout z': 
<DI00> fA .. (x,y,z) :Edef •• (x Iz,yIz) 
<DI0l> fW1:nn <x,y.z) =def. 3u[PPCu,z) 1\ t<Xlu,ylu)] 
<DI02> fTheX.y,z) =def. Vu[pP(u,z) -+ texlu.ylu>] 
type ',..,,,(-rl,'t2,-r3):UU 
type 'w~"('tl.'t2.'t4):W 
type t Th C-rl.'t2.'(4):UU. where d.'t2 = PHYSOB. ,,3 = MOMENT. 't4 = INTERVAL 
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The same increase of expressiveness can of course be extended to the 
reif1ed approach, where the OBTAINS (x,y) predicate split. into the following 
cases: IOBTAINSAio <x.y>' i. read as 'x obtains at y', 'OBTAINSw_" (x,y)' as IX 
obtains during y' end 'OBTADfS,. ... (x,y)' as 'x obtains throughout ,': 
<Dl03) OBTAINSA .. ex,y) :def. OBTAINS(x,y> " MOMENT(y) 
<Dl04-) OBTAINSw-. ex,y) act.f. 3z [pp (z.y> " OBTAINs.- .. (x.z) 
<DI05) OBTAINs,.,.,ex,y) :daf. Yz[PP(z,y) .. OBTAINSA .. ex,z>] 
type OBTAINSA .. (STATE,MOMENT):UU 
type OBTAlNSw_n CSTATE,INTERVAL):Ul1 
type OBTA INST ... (STATE,INTERVAL):UU 
The term and notion of en -envis10nment- stea. froll de Kleer's work in 
Qualitative Physics. An envisionmant takes a set of predeterained set of 
qualitative statal and express •• these in the form of a graph which 
represents a temporally partially ordered set of all the qualitative states 
a physical systea can evolve into given some indexed stat.. Envisioning 
is the process of constructing en envisionllent. Envisionmant. can be 
BttaJDable <starting froa eo •• initial atate) or total (at art inS froa all 
poss1ble states). Both types of env1sionment appear in QP literature - ••• 
Forbus [1988al for further deta1ls. 
Given the basic •• t of dyadic relations defined 801ely in term. of C, a 
subset of these <being mutually exclusive and exhaustive) can be used to 
generate an envisionJlent which describes legitimate transitions two 
objects can evolve into given sOlIe indexed state. The set of ba •• 
relations for lattice Le are the relationa: DC, Ee, PO, TPP, NTPP, TPI, NTPI, 
TPP-', and NTPP-t. In practical terms, given an ordered pair of Mmed 
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spatial regions <a,b>, exactly one of these relations will hold. This 
represents a set of qualitative states. 
Next the envisionment itself needs to be set up. This is represented 
in the form of a graph in Figure 9 below: 
00DC(x.YI 
I 
~EC(x'YI 
I 0 P01x,Yl 
flxJ\/ I ~rGJ\ 
TPP(x.yJ \:iJ~f::\ 8 TPP-l(X.y) 
I V I 
NTPPIx.y1 ®/TPlCx.YI ............... W NTPP-'(x,yl 
Figure 9: Transit:kln network based an the base relations of lattice Lc. 
Note that here the relation NTPI does not appear, since this model assumes 
all the regions to be closed regions. 
Legitimate transitions are indicated by edges, thus e.g. given a DC state, 
this can pass into an EC state (and vice-versa). The guiding intuition 
behind this network is best illustrated by considering two geometrical 
solid spheres x and y of different diameters which are initially widely 
separated, then brought together until their centres coincide. Lets 
suppose x is smaller than y. The sequence x and y will pass through will 
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pass through will be as follows DC(x,y>, EC(x,y>, PO (x,y>, TPP(x,y> and 
NTPP(x,y> respectively. The same principle is extended to cover other 
relations, e.g. the inside and outside relations - depicted in Figure 10. 
~0 'ILOUTSWE(x.yl 
~8 LOU TSWEIx.y I 
@ PJNSIDE(x.y1 
@ LINSIDEIx,y1 
@ VlJNSIDElx.yl 
Figure 10: Transition network for the deFJned :Inside and outside relations. 
Note thet the model used assumes all the pairs of regions to be 
disconnected. The reader is reminded here, that once DC and EC variants on 
these relations and inverses are defined, the complete set of relations 
that define a lattice in the manner of lattice Lc will substantially 
increase the number of nodes and transitions froll those depicted here. 
Given different sets of named relations, transition networks and the 
envisiomnents constructed from them, some lIeans to 'prune' the number of 
possible transitions from an indexed state must be made. A cursory glance 
will soon illustrate that if no restriction is made, the number of 
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potenUal transition states can grow drallatically froll solie indexed state. 
In the example used above using two spheres. salle pruning had been done 
implicitly by exploiting metric and geometrical informaUon. For exallple. 
the smaller sphere passed inside the latter, but not vice-versa. 
In general then. the pruning i. done as follows. Initially sortal 
information is exploited. For exaaple suppose the model uses only open 
regions. then the number of base relations reduce to the set {DR.PO.PP.PP-
1 ,EQUAL}. this ia because the EC relation 1s never satisfied and the 
relations C and 0 become equivalent thereby 'collapainS together' many 
hitherto distinguished relations. With the absence of EC, the tangential 
relations i .•. TP, TPP TPI and their inverses cease to be satisfied; PP 
collapses with NTPP, P with NTP and EQUAL with NTPI. This reduces further 
if only atolls are used, aince atOlls either rellain discrete or are 
identical: hence the set {DR,EQUAL}. 
However, in most cases physical objects will be aore naturally 
associated with closed regions of space which exploit the more expressive 
set of relations. In this case. empirical information extracted from the 
domain can be used to good effect. For example, separated solid objects 
do not norlUllly subsequently overlap, and rigid bodies have constant 
convex-hulls. S1IIilarly, solid deformable objects will generally change 
their convex-hulla, and in general only a smaller object will be able to 
pass inside another. This is discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
There are several ways an envisionment can be represented and 
implemented. One way to represent an envisionment uses the next (x) 
function. In this particular case I assume both object a continue to exist 
during the tellporal projection. and that both regions are closed regions: 
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(1) YxyzlDC<X",z) .. [OC(x,y,next (z» v EC(x",next(z»]J 
(11) \Ixyz(EC(x",z) ... (EC(x,y,next(z» v OC(x,y,next (z» v PO (x,y,next (z»] 
(111) Vxyz(PO(x,y,Z)'" (PO(x",next(z» v EC(x,y,next<z» v TPP(x,y,next(z» v 
TPP-' <X,y,next(z» v TPI<x,y,next (z»} 
(iv) Yxyz(TPP(x",z) .. [TPP(x",next (2» V NTPP(x,y,next (z» V 
PO(x,y,next(z» V TPI(x,y,nextCz»] 
(V) Vxyz[NTPP (x",z) ... [NTPP <x",next (z» V TPP (x,y,next (z» V 
TPI<x,y,next (z»] ] 
(vi) Yxyz [TPI <X,y,z) .. [po (x",next (z» v TPP (x,y,next (z» V 
HTPP<x,y,next (z»J J 
(vii) Yxyz[TPP-' (x,yz) ... [TPP-' (x,y,next (z» v NTPP-' (x,y,next (z» V 
PO (x,y, next (z» V Tprex,y,next (z»1 
(viii> VxyZ(NTPP-l <x,y,z) .. (NTPp-l (x,y,next (z» v TPP-' <X",next (z» v 
TPI<x,y,next <z»]] 
x,y:PHYSOB, z:PERIOD, next (x):MOMENT 
This particular set ofaxiOlls for generating an envisioruaent reflects the 
graph in Figure 9, excepting that each node would have in addition to the 
edges shown. a directed adse pointing back to itself. This would appl, if 
no change in the relation between x and , arose throughout period z and 
for the next aOllent following z. 
A second aethod introduces the notion of a lIaximel period of time 
over which soa. property. holds between regions x and y. <The notion of 
a aaxiael period over which propertles are true is aB8uaed both by Allen 
in hi' teaporal logic and in general in QP, where envlsionaents are used): 
tMAX <x",z) edef. tTh <X,y,z) 1\ 
ldu[[MOMENT(u> 1\ [MEETSCu,z) V MEBTS(z,u>J .. 
.... A ... <X"'U)] 
(in words: z 1s a max1Jlal period during whlch x bears ~ to y, if x bears • 
to y for all subperlods of z, and x does not bear • to y either for the 
.. oaent that meets z or the .oaent that 1s !let by z). 
For the envislonment, the trans1tion network follows that given above, 
except now, the direct trans1tion Is given. For this I only give one axlom, 
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since the reader can easily construct the complete set of axioms using the 
above set of envisionaent axiom. as a guide: 
Ihcyz{[oc...AX<x,y,z) 1\ ~NUlJ.(x,next(z» 1\ ~NULL(y,next(z)J ~ 
EC (x,y,next (z)] 
<Note the additional conjuncts which ensures a next state hold. only if x 
and y are not null for the moment 1mmedtately following.> 
It. third way to represent axiom. for generating an envtsionment 
introduces a NEXT(x,y,z,u> relation. This relation serves to l1nk 
successive state.. 'NEXT(x,y,z,u)' is read as 'state x i. the next state 
inmedtately following state y, that obtains between z and u', and a time (x) 
function read as 'the temporal duration of x', The sorting functions are: 
type NEXT (d,,;2,,;3t't'):UU, 'tl,'t2 = STATE, ,;3,'t' = PHYSOB 
type time (STATE):PERIOD 
The following axioms are added: 
Ihcyzu[NEXT(x,y,z,u) ~ MEETS(t1me(x),t1me(y»J 
x,y:STATE, z,u:PHYSOB 
(in words: consecutive states endure for periods of tille that meet> 
Ihcyz [3u [NEXT (u,x,y,z) ~ [~NUU..(y, tille <x» 1\ ~NULL (z, tille (x» JJ 
(in worda: a next (different) state u exists between y and z only if 'I and 
z are not null during the duration of u, where: 
NULL(x,y> :def. Vz[P(z,y> ~ NULL (xl z)] 
type NUll. CPHY9l8,PERIOD):W 
The transition network again follows that described above excepting that 
an explicit way to describe the change of state is now given. In contrast 
to the ternary relation t <x,y,z) used above, the latter argument i. now 
changed to be of sort STATE and the reading changed accordingly - thus 
e.g. CCa,b,c) would now read as 'a is connected with b in state c', For th:1e 
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I only give one entry, since as before, the reader can easily construct the 
complete set of envisionment axioms: 
b'xyzu[OC(x,y,Z) 1\ NEXT(u,z,x,y)l -+ EC(x,y,u>] 
x,y:PHYSOB, z,u:STATE 
The reader is reminded here that named events as well as stat.. can 
be incorporated into the NEXT(x,y,z,u) relation if required. For this the 
reading of the relation is changed accordingly, as are the sorttna 
functions for NEXT(x,y,z,u) and time (x) so that the correspondtng formula 
are well sorted when defined on the sort EVENT. 
3.9: Add1ng and exploit1ng a.p1r1cal :lnfOlWltion 
In the previous section I mentioned how by exploiting metrical. geoaetr1cal 
and empirical properties of particular bodies, one can restrict the manner 
in which objects can be spaUally related to each other over time. This 1& 
covered in lIore detail here. 
In general, physical objects can be adequately modelled by mapping 
them to closed spatial regions; the exception 18 perhaps gasaoua objects 
that having no clear identifiable perceptual boundaries ll:l8ht be good 
candidates to map to open regions. However, given the number of ba .. 
relations that can be satisfied using closed regions, and given the nuaw 
of possible relations generated in an env1sioMlent froll some given atate, 
additional information uncovered from the model and introduced into the 
theory, must be seen to cut the potential search space if the theory is to 
be computaUonally viable. Fortunately, this does seem to be the caae. 
One modelling domain used to illustrate this theory describes an 
amoeba which surrounds and engulfs a food particle so that the food 
passes inside. I will use this example to show how 10 principIa the 
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reduction might proceed. Initially. as suggested. physical bodies are 
mapped to closed regions of space: 
(1) \lxy[-NULL(xly) ~ CLOSED(xly>] 
This immediately cuts out one base relation froll Le. i .•. NTPI. since this 
1s only satisfied if a spatial region is open. This leaves 8 baae 
relations froll Le. Next. we note that the food and the amoeba in the 
cited process are treated as distinct bodies and reaain eo even when the 
food is inside the cell. This naturally suggests the following axloll: 
(11) Vxyz[ [PHYSOB(x> " PHYSOB (y> " DR(x.y.z» .. 
IIu [8 (z,u> ~ 
[-NULL(x.u) " -NULL(y,u)] .. DR(x,y,u>])] 
(in words: if two physical bodies are disjoint for any time, then (on their 
continued existence) they will always remain disjoint). 
Now the set of base relations of Le reduces (roa eight to two, i.e. 
{oc,Ee). However, this set will expand again once the ineide and outside 
relations (and their inverse relations> are included, so additional 
inforaatlon is sought. 
First note that in general. (or one thing to be able to pas. inside 
another, it aust be aaller in size. This relative compariaon o( .ize 
1l1U11ediately suggests an ilImedlat. way to constrain the set of possible 
transitions by introducing the (ollowing two axioms: 
and 
(iv) IIxyz[MUCH_sMALLER_THAN(x,y) ~ -INSIDE(yl z,xl z)]. 
Hence, given an amoeba (amoeba 1 ) and some amoebal food «(ood1) we can now 
deduce that for any moment z, -INSIDE (amoeba 1 I z.foodl/ z) holds. Thi. 
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immediately reduces the extended set of base relations by .xclud~ all 
the inverse relations coyered by the relation INSIDE_ 1 (food 1 I z,amoeba11 z). 
Next we note that ordinarily, we would want to exclude not only the 
case where the amoeba is inside the food but partially inside it too. This 
guiding intuition susgets that so •• notion of granularity is evident in 
the model based on the relative sizes and functional relationship we 
impose on the two objects. Even though the food may well POS888S 
negative surface curvature so that it could wrap around part of the 
amoeba's body <and sanction the wff P _INSIDE (amoeba 1 I z, food 11 z», it se .. s 
innapropr1ate to model this. Two strategies are suggested, the first by 
strengthening the axioll cited above, so that the axioll: 
or, alternatively we could introduce the elellent of granularity inherent in 
the model by stipulating that: 
(vi) ~x[Food(x> -+ ~y[ ... NUU..(xly> ~ CONVEX<Xly>)]. 
Given (vii) - the theorem: 
<T83) Vxy[[P_INSIDE<X,y> II INSIDE(x,y» ~ ... ConvexCy>} 
x,y: SPATAn. \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
then, P _INSlDE-' (food! I z,aaoebell z>, will cease to hold, with the net re.ult 
that all the inverse relations of the inside and partially inside relation. 
will be pruned out of the set of possible relations given the ordered pair 
(amoeba 1, food 1>. 
Other empirical information lIight be possible to exploit. For example, 
given a either a close proximity between the amoeba and ita food, or 
contact, we would not ordinarily expect the organisa to aove away, or 
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exhibit oscillatory behaviour. <Perhaps the amoeba responds to sOlie 
chellical trace in the fluid that surrounds the food?). Assuming this to be 
true, we could interpret close proxtaity between the amoeba and its food 
as J _OlTfSIDE (food 11 z,aJloeball z>. But froll this we can state: 
YxyZ ([Amoeba (x> 1\ Food <y> 1\ J_OUTSlDE <y,x,z) ) -+ 
-3u [s <z,u> 1\ W_OtrrsIDE <y,x,u>]] 
(in words: if the food is just outside the amoeba, then no following state 
will arise where the food 18 wholly outside the goebe> 
and, 
Yxyz[[Amoeba(x) " Food<y> 1\ J_OUTSlDE<y,x,z» -+ 
3u[B(z,u> " EC(y,x,u)JJ 
<in words: if the food i8 just outside the amoeba, a following tiJlle wUl 
arise where both the food and the saoebe are contact). 
A virtue of th1e formal theory. is that it 1s relatively easy to see 
how to model a dOllain using less expressive subsets of the full set of 
defined relations. I will use the Balle example again, of en amoeba 
engulfing some food. For this exallple I will restrict myself to the basic 
set of relations encoded in lattice Lc:. Again I use the axiom: 
(1) Yxy[-NULL<xly> -+ CLOSED<xly>l 
but not the axiom: 
(11) Yxyz[[PHYSOB(x) 1\ PHYSOB<y> "DR(x,y,z>J -+ 
Vu[S<z.u) -+ 
[-NULL<x,u> " NUlJ.<y,u>] -+ DR<X,y,u>)]]. 
simply because I now want to allow the the spaces occupied by the food 
and the amoeba to overlap. <The reason for this is because the panage of 
the food inside the cell, modelled in terms of the sequence: DC to EC to PO 
to TPP to NTPP, will require this condition to hold.) Again we add the 
axiom: 
- 121 -
and now the new axiom: 
<iv') Vxyz[MUCH_SMAU..ER_THAN<x,y) ... ..,P<yl z,xl z)]. 
Suppose now we are given the constants amoebal and food1. Froll axiom 
(i) we eltDlinate the relation NTPI from the set of base relations as 
before, which leaves 8, and from axiolls (i11) and <iv') all the inverse 
relations and equality. This leaves the set {DC,EC,PO,TPP,NTPP} from which 
the reader should be able to see that a unique envisionment can be 
constructed. Again following the above example, additional axiolls could be 
added, e.g.: 
\fXYZ([AmoebaCx) 1\ Food<y> 1\ EC(y,x,z)] ... 
... 3u[B(z,u) 1\ DC<y,x,u>]}, 
Vxyz([Amoeba<x) 1\ Food<y) 1\ po<y,x,z>] ... 
..,3u[B(z,u> 1\ SC<y,x,u>l1 
\fxyz([AmoebaCx) 1\ Food<y> 1\ TPP<y,x,z>] ... 
... 3u[BCz,u) 1\ POCy,x,u>]] 
\fxyz ([Amoeba (x) 1\ Food <y) 1\ NTPP <y,x,z) ] ... 
... 3u[BCz,u) 1\ TPPCy,x,z>}] 
The model satisfying these axioms is one where the process of com~ into 
contact and eventually engulfing the food is monotonic. In general, 
however, it will prove expedient to clearly separate out process 
descriptions froa the conditions that link and constrain them, sUSSested 
here. Otherwise, the model for the theory will be too restrictive and will 
not be flexible enough to account for leglttDlate variations in behaviour 
that are observed in the actual physical system used to interpret the 
theory. 
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3.10: Defining continuity :in proc:aaaea 
Up until now, the notion of continuity sanctioning direct transitions 
between states has been rellained implicit. The justification made an 
appeal to intuition by considering specified sequences of pictorial 
representations of spatial regions. However, not only can the notion of 
continuity be made explicit, the envisionJDellt can also be generated from 
an application two simple rules. In this case change is related to a 
change in the quantity an class of incident points shared between pairs of 
regions. 
Table 1 represents two qualitatively identical closed regions x and y 
passing from DC through to NTPP. The process is represented below in a 
tabular forll. Under each relation, the quantity of commonly shared 
boundary and interior pOints is given. The entries "none", "some" and "aU" 
mean that no, some or all points in a given category are held in common 
between the ordered pair <x,y>, while "subset" C"superset") means that x's 
points are a proper subset (superset) of y·s. The symbol "... 411-" ___ II can 
be read as •... can directly change to --- (and vice-verse)': 
Table 1: 
<x. 'I> DC EC PO TPP NTPP 
---------------------------------------------------------
Boundary 
Interior 
none .. -.. SOIl8 some 60me 411- .. none 
none none .. -.. some 411-" subset subset 
Excepting the case where regions x and 'I pass to equality, continuity 
across adjacent states Is fixed by the following two conditions: 
a) that for each class of incident pOints, the change in quantity can 
Change from "none" to "some" (or vice-versa) and froD "some" to "all" (or 
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vice-versa) but not from "none" to "some" (or vice-versa). Similarly a 
change from "some" to "subest" (or vice versa) is allowed, or from "some" 
to "superset" (or vice-versa), as is either "subset" or "superset" to "all" 
(or vice-versa>, but not froll "none" to either "subset" or "superset" (or 
vice-versa), and 
b) only one class of points can change at eny one t1Jle. 
Note that just as in the case where in QP, the value "+" cannot pass to "-,, 
(or "-,, to "+") without f1rst passing through ''O'' the salle principle 
applies in the current theory. Here the analogue of "0" corresponds to 
states where boundary connection between two regions hold. Thu8 for 
exallple, DC cannot pass to PO (or PO to DC) without first passing through 
PO, and PO cannot pass to NTPP (or NTPP to PO) without first passing 
through TPP. 
To reveal the explicit characterisation of continuity in terms of 
changing quantities 10 the classes of incident pOints shared between x and 
y for the inside and outside relations, the relations must first be 
unpacked in terms of their respective def1niens. In this instance the 
comparison between x and y 18 taken to be between x and conv <y). 
Table 2: 
(x,y> 
Boundary I 
Interior I 
none ~-. some some some ~-. none 
none none ~-. some ~-. all all 
e.g. taking the relation I_Outside (x,y>, the following equivalence arises: 
Vxy[I_Outside(x,y) ~ EC(x,conv(y»). 
Looking at the entry for Table 1: 
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(x, conv <)'» I EC(x, conv(y» 
-----------------------------
Bondary 
Interior 
some 
none 
3.11 Changfns miversea of discourse 
Objects that come into existence at a particular moment of time are 
created by invoking a new existentially quantified variable or an 
individual constantj or skolem function or individual constant respectively. 
For entities that pass out of existence, these are mapped to the sort NULL. 
For example, the wff: 
Vacuole(a,tl) ,.. Null<alnext(tl» ,.. ~2[B<next(t1),t2) -+ Null(a,t2)] 
captures the process of a vacuole passing out of existence and remaining 
so. 
Note that this is a very strong condition for non-existence, since the 
bearer of some property actually passes out of existence (in the sense 
that it does not occupy (physical space), rather than loose some other 
defining property. 
3.12 S......, 
In this chapter I have shown how descriptions of states, events and 
processes are incorporated into the theory, and how from the s:lmple 
expedient of mapping physical bodies to the spaces they occupy, complex 
relations between bodies in space can be easily described. Two methods to 
incorporate the explicit representation of time in wff were discussed, the 
simple case where each n-place relation was complemented witha n+l place 
relation, and a retfied approach that allowed in addition to the explicit 
representation of time, the explicit representation of named states and 
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events. The notion of an envisionment was introduced, and examples were 
given. Techniques to reduce the number of projected states from a given 
state were discussed. This involved both the use of sortal information 
embodied in the general theory and empirical information extracted from 
the modelled domain. 
In the following chapter I discuss two reasonably complex domains to 
show in more detail how the theory described so far is used, and how 
individual process descriptions are constructed, and linked together. 
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Chapter 4: Saaple Modelling Probleaa 
4.1: Introduct1Cl1'l 
In this chapter I show how simple physical systems can be formally 
described using the formal apparatus set up in chapters 2 to 3. Processes 
are defined in terms of specified sequences of state descriptions. 
Typically, these resolve into descriptions of spatial relations holding 
between particular objects where the degree of connectivity between them 
vary over time. I use two examples for this. The first describes 
phagocytosis and exocytosts of a simple protozoan. The second 
concentrates upon the series of processes that arise during the cycle of 
operations associated with a force pump. 
A complete axiornatisation describing either domain is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. The reader will better appreCiate the anticipated 
complexity and scope of such formal theories after reading this chapter, 
given that this chapter simply sets out to show the adequacy of the 
formal theory for describing reasonably complex physical domains. 
For the following examples, the set of sort symbols defining lattice 
1. are increased in number, in particular the number of sort symbols that 
are subsorts of PHYSOB. In order to help the reader reading the 
definitions, sort predicates are lIade explicit. Using LLAMA, these would 
not normally appear in their clausal translations, but would be absorbed 
into the sortal maChinery supported by the logic. 
Earlier workings of both domains can be found in Randell and Cohn 
[1989a,b] (where the process of phagocytosis 1s outlined) and in Randell 
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and Cohn (1989cl and 10 Randell, Cohn and Cui [19911 (where the force pump 
is described). 
4.2: Phagocytosis and Exocytosfs 
Phagocytosis is the process by which cells surround, engulf and then 
digest food particles. It is the feeding method used by some unicellular 
protozoans of which the amoeba 1s an example and adopted here. The same 
process is also used by white blood cells in an attempt to deal with 
invading micro-organisms. Exocytosis refers to a similar 'inverse' process 
where waste material is expelled from the cell. 
dJaesUon-vacuoJe 
food 
/ 
Ffsure 11: The aaoeba 
In the proposed model <see Figure 11) an amoeba is depicted living 
within a fluid environment conta1ning other organisms that are its food. 
Each amoeba is credited with vacuoles (or fluid filled spaces) containing 
either enzymes or food which the animal has ingested. The enzymes are 
used by the amoeba to break down and digest the ingested food into 
nutrient and waste. This is done by routing the enzymes to the food 
vacuole. Upon contact the enzyme vacuole and food vacuole fuse together 
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and the enzymes merge into the fluid filled space containing the food 
particle. The enzymes act upon the food breaking it down into nutrient 
and waste. The nutrient is absorbed into amoeba 1 protoplasm leaving the 
waste material in the vacuole ready to be expelled. The latter is achieved 
by letting the vacuole pass to the exterior of the protozoan's body which 
opens up, letting the waste material pass into the amoeba! environment. 
The various stages of phagocytosis and exocytosi8 are depicted in 
Figure 12 which should be referred to when reading the formal descriptions 
given below. 
Phl8ocytosjs ------------~~~ 
o 0 O~==== ceJJ~membrane 0 0 
cytoplum 
~ Exocytosk 
Figure 12: Phagocytosis and exocytoa1s. In phagocytosis, the cell 
approaches, contacts end then engulfs the food, eventually forming a food 
vacuole. In exocytosis the waste or residual material left after digestion 
passes out toward the cell membrane and then is released into the amoebal 
environment. 
Firstly, I introduce three axioms that hold in the domains I 8m 
considering here. These axioms ensure that every named physical object 
exists <physically> for at least one moment, that any physical object that 
1s null for a moment is null for all time after that moment, and that When 
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a physical object comes into <physical> existence at a particular mOllent, 
that object is null for all time before that moment: 
~x[PHYSOB(x> ~ 3y[~NULLCxly)J] 
~xy[[PHYSOB<X) 1\ NULL<xly>] ~ IIz[B<y,z) ~ NUU.(x,z>]J 
~x[[PHYSOBCx) ~ [3yz[MEETSCy,z} 1\ NULL(xly> 1\ -NUU<Xlz» ~ 
I;Iu[B(u,y> ~ NULL (x,u>] JJ 
Next I describe the protozoan. The protozoan consists of a nucleus 
and cytoplasm. The cytoplasm is the liqUid body of the cell in which the 
chemical reactions of life occur. The nucleus is isolated from the 
cytoplasm by a nuclear membrane; a similar membrane bounds the cell which 
controls the entry and exit of materials by allowing certain substances 
through but not others: 
AMOEBA(x) =def. 3yz[NUCLEUS(y> 1\ CYTOPLASM(z) 1\ 
~u[[~NULL(ylu> 1\ "NULLCzlu>] ~ 
~OCylu,zlu) 1\ NTPP(ylu,xlu) 1\ 
EQUAL(suaCyl u,zl u),xl u)] J 
NUCLEAR_MEMBRANE<x> :def. 3y[NUCLEUS(y) 1\ 
Idz[ .. Ntn..L(yl z) ~ EQUAL <XI z,skin(yl z»JJ 
CELL_MEMBRANE(x) :def. 3y[Cell<y) 1\ 
sort CELL c PHYSOB 
sort AMOEBA c CELL 
~z["NULL(ylz) ... EQUAL(x,z,skin(ylz»]] 
sort NUCLEAR_MEMBRANE c MEMBRANE 
sort CELL_MEMBRANE c MEMBRANE 
sort NUCLEUS c PHYSOB 
sort CYTOPLASM c PHYSOB 
sort MEMBRANE c PHYSOB 
Each protozoan has at least one enzyme vacuole as a part for every 
moment of its existence: 
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VX[AMOEBA(x) ~ Yy[~NUlL(xly) ~ 
3z [ENZYME_VACUOLE(z) " NTPP(zl y,xl y)] ) 
DefinItions for different types of vacuoles are constructed as follows. 
The definition for a vacuole states that it is a a fluld filled space, and 
that whenever it exists, there also exists a cell of which it is a part. 
This definition relies on the stipulation that the fluid filled space 
comprises of a connected body of water, such that no other connected body 
of water exlsts of which it Is a p~oper part. <Note the similarity with 
maximal periods of time for which BOme property holds, described in 
section 3.8.) 
VACUOLE(x) :idef. WATER,..AX (x> " Yy[~NUll<X1 y> ~ 3z[CELL(z) " PP<XI y,zl y>]] 
where: 
WATERMAX (x) :idef. WATER(x) " Yy[ [~NULL<XI y> " Connected <XI y>] ~ 
... 3z[WATER<z) " 
Connected (zl y>" PP (xl y,zl y>]] 
The definitions for specialisation. of vacuoles follow the &aile form, 
excepting the definition for the waste vacuole, which adds the condItion 
that only resIdual material is contained: 
ENZYME_VACUOLE(x> :idef. VACUOLE (x> " 
~y[ ... NULL<xly) -. 
3z[ENZYME(z> " PP(zly,xly>]) 
FOOD_VACUOLE(x) :def. VACUOLE(x) " 
Yy [ ... NULL (xl y> ~ 3z[FOOD(z) " PP(zl y,xl ,,>J 
DrGESTIO~CVACUOLE(x> :idef. FOOD_VACUQLE(x) " EHZYME_VACOOLE(x) 
WASTE_VACUOLE(x) :idef. VACUOLE(x) " 
'iy[~NULL(xl y> ~ 
3z[WASTE(z> " PP(zly,xly> " 
... 3u[PHYSOB(u> " PP(u,x) " 
... WASTE<u> 1\ "WATER(u>] 
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sort VACUOLE: PHYSOB 
sort ENZYME_ VACUOLE: VACUOLE 
sort FOOD_VACUOLE:VACUOLE 
sort DIGESTION_VACUOLE = FOOD_VACUOLE n ENZYME_VACUOLE 
Bart WASTE_VACUOLE:VACUOLE 
sort ENZYME: PHYSOB 
sort WASTE:PHYSOB 
sort WATER:PHYSOB 
sort WATER...Ax:WATER 
Each vacuole is bounded by a membrane (composed of the same material as 
the cell membrane): 
VACUOLE_MEMBRANE(x) :def. 3y[VACUOL£(y) A 
Yz [-NUl.L Cyl z) ... 
EQUALCxI z,skin<yJ z»] 
sort VACUOLE_MEMBRANE:MEMBRANE 
Here, I regard the vacuole membrane as part of the vacuole. However, in 
actual fact the vacuole is deltmited by its membrane - hence the vacuole 
could also be formally described as being surrounded by the membrane but 
forming no part of it. (Indeed, although this is not done here, one could 
easily define a function that picks out the 'layer' of atoms that surround 
a given reg lon, and map the vacuole membrane to that.) In point of fact, 
when the food is enveloped by the protozoan and the food vacuole formed, 
the cell membrane wraps around the food, and detaches itself thus forming 
the material of the vacuole membrane. <This process 18 analogous to a 
soap bubble being blown from a hoop dipped in soapy solution and leaving 
the hoop with 8 soap film intact.) Similarly, in exocytoais that same 
vacuole material is reabsorbed as the vacuole membrane first contacts the 
cell membrane, fuses together thus expelling the residue material. 
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Food i. regarded as having nutrient which is absorbed by the cell (and 
undigestible material which is not absorbed and is eventually expelled): 
~x[FOOD(x) ~ ~y[~NULL(xIY) ~ 
3z[N1TI'RIENTCz> 1\ PP(zl ,/,xl y>1 
sort NUTRIENT:PHYSOB 
I now start to describe staple processes. These are later conjoined 
together to describe more complex processes. I shall describe these 
processes in the order in which they arise in the informal description 
given above, 80 that the linkege between thea can be made clear. Firstly, 
the process where an object moves toward another object: 
MOVES_TOWARD<x,y,z} :def. DECREASES<cb, (x,y).z). 
type MOVES_TOWARD (PHYSOB,PHYSOB,INTERV AL):UU 
It should be clear from th1a definition that as long a8 x moves toward 'I, 
x end yare not connected during period z, although x and y may come into 
contact et the final moment of z. 
Next, the state where one object is in contact with another. This is 
expressed using the relation EC Cx,y.z). 
The next process to be defined 1s rather complex. In this cue it is 
where one object x engulfs another object y. The formalism allows this 
particular process to be described in different ways according to the level 
of detail required. For example it may be deemed sufficient to describe 
this process by allowing x and 'I to overlap, and stipulat~ the sequence 
where the relet10n between 'I and x passes (rOIl PO to TPP to NTPP over 
consecutive periods: (Note, immediately below and elsewhere, I express 
several conjunctions of the MEETS relation in a canonical form. Thus e.g. 
"MEETS(u,v,w)" abbrevietes "MEETS(u,v) " NEE1'SCv,w)" - where texl,x2, .11 xn) 
requires xn-l conjunctions of literals using the predicate.. The same 
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principle is extended to the summation function. Thus for example, the 
wff "sum (x,y,z>" abbreviates the wff "sum (sura (X,y>,2)"). 
ENGULFS(x,y,z) :def. 3uvw(PO(x,y,u> 1\ TPP(y,x,v) 1\ NTPP(y,x,w) 1\ 
MEETS(u,v,w) 1\ EQUAL(sum(u,v,w),z)] 
type ENGULFS (PHYSOB,PHYSOB, INTERVAL>: UU 
Alternatively, one can keep x and y discrete (until perhaps some process 
acts on them so that we would then allow them to overlap>. In this case 
the inside and outside relations can be used. Thus the passage of 'f into 
x and being enveloped by x could be formally described by stipulating the 
sequence from P _INSIDE to LINSIDE to W_INSIDE for y end x, and then froa 
W_INSIDE to TPP to NTPP. 
ENGULFS Cx,y,z) :def. 
3uvwu'v'w'(P_INSlDE<y,x,u) 1\ J_INSIDE<y,x,v) 1\ W_INSIDE<y,x,w) 1\ 
TPP(y,x,u') 1\ NTPP(y,x,v') 1\ MEETS(u,v,w,u',v') 1\ 
EQUAL (eua (u,v,w,u',v'),z) 
type ENGULFS(PHYSOB,PHYSOB,INTERVAL):UU 
Alternatively, the TS and NTS relatione could be incorporated, thus: 
ENGULFSCx,y,z) :def. 3uvw[P_INSIDE(y,x,u) 1\ TS(y,x,v) 1\ NTS(y,x,w) 1\ 
MEETS(u,v,w) 1\ EQUALCsUJD(u,v,w),z>] 
Note too, that just as the proper part relations admit surround dual., an 
analogue can be defined for the PO relation, thus: 
PARTIALLY_SURROUN)EJ)(x,y) =def. P_INSIDE(x,y) 1\ EC(x,y> 1\ 
~Z [[P(z,skin (x» 1\ P(z,conv <y»] .. 
EC(2,y>] 
type PARTIALLY_SURROUNDE[) ('t,'t):UU, 't = SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNlVERSE 
(In this case x 1s in contact w1th y and partially inside it, and every 
part of the skin of x which is inside y externally connects with y - in 
other words y wraps around x, but some of x protrudes). Thus, another 
alternative description for the process of being engulfed could be 
expressed as follows: 
ENGULFS(x,y,Z) :def. 3uvw[PARTIAlLY_SURROUNDEO(y,lC,U) 1\ 
TS(y,x,v} 1\ NTS(y,x,w) 1\ MEETS{u,v,w} " 
EQUAL (sum (u,v,w),z>] 
type ENGULFS<PHYSOB,PHYSOB,INTERVAL}:UU 
Here one can see Hayes' idea of constantly seeking out the simplest model 
for a given formal theory and introducing more formal constraints as the 
intended model is better understood and isolated. 
Given we now have the state where the amoeba has the food contained 
in a vacuole, the next process to be described is where the enzymes, 
having made contact with the food vacuole, fuse with the food and break 
down the food into its constituent parts - nutrient and waste. Again, as 
before there are several ways this process could be described. Here I . 
capture the notion of absorption by explicitly allowing both the food and 
the enzyme body to overlap: 
DlGESTS{x,y,z) :der. 3uvwu'v'[FOODCu) 1\ ENZYME (v) " OCx,y,w} " 
MEETSCw,u') 1\ EQUAL(sumCw,u'),z) 1\ 
WASTE(v') 1\ NULL(v',w) 1\ 
~NULL(v',u'} " NULLCu,finalCz»] 
type DlGESTSCPHYSOB,PHYSOB,INTERVAL) 
For process of absorption itself, this is modelled by letting the nutrient 
pass out of the digestion vacuole through the vacuole membrane into the 
surrounding cell material. 
ABSORBS(x,y,z) =def. 3uvwu'[CELL(x) 1\ NUTRIENT<y> 1\ DlGESTION_VACUOLECu> 1\ 
PCu,x,z) 1\ P(y,u,v> 1\ POCy,u,w> " -OCy,u,u') 1\ 
PCy,x,u') " MEETS(v,w,u') " 
EQUALCsua (v,w,u'>,z>] 
type ABSORBS CPHYSOB,PHYSOB, INTERVAL):UU 
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The converse process of expulsion reverses the sequence of states 
described for the engulfing process: 
EXPELS(x,y,z) !:def. 3uvw[P _INSIDE(y,x,u) 1\ TS <y,x,v) 1\ NTS(y,x,w) 1\ 
MEETS(w,v,u) 1\ EQUAL (sum <w,v,u),z>] 
type EXPELS (PHYSOB,PHYSOB, INTERVAL>:UU 
Finally, I describe the process where one object moves away from another: 
MOVES_AWAY _FROM (x,y,z) :def. INCREASES(dcM (x,y),z) 
type MOVES_AWAY]ROM (PHYSOB,PHYSOB,INTERVAL):UU 
It now remains to link these sub-process descriptions together. The 
definitions for phagocytosis and exocytosis are consequently defined and 
drawn together as follows: 
PHAGOCYTOSIS(x,y> 5def. CELLCx) 1\ INTERVAL(y) 1\ 
3zuvwz'u'v'[FOOD(z) 1\ FOOD_VACUOLE(u) 1\ NUTRIENT(v) 1\ 
EC (x,z,w) 1\ ENGULFS (x,z,z') 1\ 
DIGESTS(x,z,u') 1\ ABSORBS(x,v,v') 1\ 
MEETS(w,z',u',v') 1\ 
EQUAL (sum (w,z',u',v'),y>] 
EXOCYTOSIS(x,y> :def. C£u'(x) 1\ INTERVAL(y> 1\ 
3z[WASTE(z) 1\ EXPELS(x,z,y>J 
type PHAGOCYTOSIS (CELL, INTERV AL):UU 
type EXOCYTOSIS (CELL,INTERV AL):UU 
Note that some of the sort declarations used above could be made more 
specific than that given. For example, the declaration: 
type ENGULFS <PHYSOB,PHYSOB, INTERVAL>: UU, 
could be declared as type ENGULFS (CELL,FOOD):UU, and 
type MOVES_TOWARD(PHYSOB,PHYSOB,INTERVAL) 8S 
type MOVES_TOWARD (CELL.FOOO, INTERVAL>: UU. 
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Obviously, the specificity of sorts embedded in particular process 
descriptions will depend on the complexity of the model used and the 
degree of generality required for such process descriptions. Other sortal 
information could be bu1lt into the declarations: e.g. 
type EXPELS (AMOEBA,WASTE):UU and type EXPELS (T\AMOEBA, T\WASTE}:FF, 
indicating that only amoebae (in the model> can expel waste matter, and 
only waste material at that. 
The attentive reader will probably note severel inadequacies for the 
process definitions given above. For example, the literal 
MOVES_TOWARD(amoebel,foodl,tl> is satisfied if the protozoan remains 
stationary and the food drifts toward the protozoan during tiJIe tl. One 
useful notion missing here is agency, another of location and whether or 
not a body remains in that same location over tille. Both notions could be 
readily accommodated in the formal theory if required, though this mOves 
outside the scope of the present formalism - remembering that here and 
throughout this thesis pr~acy is given to descriptions rooted in naked 
observations, i.e. eschewing notions of forces, agency and goals. For 
example, in the case of the former, attributing agency to the protozoan 
could be linked to its abUity to change locations without recours. to 
some external force acting upon it, and its ability to satisfy simple 
goals, in this case garnering food and undergoing transformations in shape 
and topology in order to do so. The food in contrast is taken to be of 
secondary importance, in the sense that apart from its constituent parts, 
no further explicit information about its shape is required, although the 
relative size between the protozoan and its food has a bear~ on what the 
protozoan can in principle engulf. The latter notion appeared in section 
3.9. There, empirical information about the relative sizes of bodies was 
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exploited to cut down the number of possible spatial relations associated 
between particular bodies. 
Above, processes have been defined by decompos~ each process into 
specified sequences of consecutive states. This ordering, for the greater 
part, followed the direct transitions sanctioned by the envisionment axioms 
constructed for different sets of relations. However, these processes can 
be defined in a more compact form by simply sUpulating preconditions that 
must hold together with descriptions of the the intial and final stages of 
the process. The intermediate states are subsequently generated with the 
envisionment axioms. For example, phagocytosis could be defined as: 
PHAGOCYTOSIS<X,y> sdef. CELL<x> 1\ INTERVAL<y> 1\ 
3z[FOOO<z> 1\ 1_0UTSIDE<zliniUal<y>,xliniUaICy» 1\ 
NTPP(zl final<y),xl final<y»J 
(In this case we see phagocytosis begins with the food just outside the 
cell, and ends when it appears a& a nontangenUal part of the cell, i.e. aa 
part of the food vacuole so fOrDed.) 
'.3: Modell1ng the force puap 
A force pump is illustrated in Figures 13 end 14 below. For Simplicity, I 
have assumed that the pump is prilled and that the reservoir feeding the 
inlet pipe is always full of liqUid. The pump has two valves, valvet and 
valve2 which open by doors, door1 and door2. The doors are hinged to the 
pllllp body closing portals portall and portal2 respectively. On the 
upstroke, valve1 is open while valve2 is shut. This arise. because the 
upthrust pressure of the liquid acting upon doorl is greater than the 
downthrust forces acting from within the pump and acting on that door. 
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portaJ3 
portal4 
Figure 13: A fcree pump. 
plunser 
pilton 
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oUtlet-pipe 
portalS 
The pressure difference opens the valve door and allows the liquid to pass 
from the inlet pipe into the main chamber. During this process the door 
of velve2 remains closed, seeling valve2. In this case atmospheric 
pressure acting on the door plus that ariSing from any liquid in the 
outlet pipe, thrusts the door into the portal effecting a seal. A similar 
chain of processes arise with the downstroke of the piston. Dn this case. 
valvet shuts and valve2 opens and the liquid passes from inside the pump 
out into the outlet pipe. The cycle is then repeated. 
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Three basic states are assumed, where the piston is moving up, is 
moving down and is stationary. For simplicity I have assumed that when 
the piston is either at the nadir of its upward or downward motion, the 
next moment in time coincides with both valves being shut. In actual fact 
this would not arise in a primed working force pump, e.g. valve1 would 
almost certainly remain open for a few moments as the piston travelled on 
its downward path. Other strong assumptions implicit in the description 
of the working pump are covered below. 
o 
Figure 14: The _in cycle of operations of the force puap 
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Firstly, I build the pUIlP from a library of component parts. The pUIlP 
body is a multiply connected rigid object with three portals, portall, 
porta12 and portal3 which are proper parts of its inside. Note that the 
portals are represented as regions inside the pump body, and that in the 
model the outer surface of the portals al~ with exterior surface of the 
pump body. This makes a portal distinct froa any passageway that might 
link the outside of a body from some inner chamber that might exist (a8 in 
this example). Portals are specifically defined not to be surface only or 
having zero thickness. 
The definition of a portal proceeds as follows. A portal x of region 
Y is defined as part of the inside of y such that every closed atom which 
is part of x, connects with the outside of y. The last conjunct tn the 
definition ensures that the portal/outside interface is not point l1ke. 
'PORTAL (x,y>' is read as 'x is a portal of y' and 'PortaI<x)' as 'x 18 a 
portal': 
PORTAL <K,y) Edef. P (x,inside (y» 1\ 
Vz[CCz,x) ~ 
3v[C_atom<w> 1\ Pew,inside(x» 1\ cew,outsideCx» 1\ 
C (z,w)]] 1\ Manifold (sua (x,outside (y») J ] 
Vx3y[PORTALCx,y> ~ PORTAL(x>J 
type PORTAL (PORTAL, SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNlVERSE>:UU 
type PORTAL (SPATIAL \SPA TIAL_UNlVERSE):UU 
By making portals regions and not part of the boundary tnterfac. 
between the inside and outside of bodies, properUes that can be a8cribed 
to regions can also be ascribed to portals. In particular, if the apace 
taken up by a portal's door seals a passageway between the interior (in 
the non-topological sense> of a pump body and its outside (hence filling 
1n the porta!>, we can infer that the portal i8 sealed. A three place 
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predicate 'PORTAL<X,y,z)' read as 'x is a portal of y during time z' is also 
added and defined 8S follows: 
PORTAL(x,y,z) sdef. Yu[P(u,z) -+ PORTAL <x,yl u>] 
t ype PORTAL (PORTAL,PHYSOB, PERIOD ):UU 
A piston with plunger attached, two pipes, an inlet and outlet pipe, 
are added. Since the piston always form. a seal with the inner wall of 
the pup body, adding the piston means that two disconnected chambers are 
created, the main and top chamber. It is worth pointing out that the 
formalism makes this relationship expl1cit. 
It would be useful to pick out that region of the pump that functions 
as the main chamber. Given the particular example of the forca pump 
modelled, this region is delineated by first of all taking the sum region 
of the pump body and its inside, and then taking the difference between 
this composite region and the piston and plunger. This results in a 
disconnected region consisting of the top and bottoll chambers. The region 
connected to portall is chosen. Finally the target region is isolated by 
taking the maximally convex region that fits 'inside' the region i. 
question. In effect this is tantamount to defining a convex kernel (c.f. 
convex hull), but unlike the convex hull, a convex kernel i. not unique 
<e.g. as with a body with a regular cruciform shaped interior - it would 
contain two such convex regions) and hence cannot be defined as a 
function. However, this limitation hides an important fact about pumps of 
the type given. Given the function of a sliding piston in a pump body 
<and the fact that pistons and pump bodies are typically rigid objects) 
some regularity in the interior shape of the inside of the pWlP body 1& 
ensured. The piston always forms a good seal with the inside of the wall 
of the pump body and one would not expect to find component parts of the 
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pump body actlog as protrusions loto the work space. Hence despite the 
fact that no general definition of this reglon can be given (although 10 
lIlany cases it can be adequately described) a certain utility in picking It 
out can be argued for. For exallple, we might want to be able to reason 
that if the inside of the working pump body got indented, the piston would 
jam, or the pump would loose Its efflc1ency. 
Valves are created by adding hloged doors to the pump body which can 
seal their respective portals. We represent valves as a two place functor 
valve (x,,> whose argument sorts are PORTAL, DOOR and whose result sort 1. 
VALVE. 
A partial formal description of the pump 1s given below: 
Vx Mult1ply_Connected(pump-bodylx) 
Idx PP(portall,los1deCpump-bodyl x» 
Idx PP (porta 12 ,inside (pump-body I x» 
IIx PP(portal3,inslde (pump-body I x» 
IIx INSIDE (piston I x,pump-bodyl x) 
IIx EC(plungerl x,pump-bodyl x) 
IIx P_INSIDE(plunger/x,pump-bodylx) 
IIx Disconnected (diff(inslde (pump-body I x,plstonl x> 
DC (sum (top-chaaber,portal3),sum (SUID (portall,porta12),llsinchamber» 
IIx I_OUTSEDE(lolet-p1pelx,pump-bodylx) 
IIx EC(lolet-pipelx,pump-bodylx) 
!;Ix J_OUTSEDE(outlet-plpel x,pump_bodyl x) 
!;Ix EC(outlet-p1pe1 x,pUllp_bodyl x> 
IIx [[SHUT(valvel,x) 1\ SHUT(valve2,x)] .. 
NTs CIIain-chamberl x,sum (sum (sum (door 1 I x,door21 x},pump-bodyl x),plstonl x» 
EQUAL (valve I ,valve <portall,doorl)} 
EQUAL (valve2,valve (porta12,door2» 
Axiom. given below establish a relationshlp between the pump'. valves, 
the reglons that straddle them and the posslbility of liquid flow through 
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the val vee. The first axiom etates that a valve 1s shut if and only if 
that valve's portal is filled by (part of) the (solid) valve door. The 
predicate 'SHUT (x,y)' read as 'x is shut during tille y' has the obvious 
intended meaning the x has a sealed aperture; while 'Solid (x)' read as 'x is 
soUd' denotes the eap1rical notion of solidity or inpenetrabll1ty. The 
definition for 'SEALED (x,y)' states that a portal is sealed iff it is part 
of anything solid. 
tfxyz[SHUl'(valve(x,y>,z) f-+ Yu(P(u,z) ~ P(x,yl u)] 
SEALEJ)(x,y) :def. tfz[P(z,y> ~ 3u[P(x,ul z) 1\ SOLID(u)]J 
tppe valve (PORTAL,OOOR):VALVE 
tppe SHUT {PHYSOB,PERlOO):UU 
tppe SEALED(PORTAL,PERIOD):UU 
sort DOOR c: SOLID 
sort SOLID c PKYSOB 
For example, given the following description: 
EQUAL (valve I, valve (portall,door 1 » 
we can see that if for some moment in tille z, valvet is shut, door1 seals 
portall making it a solid region and hence SEALED(portall,z)j and that 
conversely if valve! 18 not shut, port all 1s not sealed by door! and hence 
(by a closed world assumption>, portall is open (1.e. not sealed). 
Additional axioms give functional definitions of both liquid outflow, 
inflow and the liquid being static with respect to a portal. Note the use 
put to the part whole relation "P(wlinitial<z),xl final<z»". Here the 
relation is used to capture the idea of some quantity of a liqUid body 
moving e.g. outside the portal over tiJDe. 
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OUTFLOW!NG(x,y,Z) :der. LlQU1D(x) 1\ 
3uv [PORTAL (y,u,z) 1\ -SEALED (y,z) 1\ 
P(wlinlt1al<z),xlinitial<z}) 1\ 
P(wlinitial<z),insideCu,init1al<z») 1\ 
O(wltnltlel<z),y> 1\ 
I-OUTSIDE (vi final<z),ul ftnaHz» 1\ 
C(vl ftnal<z),y») 
type OUTFLOWING <LlQUID,PORTAL,PERlOO):UU 
sort LIQUID c: PHYSOB 
e.g. given the description: 
OUTFLOWING(l1quidl,portel.,t) :def. LIQUIDCliquidl> 1\ 
PORTAL (portaI4,tnlet-plpe, t) 1\ - SEALED (portal4, t) 1\ 
P(l1quid2Itnlt1al<t),l1quldllin1t1al<t» 1\ 
P(l1qu1d2Itnlt1el<t),ins1de (inlet-p1pe,initiel (t» 1\ 
OCl1qu1d2Iin1tiel<t),portal.) 1\ 
J-Outside (l1quld2lfinel Ct ),inlet-plpe Ifinel (t» 1\ 
C (wlf1nal (t ),portal4) J 
we can see that during en out flowing of liquld from portal", 1.e. out of 
the portal of the inlet pipe (and into portell) during time t, a quantity 
of l1quid overlapping portal' moves to be just outs1de the inlet-p1pe and 
(w1th the last condition) just outs1de portal4. 
INFLOWING<X,y,z) edef. LIQUID(X> 1\ 
3uv[PORTAL<y,u,z) 1\ -SEALEO(y,z) 1\ 
P (wlinlt1al<z),x linitial (Z» 1\ 
1-0uts1de(vlinlt1al<z),ulinlt1al<z» 1\ 
C (v,inlt1al (z),y) 1\ 
P (v,final<z),inslde (ulfinal (z» 1\ 
o (v If1nal<z),y>] 
STATIC(x,y,z) :def. \fu[P(u,z) ~ [~OUTFLOWING(x,y,z> 1\ -INFLOW!NG(x,y,z)]J 
type INFLOWING<LIQUID,PORTAL,PERlOO):UU 
type STATIC (LlQUID,PORTAL,PERIOD):UU 
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The processes just defined are not continuous: if OUTFLOWING<X,y,z) is 
true, it is not necessarily true that OUTFLOWlNG(X,y,2') is true where z' is 
a subinterval of z. Continuous versions of these processes are easily 
defined if required; for example here is a continuous out flowing: 
CONTINUOUS_OUTFLOWING(x,y,z) :def. ~u[ [MOMENT(u) 1\ 
B (initial (z),next (u» 1\ 
B (u, final (z») ~ 
OUTFLOWING(x,y,sum (u,next (u»») 
type CONTINUOUS_OUTFLOWINOG.IQUID,PORTAL,PERlOO):UU 
It. relation for connected portals (where 'CONNECTED_PORTAL (x,y)' is read 
as 'x and yare connected (i.e. adjacent) portals' is defined; and an axiom 
1s given that states that for any two connected portals, outflow from one 
coincides with an inflow into the other: 
CONNECTED_PORTAL<X,y) :def. PORTAL(X) 1\ PORTIt.L(y> 1\ ~EQUAL(x,y) 1\ 
Manifold (sum <X,y» 1\ 
~Z[[P(ZIX) 1\ C_Atom(z)] ~ C(z,y)] 1\ 
~w[ [P(w,x> 1\ C_Atom(w)] ~ C(w,x)] 
~zu[CONNECTED_PORTAL(x,y) ~ (OUTFLOWlNG(z,x,u) ~ INFLOWING(z,y,u»)) 
type CONNECTED_PORTAL (PORTAL,PORTAL):UU 
e.g. CONNECTED_PORTAL(portal1,portal4) ~ 
[otrrFLOWING(l1quidl,portal4,t> ~~ INFLOWING(l1quidl,porta14,U] 
The definition of connected portals ensures that the connection between 
them is not point-like (use of Manifold> and that they are totally aligned. 
The axioms and definitions given above are sufficient to make the 
following deductions. Suppose valvel is shut, and portall and portal4- are 
connected. We can infer that since portall 1s part of door! (l.e. occupied 
by the door), the portal 1s not open (because implicitly the door has been 
construed as a 'solid' region). We can then deduce that no mflowmg or 
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outflow1ng can arise through either portal (or between the connected 
portals). Hence the liquid within the pump is static with respect to 
portall. With the converse case when valvel is open <not shut>, either an 
inflowing or outflowmg m8Y arise across the connected portals. 
Dlrectionality of fluid flow through the valves in the example pump is 
fixed (eschewing the realistic case where e.g. portall would actually 
experience bi-directional1ty of fluid flow over time as the piston 
commenced en its downstroke and the valve was closing>. Appropriate 
axioms fixing the directionality of the flow <actual), fixing the direction 
in which the valve doors open) could be done as follows: 
IN_VALVE(valve(x,y» :def. 'dzu ~OUTFLOWING(z,x,u) 
OUT_VALVE(valve(x.y» edef. 'dzu ~INFLOWING(z,x,u) 
type IN_VALVE<VALVE):UU 
type OUT_VALVE(VALVE):UU 
We can now 8tate that valve! is an in-valve and valve2 an out-valve, i.e. 
IN_VALVE(valvel) 
OUT _ VAL VE (valve2) 
There are 80me strong assumptions underlying the use of these 
biconditionals used in the axiomatisation, e.g. that at no time does a 
foreign body block a valve (even though a portal may remain open> and that 
the liquid doesn't undergo any change of state. This has been done to 
simplify the example, but this is no indication that such restrictiens are 
a by-product of the formalism and its underlying ontOlogy. 
As yet no information has been given covering either causal factors or 
the initial conditions required for the fluid to flow through the pump. 
But is 1s not that difficult to see what could be added and exploited. For 
example we could state that the inlet-plpe must be filled with liquid in 
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order for the liquid to pass into the pump body on the upstroke of the 
piston. Given the silllple case of a primed pump, this fact is easily 
expressed in the forllalism: 
3x~[LlQUID(x> 1\ PCinside(inlet_pipel y>,xl y» 
1.e. that the inside of the inlet-pipe is part of a liqUid body - which i. 
to say that the pipe is <in this instance) always full of liquid. The fact 
that liqUid can be drawn up into the inlet-pipe and into the pUllp body, 
1.e. that the condition given above need not hold to get liquid into the 
pump could be expressed in the formalism reasonably eas11y. In this case 
it would be useful to add an axio. abstracting out the inequal1tiee 
expressed by Boyle's Law which states that at constant temperature the 
pressure of a given maS8 of gas is inversely proportional to its volume. 
Itxy[[GAS(x> a CONSTANTCtemp(x),y» ... 
[INCREASECpress(x>,t) 4-+ DECR£ASE<vol(x>,y>]J 
Given this information we could reason that when the pump is atarted (and 
the inlet-pipe placed in a reservoir filled with fluid) the act of pulling 
up the piston would coincide with the trapped air in the pump <constant 
lIass) increasing in volume. Assulling portall was not sealed this would 
llean that forces aring froll the atmospheric presaura acting on the 
reservoir fluid would propagate through the liqUid. This would force the 
liqUid into the inlet-pipe and eventually into the pUilp body. Indeed we 
could adopt a naive view of suction by stipulating that at all times a 
pocket of air exists between the bottom face of the piston and the liqUid 
in the pump body; and that when the piston moves upward, the volume of 
the air pocket increases, its pressure drops, and the liquid fills the 
vacuum formed. In the downstroke process, the trapped air would decrease 
- 148 -
in volme resulting in its internal pressure increasing which would force 
the liqUid down and out through the outlet pipe. 
As indicated above a complete axiomatisation of the pump is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to show in 
principle the formal adequacy of the theory for modelling non-trivial 
physical domains. However, below, I indicate some directions in which this 
could be tackled. 
In the first place it would be useful to be able to pick out thoae 
surfaces of the liqUid that come into contact with the surfaces of the 
valve doors, the piston and the surface of the air/liquid interface Ocnown 
as the freesurface). By doing this the action of an external force on such 
bodies (or impressed force of liqUid on an object) could be described. The 
definition picking out the outside 'surface' or 'skin' of an object is 
already given. This i8 used as the basis for describing the free surface 
of a liquid body: 
freesurface (xl y> '"def. 1Z [LlQUm (x) " 
Vu [C_Atom (u) -+ 
[p (u,z) ~ P (u,skin <XI y» " 
3v[AIR(v) " C(u,v)]]J] 
type freesurface('t>='t U NULL, 't = SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
With the free surface defined, and an adequate characterisation of one 
region being above (or below> another, one could then reason that if the 
freesurface of the liquid did not overlap the bottoll portal of the inlet 
pipe, no additional water from the reservior could be pumped through the 
pump. Varying volumes of liquid could then be linked to the poSition of 
the piston in the lIain chaaber. This would require one to pick out e.g. 
surfaces of cOllponent parts of the ump and parts of the surface of the 
pump body. Given the formalism has an explicit distance function <'d<x,y)') 
- 149 -
this could be used here. For exuple one could simply say that the piston 
moves up in the pump if the distance between it and portall increases 
(assuming rigidity of the component parts). In turn this would be linked 
with differences in pressure between bodies of liqUid, and whether or not 
valves were shut. One would need to be able to reason that when the 
piston is drawn up, the downthrust force of the piston acting on the 
contained fluid is less than thre atmospheric pressure propogating a force 
through the liqUid and acting on the free surface of the liqUid in the 
reservoir. The downthrust force of the atmospheric pressure propogating a 
force through the liquid results in an upthrust force on the piston/liquid 
interface (if we assume no pocket of air between the two, or between the 
liquid/air and air/piston surface interfaces if we do). Pressure 
differences serve to force the liqUid through the inlet-pipe and into the 
Blain ch8JIber; valvet opens because the external force of the liquid 
impressed on its underside is less than the sum forces acting on the stde 
of the door. 
Additional .. pirical information can be added and exploited. For 
example, rigidity in a body would mean deformabUity could not aris., that 
physical objects if originally discrete would typically remain 80 over UJIIs. 
Liquids being construed as deformable incompressible bodie. would have 
constant volume with respect to compressive forces but would be allowed 
to change their shape and pass into and fill insides of regions. In 
contrast gaseous have the property of filling and occupying the inside of 
sealed containers. Below this property is defined, although it i. 
recognised that the definition for a generalised container, and where in 
actual fact containers vary according to the material contained, questions 
of gravity, orientation and so on. 
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SEALED_INSIDE(x,y,z) :def. CONTAINER<y,u) 1\ 3v[P(y,yl Z) 1\ INSIDE (xl z,v) 1\ 
¥W[PORTAL(w,v) ~ SEALED(w,z)]] 
CONTAINER(x,y) edef. [SOLID<X> 1\ HOLLOW (xl y> v 3z PORTAL (z,xl y>] 
type SEALED_INSIDE (PHYSOB,PHYSOB,PERIOO):UU 
type CONTAINER CPHYSOB,PERlOO):UU 
type SEALED(PORTAL,PERlOO):UU 
One final po1nt: the notion of being a part has been blurred somewhat. 
Above "part" Is used 1n the sense of part to whole of re81ons, and 
secondly in where parts of the pump have been picked out - the 
"component" parts. The relationship between the two can be made explicit 
as follows: 
Vx[FORCE_PUMPu> ~ Vy[COMPONEN"CPART(y,x) ~ RIGID(y>]] 
Vxyz[COMPONENT_PART<X,y) ~ P<XI z,yl z») 
sort RIGID c: PHYSOB 
sort FORCE_PUIIP:PHY9:)8 
type FORCE_PUICP <PHYSOB):UU 
type COMPONENT_PART <PHYSOB,PHYSOB):UU 
Hayes [1979,1985a) 1ndicated that an 1ndication of 8ucce8S in theory 
development was when one found one had enough concepte to describe the 
chosen domain - what Hayes called "conceptual closure". Complete closure 
was considered unlikely. Both points seem vindicated here. The rich 
partitioning of space, and the emphasis on expressing topological 
information seems adequate to describe many important properties and 
relations. As has been shown above, Ilany descriptions of process can be 
characterised in terlDs what happens when something else happens. While 
additional notions of, for example, force and agency are useful, these are 
not necessary in order to describe information derived directly from our 
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experience of physical space, but appear when explanations are sought why 
such processes occur when they do. 
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Chapter 5: Eff'lciency of inference 
5.1: Introduction 
Despite the fact one can endorse Hayes' [1979,1985a] point that one should 
not let implementational questions detract frOD the primary task of 
building rich formal theories, there 1& a comparable danger that decoupling 
representation froll inference will also result in a poor research 
methodology. At all times in the process of theory construction, it is 
wise to consider questions of computational cost arising from implemented 
theor1es. 
The computational cost of using uncontrolled inference for 
computational logics 18 well known. This fact has given rise to the recent 
interest shown in the use of different hybrid representatIon and reasoning 
systems (see e.g. Frisch and Cohn 1990 for a fairly recent summary). The 
basic idea is to abstract or factor out partIcular knowledge structures 
embeded in a theory, and then assigning each ·factor" to a subsystem in 
which specialist inference 1s done. It should be apparent that the theory 
used in this thesis reflects this. Although the representational language 
i8 first order and sorted, the theory includes knowledge about sort., 
subsullption relationships (both for sort predicates and relations - see 
below), transitivity networks and transition/continuity restrictions, all of 
which are factored out and can be used in different ways. 
This chapter concentrates upon one way the theory described in this 
thesis can be used and implemented - in this case a direct implementation 
within an autoDated resolution based reasoning program. Efficient means 
to secure various forms of control of inference are suggested. However, 
it should be borne in mind that given the emphasis given to the 
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development of the conceptual apparatus of the theory. sections that 
discuss effici~ncy of inference are exploratory in nature. 
This section presupposes some familiarity with the machine inference 
rules known as resolution and paramodulation. The classic introduction to 
the former is Rob1nson (1979J. Good introductory texts to resolution and 
paralDodulation are Chang and Lee (19731 and Was et al (1984], 
5.2: Relating unsorted end sorted lcgics and axio.at1c theories: sa.e 
probl-. 
There are well known methods by which sorted logics are mapped to their 
unsorted counterparts. The translation given is called the relaUvlsation. 
The lsomorphi_ between the sorted and unsorted sorted theory is then 
established with the Sort Theorell that shows (for the model theoretic 
part), a set of clauses expressed in a sorted logic is unsatisftable iff 
its relatlvisation is unsatisfiable and (for the proof theoretic part> a 
refutation for a set of clauses in a sorted logic exists iff a refutation 
for its relativlsation exists. [Cohn, 1988]. With respect to the converse 
case (relating an unsorted logic to its sorted counterpart), general 
translation rules do not exist (but see Schmidt-Schauss [1988] where a 
technique is given for his logiC). 
Convert1ng a first order unsorted theory to a eorted one frequently 
requires much groundwork establishing the embedded sort structure. In 
practise this requires proving that for each pair of potential sort 
symbols, the monadic predicates in the unsorted theory are either diSjoint, 
or form a subsumption relationship. If the sorted logic into which the 
unsorted theory is being translated requires complete knowledge about the 
sort structure i.e. having a set of base sorts that are all pairwise 
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disjoint (e.g. as currently required by LLAMA), the difficulties can 
increase dramatically. If for example 7 non-base sorts are subsorta of 
some given sort, 27 paired sort intersections must be first evaluated 
before other subsorts are added and the new set of sortal relationships 
established. Clos~ such a lattice structure can prove difficult in 
practice. This becomes particularly problematic if the target unsorted 
theory uses only a few prtmitlve notions, and employs many definitions (as 
in Clarke's [1981,1985] theory, and in the theory developed in this thea is). 
In this case, proofs to secure the relative positions of the potent1al sort 
symbols will tend to prove difficult to tease out. Until a set of base 
sorts are generated and the sortal lattice closed, the theory builder will 
be required to continually revise the sortal declarations provisionally 
made. Moreover, given complete knowledge of the sort structure, these will 
also change if an extant theory 1a further developed. and where additional 
base sorts are embedded in the lattice structure. 
One other point needs ment1on~ here. It is well known that using 
the standard (objectual) interpretation of the quantifiers for FOL, at leaat 
one object must be posited in the intended model. But in a sorted logic 
the minimal model will change, simply because whereas in the unsorted 
logic only one object may give the minimal model, in a sorted logic each 
sort must be non-empty too. That is to say, in general as one moves from 
the unsorted, to the sorted theory, the minimal modele will constantly 
Change. In the case of LLAMA, the theory builder needa to be particularly 
aware of this fact. It is all too easy to fail to recognise that two 
potenUal sort symbols must be disjoint, or the one must subsume ths other 
simply because each sort must be non-empty. For exallple, in an unsorted 
theory (in this case not a relatlvisation) there seems no apriori reason to 
rule out the case where the universal temporal region 1a atomic Le. hae 
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momentary existence. But once the sorts MOMENT and INTERVAL are added, 
this interpretation cannot be maintained. The point here is that, given 
the process of theory contruction, one's intended gUiding model may not be 
the minimal one required by the theory. 
Further difficulties also arise if the unsorted theory under 
investigation is incomplete, but not known to be so. In this case the 
presupposition of completeness will hide the fact that the formalised 
theory may not be capable of eliciting the desired proof Ce.g. as lIay arise 
when an axiom is missing) and prevent the relative position of the sort 
from being factored out. Such difficulties are especially apparent when 
building large scale Naive Physical theories along Hayesian lines, since a 
rich theory will support a dense web of inferent1e1 connections between a 
theory's concept tokens and may make it difficult to see what 18 'Ilissing'. 
Although LLAMA supports some useful coaputational properties that can 
be expl01ted if one has at the outset complete knowledge of the sort 
structure (which Is discussed below), in practice this 18 unlikely to be 
given. It would be useful to be able to relax the condition that the sort 
lattice be closed, since evaluation of disjointness of 'base sort.' would 
not be required. An outline of such a logic can be found in Cohn [1990]. 
In this case a sorted logic with the same expres8:1veneas of lJ.AMA (1 .•. 
allowing ad hoc polymorphic functions and predicates, and overlapping) is 
enVisaged, but the condition for cOllplete knowledge of the sort structure 
1s relaxed. It is perhaps instructive to reaHse that it was in 
recognition of the difficulties cited here, that convinced Tony Cohn (my 
thesiS supervisor) to set to and develop such a logic. 
In some respects, unsorted axiomatisatlcns that are chosen and 
converted into sorted ones (to demonstrate efficiency gains in automated 
- 156 -
theorem prov:tns) are somewhat contrived and ad hoc. In most cases 
taxonomic information is not deeply embedded in the axiomaUsatien. but 
appears at the surface and is e8sily extracted. This makes the 
translation of the unsorted axlomatisation into a sorted one fairly 
straightforward. Although it could be argued that the sort structure 
encoded in, for example, Schubert's Steamroller challenge problem (SUckel 
1985] was intentionally kept at the surface 80 that it could be 888ily 
extracted, exploited and then used a. a test-bed for evaluating automated 
sorted logiCS, it would be a mistake to think such axiomatisations are 
always forthcoming or even desirable. While it is true that <given a 
theory rich in taxonomic information> an implemented sorted logic has well 
known computational advantages over its Wlsorted cOlmterpart, it is all too 
easy to let questions of effIciency dominate one'. thinking in the 
selection or construction of first order formalisms deemed suitable for AI 
applications. 
Most of the interesting ax10m8tisations that could be used a. a 
foundation for modelling reasoning about aspects of the everyday world are 
not sorted, or if sorted only support a few sorts, see e.g. Carnap [1958 
Chapter's D to H and Appendixl. One can invest a greater degree of 
confidence in the use of such formal theories than some of those that have 
appeared in AI literature, since it is reasonable to expect questionS of 
economy, for example of establishing formal independence of the ax10as and 
the desire to use a minimal set of primitives, conSistency and 
completeness (with respect to the formalised theory> have been addressed. 
Unfortunately the saae cannot be said for the latter. See, for example 
the Commonsense Summer '85 report [Hobbs et al 1985] where questions of 
consistency were waivered in lieu of expressiveness. 
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AXiomat1aations that have a set of independent postulates (axioms) and 
primitives are particularly difficult to construct and use. Gains in 
economy coincide with a gain in cOllplexity in use: both in terms of 
constructing desired proofs and given an uninterpreted formal system. 
finding a concrete interpretation. However. in practical terms 
axlomatisations that support IS set of non-independent axioms are 
frequently used along with the use of lemmas to assist in the derivation 
of desired proof.. Similarly a sorted logic may be employed to facilitate 
shorter proofs and thereby render them easier to construct either by hand 
or mechanised. by machine. 
5.3: l1Btna the sorted lag1c UAJIA 
A brief 1ntroduction to sorted logics and LLAMA is covered in Chapter 2 
and is assumed here. 
LLAMA's sort lattice L. and special Boolean sort lattice L. provides 
the basis for 'building in' theorems or lemmas into the sortal mach1nery 
without increasing the nWlber of clauses that serve to define the 
formalised theory. For example, in the present theory, the theorem 
Vx ~EC<X.UT) (which states that no period externally connects with the 
universal teaporal period) can be embedded in the declaration 
type EC <PERIOD.PERIOD_UNIVERSE):FF. The same can be done for theorems (or 
lemmas) which incorporate constants or function symbols. For example. the 
theorem: Yxy[OPEH(x> " OPENCy>] -+ OPEN(suIICx,y»] is absorbed in the 
declaration type sum (OPEN,OPEN>:OPEN. Securing proofs of these theorems 
just using the main set of defining axiolls of the theory, are surprisingly 
complex. For exallple, take the first theorell: 
- 158 -
Refutation set: 
1 -C (x,y> v C (y,x) (from A2) 
2 -O(x,y) v P(f3(x,y>,x) (from 05) 
3 -O(x,y) v P(f3(x,y>,y> (from 05) 
, -P(z,x) v -P(z,y> v O<x,y) (from D5) 
5 -ECCx,y) v C<x,y> <from D8) 
6 -EC(x,y> v -O<X,y) (fro. DB) 
7 -C(x,,.> v O<x,y> v EC<x,y> (from DB) 
8 -NTP<X,y) v -EC(z,x> v -EC(z,y) (from 010) 
9 -EQUAL (tnt <X>,x) v NTP (x,x) Clell1lla) 
10 -OPEN <x) v EQUAL (tnt <X),x) (from 031> 
11 -PERIOO(x) v OPEN(x) (from A36) 
12 PERIOD (a> 
13 EC(a,b) 
Proof: 
14 OPEN (a) ancestors: 12,11 
15 EQUAL (tnt (a),a> ancestors: 14,10 
16 NTPCa,a) anc_tors: 15,9 
17 -EC <X,a> anentors: 16,8 
18 C (a,b> ancestors: 18,1 
19 -O(a,b) ancestors: 13,6 
20 C(b,s) ancestors: 18,1 
21 .. C<X,s) v OCx,s) ancestors: 17,7 
22 O(b,s) ancestors: 21,20 
23 -P<x,a) v -P<X,b) ancestors: 19,4 
U P(f3 <b,a),b) ancestors: 22,2 
25 P(f3 <b,a),a) ancestors: 22,3 
26 -P(f3 (b,a),b) ancestors: 25,23 
27 null ancestors: 26,24 
This particular proof uses 14 <btnary resolution> inference steps - and as 
the attentive reader will notice it also uses a lemma - clause 9. 
It should be reasonably clear that simply adding lemmas to a set of 
defining axiom. and definitions using IS simple mechanised unsorted logic 
runs the risk of druatically increasing the potential search space. Thus 
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the facility where such 1oformation can be 'built 10' without 1ocreas1og 
the size of the clause set that def10es the theory is to be welcomed. 
As mentioned above, LLAMA's requirement that the sort lattice .... be a 
complete Boolean latt1ce offers some useful computational properties. The 
first is that the elements of the sort lattice can be represented as a bit 
map (see Art-Kaci et al [1989) for the relevant details). The second 
advantage ga10ed 1s that a normal form can be defined so that no tena 
appears as the argument to more than one sort predicate in any clause. 
For example, the clause: " v INTERVAL (x) v MOMENT (x)' can be normalised to 
the clause " v PERlOO<x)' - see Cohn (1987J. A th1rd advantage 1s that 
reasoning by cases 1s possible [see Cohn 1989b). 
5.3.1: Coaparfns msorted and sorted <LLANA) proofs 
Below I show how by exploit1og sortal information, the number of inference 
steps are reduced in LLAMA when compared with the unsorted case. In fact 
for the follow~ example, the unsorted case 1s actually sorted. That 1. 
to say, I compare two proofs that use the lI10imal sort lattice for the 
·unsorted" caae, and a r1cher sort lattice for the sorted case. But in any 
case the principle should be clear. 
In the following example, I introduce OPEN, and CLOSED as add1tional sort 
symbols. Declarations for the set of mereological relations (without their 
inverses), and the topological function int (x) follow. The reader 1a 
reminded that here I assume the Blodelled domain to be space, l.e. the 
variables range over spatial regions only. 
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Table 3: Boolean sort declaract10ns for the aereological relations. 
I e DC P PP EQUAL 0 OR PO EC TP NTP TPP NTPP TPI NTPI 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Op.n Op.n I UU UU UU UU UU 
Op.n Clol.d I UU UU UU UU FF 
Clol.d Op.n I UU UU UU UU FF 
Clol.d Clol.d I UU UU UU UU UU 
UU UU UU FF FF 
UU UU UU FF FF 
UV UU UU FF FF 
UU UU UU VV VU 
VU FF 
VU FF 
UU FF 
UU UU 
VV 
VU 
UV 
VU 
FF UU 
FF FF 
FF FF 
VU FF 
wh.r. ,1,,2. SPATIAL, • ( {C,OC,P,PP,EQVAL,O,DR,PO,EC,TP,NTP,NTPP, TPI,NTPI} 
type OPEN (OPEN >: IT 
type OPEN (CLQSED):FF 
type CLOSED (CLOSED): IT 
type CLOSED (OPEN>:FF 
type int (SPATIAL):OPEN 
ExaJlple 1: Unsorted proof of the thereom: ~x NTP (int (x),int (x) 
Refutation set: 
P(x,y> \I C(f2 (x,y>,x) (from D2) 
2 -C(f2 (x,),>,),) \I P(x,y) (from D2) 
3 -P(z,x> v "P(z,),> v O<x,y> (from 05> 
.I -EC ex,y) \I -0 (x,y) (froJl DB) 
5 -P(x,y) v NTP(x.y> \I EC(f5 <X,y),x> (from DIO> 
6 P(x,x) (from T3) 
7 -NTP(1nt<a),1nt (a» 
Proof: 
8 -P(tntca),int (a» \I 
EC(f5 (tnt (a),tnt (a»,int (a» ancestors: 7,5 
9 EC (f5 (tnt (a), tnt (a»,int (a» ancestors: 8,6 
10 -O(f5 (int (a),int (a»),int (a» ancestors: 9,4 
11 .. pex,f5 (tnt (e),tnt (a») \I - P (x.int (a» ancestors: 10,3 
12 "P(int<a),f5 (int (a),int (a») ancestors: 11,6 
13 C (f2 C:1nt (a>, f5 (int (a),int<a» ancestors: 12,1 
14 -C(f2 (int (a),f5 (int<a),int (a» ancestors: 13,2 
15 null ancestors: 14,13 
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Example Ib: Sorted aLAMA) proof of ~ NTP(tnt(x),int(x) 
Refutation set: 
1 P(x,y> v C(f2 (x,y>,x> (from D2) 
2 ~C(f2 (x,y>,y> v P(x,y> (from D2> 
3 ~P (2,X> v ~P(2,y> v O(x,y> (froll 05) 
4 -EC (x,y> v ~O (x,y> (froll 06) 
*5 -P(x,y> v NTP (x,y) v EC(f5 (x,y),x) (from D10) 
*6 P(x,x) (froll T3) 
.7 ~NTP (int {a),int (a» 
Only clauses marked with an asterisk "." are actually used in the 
following proof, but the original set is repeated to show the reduction in 
the number of clauses used: 
Proof: 
<7 > ~NTP {tnt (a),int (a» 
(8) ~P(int(a),int{a» ancestors: 7,5 
(9) null ancestors: 8,6 
In this particular example, clause 7: -NTP (tnt {a),int (a», is resolved with 
clause 5 producing the resolvent: 
~P {int {a),int (a» v EC {f5 (int (a),int (a»,int (a». LLAMA then detect. that the 
sort environment for literal EC(f5 (tnt {a),tnt (a»,int (a» ia FF (aa can be 
verified from the table above) and deletes the literal from the clause, 
resulting in the simpler clause ~p {tnt (a), int (a». 
Both proofs use the same general rules of inference - in this case 
binary resolution. The LLAMA proof reduces the number of general 
inference steps from 8 (in the unsorted case) to 2 in the sorted case. 
It is difficult to evaluate efficiency gains of a sorted logic over its 
unsorted counterpart from a few examples, however it does seem clear from 
the literature and initial forrays using complete sub-lattices embedded in 
the overall sort lattice, that given a non-trivial theory supporting a rich 
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taxonomic structure, the sorted logic will typically score over it. 
unsorted counterpart. 
Further work is needed to absorb all the monadic predicates supported 
by the formalisll into the sortal apparatus afforded by LLAMA before the 
complete theory can be implemented and statistical measures made. There 
1s however need of a cautionary note here. 
While it is indeed p088ible to factor out all the monadic predicates 
and rework them as sort predicates, the demand lIade on the translator of 
the formalism simply reflects the computational cOllplexity that arises in 
the use of the sorting functions, and in the work undertaken by the sort 
algorithm. For BOlle applications, it may be more expedient to use a 
minimal sort lettice and not factor out all the monadic predicates in the 
implemented theory. An exemple of this can be seen with the theorem: 
Vx ~EC (x,u.> (1.e. no spatial region externally connects with the universal 
spatial region). In this theory, no open region can externally connect with 
another region. If OPEN is included as a subsort of REGION, the sorting 
function declarations: 
type EC <REGION,OPEN):FF 
type EC (OPEN,REGION):FF 
type u..:OPEN 
would be sufficient (using the entries in Table 1) to 1aaedlately detect 
that the wff Vx -EC (x,Us), is a theorem. But the same result can be 
derived USing the following sorting function declarations, without !laking 
the monadic predicate OPEN (x) a sort predicate. 
type EC<SPATIAL_UNIVERSE,SPATIAL):FF 
type EC <SPATIAL,SPATIAL_UNIVERSE):FF 
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For a given cla •• of theorea. to be derived, there may well be some 
optl.aum point after which the conversion of monadic predicates into sort 
predicates, may actually increase the tille for which a desired proof is 
secured. Further work i& needed her~ although it may be difficult to 
generalise the results to other axlomatisations. 
5.3.2: Expresa~ defined functions 88 ideDUty unit clauaea. 
Currently formulat~ the definitions used for the expanded set of Boolean 
and topological operators follow Clarke [1981]. However, an alternative 
set of definitions can be constructed sl.aply by defining the complement 
operator and one other Boolean operator, and similarly for the topological 
operators, e.g. given coapl <X), BUll (x,y) and int (x> as defined, i.e.: 
prod (x,y> =df. 1Z [EQUAL <z.cOIapl <sua <coapl <x>,collpl <y») 
dlff(X,y> =df. 1Z [EQUAL Cz.procl <x,COlllpl<y»] 
cl (x> =df. 1)' [EQUAL Cy,coapl<inHco.pl<x»)] 
ext<x) =df. 1)'[EQUAL<y,int(co.pl(X»] 
When seeking mechanised proofs of 80me theorem.. the use of such a 
set of equality unit clause. combined with para.adulation can lead to a 
qUicker derivation of the null clause than using the default set of 
definitions. Siailarly, one proof run will terminate quicker if equality 
term rewriting is done instead of unpacking the equality relation in terms 
of other lIIereological relations and using noraal inference on the set of 
generated claus... The appearance of deeply ne.ted funct ions in a proof 
run lIIight suggest the use of unit identity definitions coupled with 
either paramodulatlon or saply assigning them to a dellodulator list. 
However. as i& well known. parallodulation ia difficult to control. while the 
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practice of st.ply a88~ing unit clauses to a demodulator list can result 
in an 1nco_plete refutation <proof) strategy <see e.g. Wos 1988). 
Having equality sorted in a .echanisad logic provides an effective way 
to constrain the number of potential clauses generated with the 
unrestricted use of paramodulation. In the case of l.LAMA, equality clauses 
1nstantiated with inca.patible sorts are iaaed1ately rendered FF, and can 
s~ificantly add to the sought refutation. 
5.': AddiDS furl .... ,lobel centrol &trates1ea 
5.'.1: PeeIdns. 'OW CutJag' IDl GazinS 
Although definitions allow compact expressions to be constructed and used 
1n a fonaal language, many use leas branches in the search space using an 
auto.ated logic can ari ... if the definitions are unpacked without 
restriction. In addition to the use of a sorted logic, techniques exist to 
control the prollferation of inference by controlling the aanner in which 
def1nltions are unfolded 1n a proof run. 
'Old' gazing [Pluaaer.I9871 and 'Gazing' [Glunchigl18 and Walsh, 
1988,1989] eaploy efficient global technique. for d1recting a proof 1n 
auto.ated logiCS. Gazing iaprov_ upon earUer local strategies employed 
in the use of definition., e.g. peeking (Bledsoe and Tyson. 1975]. 
Giunchigl18 and Walsh take earlier work {Plua.er, 1981, Warren, 1981 and 
Simpson, 1987] end put thla in a fonaal frUDework. 
Old Gazing (Plu_er,l981J utU1&es • heur1sUc that only unfolds 
def1nitions deeaed necessary to ensure the eet of functions and predicates 
in the hypothesis and conclusion match. The hypotheses and conclusion are 
abstracted to give the set of predicate n ..... used. Definitions are 
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abstracted as a set of rewrite rules. In this case the direction of the 
rewrite 18 restricted so that e.g. predicates can only be unfolded in terms 
of lIore pr1ait1va predicates in the theory. Old gazing and gazing use a 
propositional abstract apace in which the abstract solution for sOlie 
problell is sought. An lJuIedlate consequence of this abstraction is that a 
proof found in the absract space does not guarantee the existence of a 
proof in the non-abstracted first order case. However Giunchigl1a and 
Walsh prove for gazing that if eolle wff i8 a theorem in the or1Sinal 
space, a proof exists in its abstraction space. Given, the extensive use 
of definitions in the current theory and the relatively few number of 
pr1mitives used, the use of such techniques would seem promising for 
securing proofs that normally require lIuch unpacking to find literals that 
clash and eventually secure a proof. 
5.4.2 Theory resolution 
Stickel's (1985a1 Theory Resolution offers a general frallework for building 
in theories into a resolution theorem proving program so that it is not 
necessary to resolve directly upon the given axioms of a theory. This is 
a powerful technique since theory resolution related to the .. t of nod_ 
of the relational lat Uce <Figure 2) would detect the unsatisf1ab1l1ty of 
e.g. clause PO<a,b) with clause TPP(a,b) without having to unpack the 
definitions for both predicates to get the clash. Theory resolution 
generalises the notion of a clash between literals, since normally only 
Uterals with opposite polarity <e.g. t(x,y> and -t <x,y» are allowed to 
clash. 
An application of theory resolution called characteristic resolution 
appears in LLANA [Cohn 1987J. In this case normal resolution 1& extended 
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to allow two sort l1terals, a<X) and ~ (x) Ce.g. MOMENT (a) and INTERVAL Ca» 
to clash even if they are not complementary and have different names. In 
th1a cas. the clash 1a deduced frOID the relative positions of the sort 
symbols in the sort lattice.... If, for example [a n lSI <x) = 1. as in the 
case where literals MOMENT(a) and INTERVALCa) occur - sorts MOMENT and 
DrrERVAL - then the resolvent of the two formulae 1s semantically 
eqUivalent to "false- and the clash indicated. Characteristic resolution 
also allows a partial clash between literals resulting in a residue literal. 
For exampl., given the monadic predicate Atom (x) now funcUon1n8 as a sort 
symbol, the clauses: , v ATON(a), and , v PERIOD(a) resolve to 
• II MOMENT (x). 
Characteristic resolution is defined as follows: 
(1) a{x) and fI{x) resolve to give [a n fI] (x), 
(11) aex) and .. rs(x) rHOlve to give [a \ fS] Cx) 
<U1> "aCx) and "flex) resolve to give -[a u fS] (x) 
Further, if respectively either [a n fS) = 1., or [a \ tI] = .i, or 
[a u 15) • T. then the resolvent is semantically eqUivalent to -false". 
The rule of characteristic resolution 1s generalised so that it applies 
to sets of relations that fora a lattice, and not just the monadic .art 
predicates. As in the case of the sort lattice .... the set of named nodes 
are complelDented with a set of un-named nodes, 80 that the set of nodes 
can be .. bedded in a cOlDplete Boolean lattice. This appl1caUon of theory 
resolution is illustrated here using the relational lattice Lc (depicted in 
Figure 3) which covers the set of dyadic relations defined solely in ter.s 
of C (x,y). <However, it should be evident that the principle applies for 
other sets of relations that can be embedded in a lattice.) Thus (for the 
dyadic case): given two distinct literals a(x,y) and IHx,y) belonging to I.e. 
these resolve to give [a n 151 (x,y); just as 1s done in the monadic case. 
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Case. where one literal i8 positive and the other negative, or both 
literala are negative again follow the rule of charateristic resolution for 
the lIonadlc case. 
It is reasonably easy to verify the correctness of this inference 
procedure. Each literal of the form a (x,y) and belonging to Lc is proved 
to be equivalent to a finite disjunction: 011 <x,y) v ... an <x,y>, where 011 
em represents the set of base predicates that extend below a and are 
above.1.. Given that each predicate appearing as a node in the lattice can 
be identified With a set of base predicates, one can slllply use the lattice 
theoretic operations: n. \, and U on the corresponding set of base 
predicates in this specialised form of resolution. For example, suppose we 
wished to resolve the literals P (a,b) and EC (a,b)j we compute [p n ECJ (a, b). 
This 18 .1. and a clash i8 found. This is equivalent to proving that the 
intersecUon of the set of base predicates for P(a,b) and EC(a,b> is empty, 
l.e. 
P (a,b) = {TPP (a,b),NTPP (a,b>, TPI<a,b),NTPI<a,b> } 
EC (a,b) = {EC <a,b) } 
which it 18. 
By parity of reasoning, if [a n es] <x,y> ~ .1. then a(x,y> and tUx,y) are 
conSistent, if [a n es] .. es, then «(x,y) is lIore general than " <x,y>, i.e. 
j!(x,y> ~ a<x,y>. Finally if [a u "j (x,y> = T, a tautology i. indicated: 
appearing within a single clause, the whole clause can be safely deleted in 
the proof run as it cannot add 10 any way to the desired refutation. 
Stmpl1t'icaUon of formulae also carries across to the higher arity 
predicate case: the clause can be norma Used so that no argument tuple 18 
predicated by lIore than one predicate symbol acting as a node in Le. For 
exaaple, the literal. TP(a,b) and NTP(a,b> norllalise to P(a,b). Similarly 
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the definition of subauaption can be changed (as it is in characteristic 
resolution to take account of characteristic literals appearing 10 
fonaulae> to take account of redundancy in the predicate case: e.g. where 
EC Ca, b> \I ., su baWl.. DR Ca, b) \I •• 
Obviously properties of relations e.g. the sy.aetry of the relationa 
C(x,y>, o <X,y>, OC(x,y>, DRex,,>, Ee<X,y>, EQUAL <x,y>, TPI<X,y> and NTPI<x,y> 
aust be taken into account, since without for example, syaaetric 
unification, the claua .. P (a,b) and DC (b,a> will fa-ll to raaolve using this 
fona of resolution. S1JI1Iarly, normalisation of fonaulaa will be affected. 
The clause PCa,b) \I TPPCb,a> \I EC(a,b) can be normalised aa [p U Eel (a,b) \I 
TPP(b,a), or as pea,b) \I [TPP U Eel (b,a). This non-uniquenesa does not 
cause any particular problea (except perhaps (or detena101og which will 
give riae to the better search space for the probl.a under conaideration>. 
Further properties o( tbe base theory can be built into tht. fora of 
resolution. For exaaple, in the base theory the unit clauaea: C (x,x), 
o (x,x), P<X,x) and EQUAL<X,x) are eqUivalent. '"'- addition of the 8ingle 
adOll: Yx EQUAL(x,x> to the clause set, cOllbined with th!a rule of 
resolution is sufficient to prove all the other totally reflexive (and 
lrreflexive) proprtl .. of the relatione eupported by le. 
5.4.3 TranaitiY1ty oetwarlal 
A transitivity table s:t.llar in function to that ueed by Allen (1983» ia 
calculated for all coabinationa of the baee relations that appear 10 Le· 
Each entry of the form Rl (a,b) and R (b,c) is aapped to a diaJunctive set of 
base predicates, corresponding to a theorell. For example the entry 
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DC , EC PO , TPP , IIITPP 'TPP-I ,IIITPP-I, TPI , IIITPI I 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I 1 DC. EC. I 0(, EC, , DC, EC, , DC, EC I I I 
DC I no tnfol PO,TPP, I po, TPP, I PO,TPP, I PO, TPP" DC I 0( I DC I 0(1 
1 1 ITPP 1 IIITPP I IIITPP 1 IIITPP 1 1 , 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I DC,Ee, 1 DC,Ee, 1 DC,EC 1 1 I 1 I 
EC I PO, I po,TPP, I PO,TPP, I EC,PO, I PO, TPP,I DC,EC 1 0( I EC I 
1 TPP-I, 1 TPP-I, 1 IIITPP 1 TPP, 1 NTPP 1 1 1 
1 IIITPP-I 1 TPI I 1 IIITPP I 1 I 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 DC, EC, , 0(, EC, , DC, EC, , 0(, EC, , , 
PO ,PO, ,po, 'no infol po, TPP" PO, TPP' PO, 1 PO, I PO PO I 
I TPP-I I TPP-I, , f IIITPP I NTPP I TPP-I, , TPP-I, , I 
I NTPP-I I ITPP-I , 1 I I ITPP-I I IIITPP-I I , 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
TPP J DC 
J , 
J OC,EC, f , 1 DC,EC, , DC,EC , 
'DC,Ee J po, TPP, f TPP J NTPP J PO, TPP, J po J TPP I I I 
J NTP' I ITPP J I TPP-I I TPP-l, J , 
1 1 I 'TPI' IIITPP-I , , 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I 
ITPP 1 DC 
, 
J 
, 0(, EC, 1 J , DC, EC, , J I I 
DC I PO, 1 IIITPP I ITPP ,PO, ,no info' NTPP I NTP', 
1 TPP, f , ,TPP, 1 , 1 J 
'NTPP' , 'IIITPP J I I 1 
------------------_._-------------------.--------------------------------------------I De,EC, I EC,PO, I PO ,PO, TPP, I po, I I I I 
1PP-I ,PO, 'TPP-I' TPP-I, I TPP-I, , TPP, ,TPP-I, I NTPP-I , 1PP-I I I 
I TPP-l, , IIITPP-l , ITPP-l I TPI ,NTPP ,IIITPP-1 J , , 
J ITPP-I I I I I If' I 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
, DC, EC ,po, I po, I PO, ,po, TPP, I 
I PO, TPP" TPP-1, I TPP-l, I TPP-l, , ITPP, I I I I , 
IIITPP-Il TPP-I, , ITPP-I , ITPP-I I ITPP-I , TPP-I, , ITPP-I , ITPP-I I ITPP-II ITPP-I, 
, ITPP-I I f I I ITPP-I,I , I I 1 
I , 1 f ,TPI 1 , f 1 f 
, I I I I NTPI t I I I J 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I f 1 I 1 1 
TPI 1 OC EC PO TPP I NTPP 1 TPP-I f ITPP-I I TPI f I 
J I I I 1 I 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
IIITPI , DC 
, 
I po 
I I 
I 1 NTPP , 
, , 
I I 
I ,ITPP-I I I 
, , 
1 I 
1 ITPI I 
I , 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table ,: The tnmslt1vtty table for the _t of be.. relattana of lattice ~. 
If R1 (a,b) end R2 Cb,c) are satisfied, then R3 Cafc) follows, where R3 1. 
looked up in the table. "No info· means every bas. relation i. pos.ible 
and "X· means the conjunction Rl (a,b) and R2 (b,e) cannot be aaUsfieci. 
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NTPP(a,b) and ECCb.c) 1& OC(a.c), and correeponda to an instance of the 
theorem: Vxyz[[NTPP<X,y) • EC(y,z)] ... OC(x,z)]. Cella marked with an "no 
info." indicate that for the (Rl (a,b),R2 Ch,c» pair, no base relation as the 
result is excluded, and those marked with an "XW indicate that the related 
conjunction cannot be true and thus no deduction 1& made. For example 
EC (a,b) and NTPI Cb,c) are unsaUsf1able: for EC (x,y) to be true both x and y 
Dust be non-open region., but NTPHb,c) requires both b and c to be open 
regions - contradiction. Where non-base relations appear in the target 
set (e.g. PP(a,b) and PfCb.c». the calculation i8 done as follows. Firstly. 
the lattice is used to compute the set of base relations each relation 
covers (in this case {TPPCa.b).NTPP(a,b)} and {TPPCb,c) and NTPPCb,c)} -
remeabering that Vxy[PP<x.y) ..... [TPP(x.y) v NTPPCx.y)] is a theorem). Next 
we take each RI <Sob), R2 Ch.c) pair where Rl (a,b) c (TfP(a,b). HTPPCa,b)} and 
R2 (a,b) E {TPP(b,c),NTPPCb,c)} and fora the union of all the disjunctive 
sets of base relatione each 11 Ca.b) and R2 Ch,C> pair yields using the 
transitivity table. In th1& case this would be [TPP U NTPPJ (a,c) or simply 
PP(a,c). So given PPCa,b) and PPCb,c) we deduce PP(a.c). 
5.'.': BuUdfnS in set. of definiDS anOlMl 
Given an implementation of theory resolution described above combined with 
the us. of a transitivity table. there is a clear indication that Iloat, if 
not all of the defining axlaas of the theory (which correspond to the 
axioms and definitions that describe the properU .. of the mereolog1cal 
relations) am be excised. 
I put forward as a conjecture that in the case of lattice I.e. all the 
defining clauses that describe the base theory. and which use only free 
variables, can be excised. The conjecture !mpU .. that an such clause. 
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wh1ch define the basic theory become theorems in the hybrid reasoning 
case. In other words given the lattice, the specialised form of resolution 
perforaed on that latUce, and building in syllJlletry and transitivity into 
the inference mechanism in the lIIanner suggested, all the clauses using 
free variables that define the forlllal theory, will be derivable 8S 
theorems. Clauses froe the sallie set containing bound variables <1.e. using 
skolelll functions> cannot be similarly proved, since these express the 
eXiatenUal cond1tions required by the theory. However, the reduction is 
stUI significant. For exeple, simply taking axioms <AI) to <A3) and 
definitions CDI) to CD20), the nUJIber of clauses reduce from 59 to 10. 
However, there is reason to believe that all the other clauses that 
use skol .. functions 118y be in tum absorbed. Take for example the 
formula: ~y [0 <x,y> ~ 3z[P(z,x) 1\ P(z,y>J] which embodies a skolall function. 
Thi8 incorporates two clauses and is in fact one half of the definition for 
o <X,y>. Firstly, we know from the theory that if two regions overlap they 
share a cOJlUllon part, and that that part can be the product of x and y 
(I.e. the theorem ~[O<x,y) ... ~ -NLU.Cprod(x,y»]). Next we note that 
o <X,y) i8 a symmetrical relation, and that prod <x,y> i8 cOlUllutative, i.e. 
prod (x,y> = prod <y,x>. By building these properties into the inference 
Dechanisa, the formula could be replaced with the single clause 
~ [0 <X,y> ~ p <prod <x, y>,x>] - remelllbering that if two regions overlap they 
have a non-null product as a common part. It 1s then relatively easy to 
see how this clause could in turn be absorbed. In this case one could 
extend the transitivity table so that the conjunction -P(prod(x,y>,x> 1\ 
o <X,y> is mapped to MfalseM. Further work is needed to see if all the 
remaining clauses can be similarly absorbed. 
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Although rules exist where sorted lo,gics are translated 1nto unsorted 
logics, in general. the converse 1s not available. Translat1n8 an unsorted 
axiollatic theory to a sorted one 1s a non-trivial task. The translation of 
a cOllplex theory that uses few prtaltlves and many def1nltions into a 
LLAMA tran.lation 1. _pecially difficult, in particular it can prove 
especially difficult proving <in the unsorted logic) the relative poSitions 
of potential ecrt syabol. in the aort hierarchy in the sorted case. 
Given a rich sort structure, lJ.AMA can be effectively used to 'build 
ln' theorems and cut the search space during a proof run. Techniques such 
as Peekin8 and Gez~ see. particularly suited to the theory developed in 
this thesis. An extension of Cohn'. characteristic resolution is outlined. 
This allows paired literals of any degree of polyadicity and with differ1ng 
names (but seaant1cally known to be contradictory> to clash. This i. used 
alon8 with a transitivity table for the set of base relations of lattice 
I.e. I add as a conjecture that usinS theory resolution, the transitivity 
table and building in other properties of the theory, that most if not all 
the def1ning axio.. for the .ain part of the theory can be effectively 
absorbed and thereby pruned froa the main clause set. 
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auaptar 6: Q1tological and related 1saue8 
6.1: lntroduct1cn 
Thls chapter tntroduces ontologlcal and related issues thrown up by the 
worktng aethodology and chosen formal theory developed in this thesl •. 
Two main parts are discussed in turn. The first is an examination of the-
formal treatment of aass terms in a first order language. The second part 
discusses the relationship between epistemlc priorities in ones ontology, 
representation and ~pleaentatlon, and raises the question of a cognitivel)' 
adequate theory. 
6.2: QuaDtlf:lcaUoo theory end __ ter.s. 
As there 1s an extens1ve 11terature on how mass terms should (or should 
not> be treated in a foraal theory (see e.g. Pelletier 1979 for 
comprehensive bibliography> a comprehensive analysis of this subject cannot 
be undertaken. However, given the appearance of mas. term extensions 10 
this theory, the formal adequacy of a language used to represent aa .. 
term extensions must be addre.sed if only to show that a chosen 
representation has its l1a1tations. 
In natural language, the distinction between stuffs and thing. 18 
preserved in the separation made bet ween mass and count nouns. 
Grammatically, aass and count nouns are respect1vely paired with the 
adjectives "less· and ·fewer". Whether a noun 1s aass or count depend. 
upon which adjective 1& correctly applied. In SOlIe cases syntact1c 
distinctions appear sufficient to distinguish between aasa and count nouns, 
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but as Bunt [1979 p2'9J points out, lIIost nouns can be used both a. lIa88 
or count nouna. For exa.pIe, the noun "apple" in the phrase "an apple" 
function. a. a count noun, and in the phrase "the apple in the salad" aa 
maaa. 
Throughout th1a thesis I have assumed that standard quantification 
theory to be adequate for the formal characterisation of stuffs <e.g. 
l1quid and gaseous bodies) as well as things ( .. oebes, pumps and valves). 
I have assulled that aas. terll. can be treated as predicate., and that the 
dOilain of quanUflcation for stuffs rangea over physical objects or bodies. 
But thia approach 1a by no mean. free fro. probleaa. For exa.ple, given a 
body of water, it is not entirely clear whet...- it has bodie. u parts, and 
if it does, and how these bodies ere to be individuated. In general, 
universals such as cell and puap provide a principle for di.tinguiah1ng, 
counting and reidentifying particulars - saying what sort they are [Lacey 
1976J. But by treating physical objects and indeed water a. aorts 
presupposes that bodies can be so distinguished, counted and reidentified, 
and it 1. that, that begs the question. For further difficulti_ 
associated with this approach see Pelletier £197'J and Bunt [19851. 
A good overview of the different approaches that have bean used to 
deal with the foraal treat.ant of mass terlls can be found in Pelletier 
C19U] and Bunt [1985]. These sources are extenaively used in the sUllmary 
given below. 
The classical treatment advanced by Quine [1960J allows for two uses 
of lIass nouns, appearing 10 a subject position it counts as a s~lar 
tena, and in a predicate position as a general tera. In the laUer case 
the extension of the predicate 1& taken to be true of each portion of the 
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stuff in question, but excluding those part. too saall to count. Quine'. 
analysls can capture enough intra-sententl.l form so that the sentence 
"'his puddle i. water, Water is wet, so this puddle 18 wet' expresaes a 
valld arguaent, but it falls to capture the analyticity of the sentence 
'Water is water', or 'Dirty water is water' - but not. the analyticity 0(: 
Vx[Water<x) .. Water(x)] .nd Vx[[Water<X> 1\ D1rty<x>] .. Water<x>] aBaUJIing 
standard quantiflcation theory and where the dual treat.ent i. dropped. 
The approach championed by e.g. Strawson (1959) and Clarke £1970] 
assumes a set-theoretic interpretation. In this case expressions using 
mass ter.s are taken to be elllptical expressions that hide an implicit 
sortal tena. Thus for example, 'ls water' might be elliptical (or 'i. a 
body of water', 'i& a kind of water', or 'ls a puddle of water'. The 
context-dependence ~t in this approach create. probl ... 
establishing whIch aortal to apply. Another dIfflculty arise. given 
identity claw&. Given. for example the sentence: 'The water spilt on the 
floor i& the .... water that was in the tank before'. we have two 
indlviduating standards: say. a puddle and a tank of water respectively. 
But given the identity claa. nelther of the two standards can be used 
simultaneously; for exemple puddles cannot be spilt. 
As far as context-independent standards go, thls too runs into 
problems. In this case one needs to aake sure the standard used 1s s.a11 
enough so thet nothing is excluded froa the intended .et of entities. but 
what then are these iaplied ainmal parts? Water. {or example takes the 
fora of drops. but then drops can be further broken into 8IIIaller drops. 
In the case of Scientific claBaHications, water ea the set of HzO 
molecules seem. plausible since ita parta are not water, but somewhat 
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artificial. Bunt (1919] argues that the .1nt.al parta hypothesis lead. to 
difficulties on several accounts. In the firat instance. if we take the 
hypothesis to be en aseertion about the real world. then the referents of 
some abstact nouns, e.s. 'Ulle' have no known min1llel parts. On the other 
hand if we then teke the hypothesis to be an assertion about the u.. of 
uss nouns in EnSlish, it is difficult to see how this analya1s can be 
correct. since for exaaple. speakers of English have used <and sUl1 use) 
the tera correctly without any knowledge of the chemistry of water. Thes. 
observat1ons Lead Bunt to the v~ that masa nouns provide a way about 
talking about things aa bOJlogeneous entitiea, without the presuppoeit:1on 
of .inaal perta. Bunt 'a U 919,1985a,b] Ensemble Theory act ual1y builds on 
this assumption. 
An alternative approach tat., by Parsona [1970], takes aa88 nouns to 
name abstract entities. Parsons theory has been heavily criticised for 
being too coaplex - a8SUJling a distinction between physical objecta, bits 
of aatter and substances - see Bunt U985aJ. 
Mereology [Leisn1ewak1 1927-311. reformulated by Leonard and Goodman 
[Leonard and Goodman, 1940] as the ClIlculus of 1ndiv1duals has a180 been 
used to deal with maS8 teraa, e.s. by Quine (1960) and Moravca1k £1973]. 
Mereology uses the part/whole relation to deal with the fact that .a •• 
nouns unlike count nouns, divide the1r reference. That 1. to aay that 
whereas count nouns possess built 1n modes of reference that determine 
what counts aa a aingular inatance, Ilass nouns do not. Mereology tak .. , 
for example, the water on thia planet aa an lnd1v:ldua1. and lakes, puddles 
and drops as pens. "ereolagy has been criticised by Bunt [1985a] on the 
grounds that 1t does not support an .. ptyobject. which Bunt takee to .ean 
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that .ass teras fetl1ng to denote cannot be ecco •• odeted (but see notes 
11,12 end 14>. Bunt a180 notes a uneasy tenslon that exiet. between 
l1ereology proper <1.e. Lesn~l'a syta whlch wa. _t up a. en 
alternaUve to 88t theory> and Leonerd end Goodaan'a refor.ulaUon (which 
1s (ormally defined in set-theoretic terms) and to what extent the two can 
be formally wedded together. IUlt'. Ens_ble 17HIory whlch .ploys both 
the part-whole relation and set-theoretlc notlons can be seen as an answer 
to thl. probl •• 
Given the appearance of _reo logy 1n this thesis (for exaaple I refer 
to the set of dyadiC relations def1ned 111 teras of C as -the .ereoloaical 
relation.-), ecae r .. ponse to Bunt's criticisa 1.8 required. In the first 
instance, whlle I use •• reologlcal naa.. for relationa. I never the Ie •• 
use set theoreUc notion. 1n ay aetalanguage to intwpret the theory. 
Thus for exaaple, a forael distincUon is preserved between bearers of 
properties and the properties theIIselvas. Th1a does not accord with a 
full flung aereological .yst. that would treat a yellow ball as the 
overlap of the 1ndividuals yellow end ball. Secondly, whUe Goodaen allow. 
an unrestricted use of his .uaaat~ operator, I only allow th18 (or 
region. of .pace or U ... but not for physical bod1aa. Good.en'. 
insistence to allow, e.g. the existence of an indlvidual that is the sua of 
a speck of duat in the Sahara and the Arctic Sea <and the critici_ raised 
by this - see e.g. Eberle 1970) i. thereby avoided. 
On Goodaan's (1951) understanding tndi viduala "need not be organised 
or uniform. [and) need not be continuous or have regular boundar1M-, 
Appeals to amillal noUons of coherence or hOllogeneity of individuals are 
similary dealt with. Despite Goodaan's 1IIsistence on allowing bizarre 
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ind1v1dual. into h1. ontology, there 18 reason to believe add1tional 
cr1teria to 1dentify 1nd1v1duals aust be secured. It would seell that on 
Goodman'. analyala a cup would be a cup whether it were 1n one piece, or 
scattered in b1ts all over the floor - even though co_on sense would 
prevail whic:h one would btl the better container. Pace Goodman, criteria 
for 1ndiYlduating, 1denUf)'ina and reidentifying 1ndividuals, as well as 
cr1teria for COIling 1nto and pass1ng out of exlstence for materlal bodlea 
must be addressed. Otherwise <given the continued existence of the cup 
parts) one would be forced to accept the unintult1ve consequence that the 
cup sUll existed. 
As aentioned ebove, Bunt critiCises the mereoloslcal approach on 
several accounts. The first 18 that mereology does not .upport an empty 
object. Although Bunt's criUcis. can be endorsed Ce.g. in the decision to 
i.port NUU.<x) 1nto the theory described 1n this thesis>, two po1nta must 
be made. The first 1& that a virtue of mereology over standard .et theory 
Ilay be cla1aad in the fact that it does not require one to poeit dubioul 
'general object.' < ... not. 12>. Thua whUa Bunt 1.apl1c:1tly a_WI .. a sat-
theoretic foundation to stendard a.reolosy, the sain 1n expresaiven ... in 
Ensemble Theory is not argued for againat the nominalist 'a .tance that the 
underlying ontology assumed by Bunt ia equally not without question. The 
second 1& that the foraal treatllent of objects wlthout extenslon can be 
successfully carried out JI;Lthout iaporting an .. pty object 1nto the domain 
uaing Free Log1ca <see note note 14). However, in actual ract, 
IIlereologlcal ayet ... ha" been constructed using a null individual (aee 
note 11). 
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6.3: Ep1alelloJos1cal pr1ar1t,. repreaentattan and 1ap~entat1OD. 
The notion of ep1st"ologlcttl priority appears in Clarke [1985 p6g], in the 
following context: 
• ... an atomic definition of points 1.8 philosophically questionable, because 
of what (Mortensen and Nerl1chl call ·the ep1Btuological priority of 
interval. oyer pointe: Separation and intervals are somehow visible in a 
way that point. are not.· (Clarke 1985 p6g]. 
Although (as Clarke correctly points out) the notion 1s undeveloped, there 
1. an obvious ~.ediacy that regions have over points in our concept1on of 
space and tiae. This observaUon is shared by Turner [1984 pS9] and by 
van Benthem £1982 p230]. Hamblin (1971 p1271 alllO reiterates the same 
point, saying the much interest in Philosophy has centred on "supposedly 
primitive observational or phenoJDellal languages, languages whose features 
can be directly related to features of our experience of the world around 
us·. 
The notion of epistemological priority also appears in the following. 
Van Benthea £1982 p230] cites an interesting reflection on the distinction 
drawn between the order of knowledse - gOing from point. to extended 
objects, and the order of learning - gOing frOli extended objects to points 
within geometry. Tarski's developaent of a solid body gaolletry which only 
appeared this century 1. cited as a case in point, but other exampl .. 
arise, e.g. Whitehead (19781, and Laguna (1922]. The salle trend 1. also 
apparent in other domains and in AI itself, where extended objects are 
taken as pr1alUve as opposed to points e.g. for the temporal: Hamblin 
(1969,1911] and Allen £1981,19841 and Allen and Hayes [1985]; and for the 
spatial/temporal: Woodger £1937], Clarke (1985] and Bl1zard [1990]. 
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Given that ronnel theories exist which take either pOints or extended 
bodies as ontological pr1aitive. froll which the other may be derived, no a 
prlori argument on the.e grounds alone can be given for an alleged logical 
prlorlty of pointe over regions or vice versa. However the notion of a 
stated ep1ateaological priority is st111 worthy of some conslderation. 
There are at least three criteria that can be considered in this 
respect. The first 18 in terms of the ease by which a person can use IS 
theory. The more intuitive and immediate the concepts appear to be, the 
easier it 18 to understand. The second is related to the question of 
cognitive validity. for ex_pIe, which ontology better matches the set of 
primitive. aS8UJNd to be at the heart of a theory of cognition, While the 
the third 18 related to what degree a theory exhibits desirable 
computational properties oyer its rivals. 
In Hayea [1985a], Hayea' argued that obvious deductions within a naive 
phYSical foraalLaa should coincide with ahort proofs. On the surface this 
seeas to reflect a reaaonable position. Given the apparent ease by whlch 
we make certain decisions in our everyday deal1ngs with the physieal 
world, it seea. plausible that if soae automaton is to be seen to share in 
our way of llf., it too should reflect this same ease in decision making 
g1ven comparable tesks. But against th1s lIIust be weighed the point lIIade 
by van Benth_ [1982 p237) that "natural pr1aitivee [1n a formal theory) 
often require complex axiOllls, and vice versa". Hayes also aentioned that a 
good naive physical formallsa should be both broad and dense, meaning that 
although a clustering should arise in large formalisms, a complex web of 
1nferential connections should be seen to ex1st, linking the concept tokens 
of the theory. If computational effietency is to be upheld as an 1JIportant 
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criteria tn the decision to use a particular theory over any rivals, care 
Iluat be taken that the chosen axiomatisation is not sparae (cf. Hayes'. 
[1979,1985a) crit1c1sae>, otherwise the general expressiveness of the 
forma lisa will suffer. 
Within autoaated reasoning, it is well known that a tight coupling 
exiats between the different ways a theory .~ht be represented and 
processed U8ing distinct general rules of inference and proof 8trategies. 
Given a fontal theory, and a class of theorems to be proved, it is 
sOllething of an art to recognise what axiollaUsaUon of a theory, 
representational ~uage and set of inference rules have the 
computational edge over any rival. The taportant point here, is that the 
question of centrol (of inference) should be sought using a rich theory. 
However one proceeds, frca natural prlllit1vea or froll less natural one., 
the theory generated will tend to be a rich one. Although different 
techniques can be used to effectively llIplement a given theory (for 
exallple, by using hybrid reasoning and abstracting out and explo1t1ng 
topological and eapricel infaraation (rOIl the modelled domain), in each 
case the richnesa tn the foraal theory is not saaificed. 
The notion of "epitellologieal priority" discussed above and that of 
the contrasting ordering of knowledge and learning, carries over quite 
naturally tnto establishing whether or not a particular theory can be 
lnterpreted a8 a theory of cognition, or at least supports an ontology that 
can be grounded in cognition. In this respect, it is tnteresting to reflect 
that lIany of the dyadic relations defined in terms of the relation C, ad.it 
intuitive nam.s. This suggests that the primitive notion of connectivity 
between regions <which is used to describe a rich theory of space) lIay 
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well be grounded in a theory of cognition. That is to say, given the fact 
that a coaprehensive theory of space can be developed fro. the use of 
this prllllUve relation, connectivity between objects 10 space, and change. 
in connectivity may well be an invariant exploited by the human visual 
system. It Is also tnteresting to note a connection that can be made with 
Pentland's [1986J work. Pentland [1986J points out that in much vision 
research, the models tend to be elther high-level specific models, e.g. of 
people or houses, and low level models of image formation, e.g. of eelg_. 
The latter approach has grown {rom models used within the well-developed 
fields of optics, material science and physics (the order of knOWledge>, 
the fOnler from modelling industrial parta and assembUes used in 
eogineertns and computer-aided des1gn (CAD) applications (the order of 
learning>. Pentland finds both the pointwise, quantitaUve aodels of taage 
formatlon process and the CAD-like mode18 used in engineering, wanting. In 
its place, he argues for a model that lies between the two. Pentland's 
ontology usumes the pr1ait1ve notion of a part. These macroscopic part. 
are deforaed by stretching, bending twisUng or tapering them, and .... 
then coabined using Boolean operations to {orll new complex prototypical 
objects that thea.elves can be similarly deforJled. Pentland'. part. a,.. 
abstractly conceived to be akin to lUllps of Clay. The correspa'ldence with 
the noUon of a region, the part/whole relation, and the use given to 
Boolean coabinations of regions for modelling complex physical model. in 
the theory developed in this thesis should be reasonably clear. Pentland 
shows that a close corresepondence can be made between the way object. 
are described and represented using his model, and that aade by people 
describing the same dOlla1o. This leads h1ll to sugsest the pr1JliUve 
predicates used would be a good set to UN {or comllonsense re .. on1n& 10 
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the manner of Naive Physics. Given the correspondence drawn here between 
Pentland's lIodel and that used in the basic theory developed :in this 
thesis. this also provides some support for ground~ the theory developed 
in this thesis in a theory of cognition. 
6.4: 9-eer, 
Any comprehensive theory that aiaa to describe the everyday world come. 
upon the problell how beat to represent mass terms. While standard 
quantification theory 18 asauaed in this theory. problems exiat when it 
comes to formally representing mass ter .. and stuffs. An indication of 
the l~itatLon of atandard quantification theory is h~hl~hted. 
I show how notions of ep18te.ologieal priority. representation and how 
a theory might be used and 1IIlpIe.ented, are inUmately related. I also 
show that some support drawn from Cognitive Science validatea the basic 
ontOlogy used. 
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au.pter 7: Related wcrIt. 
7.1: Introductb 
Th18 chapter coapares and contr .. ta related work. It presuppose. 
knowledge of Chaptertl 1 throush to 6. Soae of the discusaion of related 
work appears throughout the theata, end in the not .. on the text. For 
ease of expr .. sion, throughout thi8 chapter the theory described in thla 
thesis ls refered to as AF (frOli 'Analysing the Fa.111ar'), and Hay'" Na1ve 
Physics prograrue as NP. 
7.2: Related worIc a.perS8oDa aDd amtraata 
Ear lier workfnga of the theory described in this thesis are to be found in 
Randell and Cohn £l989a,b,c and 19911 and Randall, Cohn and Cut £199ll. 
In gen .... l, the direction of research and .ethodology used owea Bluch 
to that outlined in Haye. £1979.,1985a] Naive Physlcs prograll.e. A fuller 
outline of Hay'" progre ... ia given in Chapter 1, and 1. not repeated 
here. However, below, I au •• arize the aain pointa of compar1aQn and 
contrast between the two. 
The first point of siJIilarity between AF and NP i. the joint use of 
FOL as the repreuntational language. In both cas .. a sorted logic 1a 
used. but for Haye. U985a,bl the cholce seems saply motivated by the 
need to have a COlipact, yet perspiCUOUS notation. The advantase of uains 
a polYllorphic sortad loglc in autoaated reasoning i8 well known both in 
teras of search and the cOllpactnesa of the set of defin1ng arlo... But 
Hayes does not use hi. sortad logic to expllcltly represent and draw 
attention to the ontology a8sUlled by the forMll.ad theory which has been 
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done 1D AF. In thl8 .... p.ct. the ontological prlllitive. of AF are 
~med1lt.l, identifiable aa the .et of naaed disjoint sorta that fall 
.... ed1ltely below T. A stailar point can be .ade for the .. t of sorting 
functiona whe,.. the ontoqy 18 clarif1ed by haying to make explicit the 
sorts a particular constant, function or predicate drawa together, and in 
the cue of the transfer functions e.g. the function apace (x,y> (abbreviated 
aa xl,), as t". apace(PHYsnB.MOMENT):SPATIAL U NULl., the aapping between 
disparate aorta. 
The second point of .1Ililarity between AF and NP 18 the way the model 
and proof theoreUc aspects of POL are used as a tool to deyelop the 
theory. In Hay. £1985aJ the aoctel theory is used to help iaolate 
unintended aode1s and suggest ways to eltainate thea by adding 
d1sUngu1ahing concepts that had hitherto r •• ained tapl1e1t. Th18 of 
course followa froa Hay .. ' conviction that a good theory ahould be both 
broad and dan.e, and that the modelling Mould not suffer from pr .. atura 
atteapta to 1aplellent the theory. In AF the process of theory refinement 
wae automated. Using the auto.ated reasoning program. rrP [Lusk and 
Overbeek 1984J and O'M'ER McCune (1988). unintended models were i.olated by 
prov1Ds that a .. t of cla.... (thought to be inconaiatent) were in fact 
conatatent, and partial cona18tency .... ult. were established by proving the 
extatence of a logical aodeL An .. aa1n1naUon of clau .. du.p8 were also 
found to be particular 1, usefuL l.hexpected theor.s often expoud an 
overs~t 1D the aodeUing and .,ablecl 1nadequac1ea in the set of defining 
adea. to be quickly 1aolated. 
1be next point or 81allarlty between AP and NP 18 the pr1llary taak of 
building a rich foraal theory and not letttng taplementational que.tion. 
intrude too aueb. In He,_ £1919a) the notion that one can clearly 
separete out representational content and iapleaentetlonal detaiLl 18 taten 
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to be substantially true, though not abeolutely. And in Haye. [1985a p3J 
h. aLIa point. out tbat tn8uraountable problaas can arise froa inadequate 
, 
repreaentaUona. HoYwar, in practice, aodel.l1ng and apleaentation are 
IlOre t18htly coupled than at f:1rst aay be thousht. That this 18 so has in 
fact been aid in d1ffarant ways sany ttae. before. For example, Wos 
[198' pl"S) points out that a ttaht coupltns exists between representetion 
and inf .... ce .. tns .toaated reaaontns pr .... ' and that certain 
cOilbinaUona of a glwn representation and rul •• of inference can greatly 
degrade the perf0raaDC8 of a reasoning progr_. And MarT (1982 p21] 
uk.. the san.,..l point that t~ way inforaation is represented greatly 
affects what can be done with it. Th1a sUSS-t. that sodelU.ng and 
1aplaaentat Ion Mould not be leapt too isolated in practice but viewed _ 
cOllpl..-tary aspec:ta of theory devalopaent. Hay .. ' NP progra_e puts the 
pr1mary _phu1s en tMary construction, and in general, Qualitative 
Ph),Sica Cd18cueaed below) puta lIIpluentaUonal que.tions to the fore, with 
Ie .. attention given to aodelling. I argue that Ilodelling, representation 
and tapleaent1an cannot be effectively "parated in theory 8a well al in 
practice given the C8ltral goaIa of AI. 
An exeapla of tbe coapleaentary relationship between representation 
and tapleaentation c:.a be sean in AF with the declaion to u.e functor 
notation. The dec1s" was basad on presllaUc srounda, since functor 
notation <ratMr tben relational notation> Heaed the best altemaU". of 
the two given a aec:ben1Hd aorted logic was to be uaed to laplellant the 
theory. It 18 also worth pointing out hera, that a tight coupling alao 
ax1sta between a glv.n representation and the ontology a .. used by a 
theory. Alain in AF thi. 18 clearly evident when noainal1Hd aentenc .. ere 
uaed to reaean about objecta ovar UlIe: a.g. the term cCx,y> in 
OBTADlSCc<X,y>,z> r.quiree a new sort STATE need. to be added, a8 does the 
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_ta!osleal function .c.) in OCR£ASEC.Ot>,y> with the sort MEASURE. Thus, 
even though t.ple.entational questions m1ght be given llttle attention 
dur1n& theory de"elopaent, once a representation 18 decided on. the 
ontological eo_itaent _bedded in that representaUon sets tamediate 
constreints on how tbat theory can be taple.ented. 
ID NP Hay.. usea e prolix ontolO81 but in AF a reduction1stie wo~ 
a .. u.ptton 18 argued for. Thi. needs soae clarification since on a fir.t 
reading, one aJaht argue that the conceptual apparatus used in AF actually 
incorporate. a prolix ontology itself. By "reduetionisUc· I .. ean the 
fOllowing. In tbe finlt instance, care has been exercised to keep the 
nuaber of pr1aiU"e aort.. functions and predicates supported by the 
theory to a ainiaua. W the funcUona and predicates described in teras 
of the dyadiC relation C are a cese in po1nt. For example, although the 
function '&WI <x,y)' appears a. a tara in the object language, the function 
can be contextually el1ainated away uaing Russell'. Cl9031 theory of 
deacript lone. 
The reducUon1aUc .ethodology 18 justif1ed a. follows. Modelling 
coaaon aen .. 18 argued to be at least a. difficult as that expected in 
foraaUsing any other theory encountered within either the sci&neee or in 
philsophy. If one 1.8 to be ,....onably sure that one'. theory i. fr.. fro. 
contradiction, yet i. both broad and dense, the fewer prtalt1ve. in tbe 
theory, the better. I find it difficult to believe that ax1o .. aUaat1ons 
constructed by .. the •• tlclans and logicians are always aotlvated by 
a .. thetic considerationa. Unlike Hayes, I do not view reductionl •• in 
teras of theoretical elegance and having ontological interest only. 
Establ1sbing a set of prt.it1vea and lndependent axioms (in principle if 
not in practice) enabl. tbe theory to provlde a useful foundation for 
general AI. HavSns proved the sufficiency of a theory to generate a 
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plausible .. t of consequence., the search for physical correlate. of the 
theory'. underlying .. t of pr1alt1ves can be effecuvely constrained. 
Pentland'. (1986) theory of v1810n which u.es an ontology of aacroscopic 
-parts- that can be defor.ed by stretching. bending. twisting or tapering, 
and which can be combined using Boolean operation. 1. a case in point Csee 
.ection 6.4>-
In 'Ontology for Liquids' [Hayes 1985b]. Hayes skstch .. the beginnings 
of a topological theory of apece. This 18 modified and developed further 
In Welh ... and Hayes [1984]. However. despite the importance given to 
spettal information, and in particular topological inforllation. no further 
attempt appears to have been aade. Hayes' U985b paO] relat10n INCal,a2). 
<see also Welhaa end Hayee, 198"> expressea e parUal ordering defined 
over p1ec:ea of apace. This haa a1allarittes with the relation P(x,y> 
defined over resiona used in AF. However, whereas Hay .. clearly Intends 
to include facea as pieces of spece [Hay.. 1985b paOl. and moreover 
defines IN(sl,s2) over (directed) surfaces, only enUti" poeaeasing non-
zero voluae, are admitted as (spatial> regions in AF. Similarly Hay'" 
character1aaUon of a portal differs from that developed in AFj for Hay.. a 
portal 1. surface-like where I have chosen to represent portal. as 
arbitrarily thin resions of spece which are not surface only. 
The spatial sub-theory used in AF subsume. much of Hayes' earlier 
work but develope {rca fewer pr1a1t1ve notions. Hay.s' complex ontology 
of directed surfaces and edg.. 18 d1.apensed with. and concapts such as 
objects being joined or touching are reworked in terms of externally 
connected ...,1cIn •. 
Hayesian histories (contiguous chunks of apace-time) are not used in 
AF - the spatlal and t.mporal doaains are modelled and reasoned about 
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aeperately. In contrast to Hay., dyna.ic descriptions of the world are 
modelled by st1pulat~ sequences of atate descriptions, with physical 
bodi.. upped to the .peces they occupy at a given .oaent with the 
tran.fer apse.ex,y> function. Although h1.torl .. were orig1oally developed 
to .eet tb. well known fr ... probleJl and poverty a.sociated with the 
.ltuation calculus, it too is not ialaune fro. it [see e.g. Shoham and 
McDeraott 1988 - and the tnteresting .lant by Rayner 0989] who argue. 
that the r.lated -extended prediction probl.... 18 ~ooted tn a .tataken 
analy.l •. 
Aa has been .entioned before, little work clearly ra1lins in the Naive 
Physica mould has appeared 10 AI literature. Cunninghall [198'a] devote. 
soas attenUon to .ode1l1ng eoaaon sen .. knowledge, but this 1. clearly 
periphsral to the central contribution to his thesi •. 
An earnest atteapt to put COlUlon sen .. knowledge upon a foraal 
footing can be found 10 the Coaaonsenae Su_er workshop, [Hobbs at aI, 
1985] and 10 [Hobbs and Moore 1985]. The foraer contains work by Kautz 
ll9851 who dl.cuaaes a foraalt.. for the representation of spatial 
descripUons and concepts, Hager (19851 who tackles the representation of 
properties of llateriala, and Shah.. £1985bl the representation of 
kineaatics and shape. Unfortunately, .any of the.e papera suffer froa a 
free use of ·axl0 •• - and there 1a Ut tIe overall eyidence of theory 
development in ter •• of 10teresting theoreIU given. Part of this tendency 
8 ... 8 to have arieen fro. the Ilethodology adopted by the group, for 
exaaple, putt10g questions of conSistency a8ide and a1llling for conceptual 
cover. The aethodological weaknesa of this approach and it. attendant 
dangers haa been .. ply diacueaed elaewhere, and 1. not repeated here. 
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A notable attaapt to develop a foraal theory d.scrlb~ a non-trivial 
domain problem arises in Devia (1988). [)eVH uses a f1rat order foraal1a. 
for reason1ng about 80lid object behaviour; the whole be~ illustrated by 
modell1ng the poeaib1l1ty of and peasege of a die pa •• ~ throuah a 
funnel. Several concept. used in AF, e.g. open and closed regiona, and the 
notion of a convex hull also appear in Oav1ea' work, but the eet of 
primitives differ. The _phu18 of tbe work 18 representation with no 
discussion about effective waya_ to laplement the theory. Thi. piece of 
work 1. 1nterestina since it does not smply nek to a1llulate the 
behaviour of the die. but provide. a proof <given certain conditions) that 
the die will pass through the funnel. Other spatial work can be found in 
KUipers and Levitt U 988] where Mvtaation 1n large scale space 1& 
discu.sed. 
Other work in naive physics includes Gardin et al [1986] and Gardin 
and Meltzer (1989) who concentrate upon sDulation us~ analogical aodela 
of flUid flow, strings, flexible and rigid object.. A co •• on crit1ct.. of 
any alaulation approach 18 8laply that certain contrafactual acenarioa 
cannot be represented <since the aodel i. purpoeely con.tructed to exclude 
theee>; aoreover the question of drawins inferences frca .uch an approach 
e.g. a. eight be required in planntns and .)'8tea diagnoau ia not only 
dependant upon the ef'fic18nt r\ll'V\ing of the alaulation, it .till requlr.. a 
theory <independent of the prograa> to interpret it. 01 Manzo and Trucco 
[1987] also .elect a do.ain of flexible string-like object., but chOON 
Forbus's (1984) Qualitative Procesa Theory (see below> to encode the 
theory. 
In contrast to Raive Physics proper. Qualitative Reasoning literature 
18 wen .upported but 1. too extensive to cover in any detail here. Cohn 
(1989c] reviews the field up to the SWl .... of 1987; for other u .. ful 
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introductory •• t.-tal ... the apac:t.l edition of the journal Art1flc1al 
Intell1fence (vol 24, 1984> which cove,.. key contributions to the field, 
Forbus 11988bJ for a pcsrticulerly clear survey of qual1taUv. physic., and 
8onissone and Valavan1a (1985) who COllpar8 key approach .. u.ing a coffee 
aaker as the do.ain lIOCIel. 
Qualitative Pbys1ca tekH the physical world as it. doaain and aeeJca 
to .odel both expert and cOIUIonsenae reaeonq about phy.ical syat ... ; it 
also aeeJca the COlUlon ground between the lIod.ls it uses and the lIor. 
traditional on .. a.aoc1ated with physics [Forbus. 1988a,bJ. Difficulti •• 
are acknowledged exactly what the def1ning characteristic is by the use of 
the tena ·qualitaUve·, but it has bHn identified with lIodelling that 
takes continuous parameters and abstracts out a finit. set of discret. 
values to work with £Forbus, 1988a). A cOJllK)n exallple i8 the use of 
signed nUller-icel values ...... , "0" and _.. - changes in .uch sfan. being 
aaaociated with 8tan1ficant changea in the behaviour of SOli. phy.ical 
syst •• , e.g. heet 'low COinciding with a temperature differenc. aaos. two 
conn.cted bodlae of wat.... In AF the finite set of discrete valuea can be 
identified with the role given to chang.. in boundary connection between 
region. oyer U.... e.g. DC to EC to PO to TPP and to NJ'PP. As in QP wh.r • 
... " cannot change d~tly to It-It without pa.sing through ~", the .... 
restriction arises for petre of region. underg0tna a change 1n 
connectiY1ty. In this cue the change frOll e.g. DC to PO .ust pe.. through 
Ee, and PO to NTPP .u.t pen through TPP 1n the normal caee. 
tbe notion of an "envision.ant" COllaon to QP also appeara in AF. The 
.et of finite stat .. assumed by physical syate •• in QP .odelling. 18 
carried aeross to f1nite .ets of base relationa developed 1n the theory. 
These sets of base relatina are used both to de.cribe individual stat.s, 
and events and processes a. specified sequences of state transit tons. 
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Restrictlona on direct transitions are fixed by trans1tion networks 
developed 1n the theory. 
There are three ' ....... 11y recognised approaches to qual1tative 
reasoning and aodell1na: the constraint centrad approach, the coapon8lt 
centred approach end the procese c~tred approach. The.. are briefly 
discussed 1n turn. 
The conetra1nt centred approach. axeapl1fied in the work of Kuiper. 
(1984,1986), aodela a physical .y.t .. a8 a eet of constraint equat10na 
which are qual1tative analogue. of differential equation •. 
In contrast the coaponent c~tred approach, ex_pUfied in the work of 
de Kleer and Brown (1984.) and Villiaaa [1984.), aoclels a physical 'Y8tea by 
explicitly repreaenttng a connected network of coaponent. drawn fro. a 
library. Each cOliponant ha. an as'ociated deecriptton that deacribee it. 
behaviour. Aaauapttons about how the coaponenta are used in a physical 
8yste. are carefully avoided so that the generic descriptions a .. oc1ated 
with the individual coaponante do not iaport function into the givan 
structure (the no funct10n 1n structww postulate - criticised in leunete 
and All_eng (1989), although behaviour aaaWled to hold over a wide cla •• 
of physical eyateae (called classwls. anuapttons> are ueed. The global 
behaviour of a given physical ayatea is then d.terained fro. coaput1n8 the 
behaviour of the priaitivee in the syat ••. 
The proceea centered approach, exemplified by the work of Forbus [1984) 
follows the lett.. approach in spirit by .odeUing coaponents but also by 
Ilodelling the processes that are said to act upon thea. Qual1tative 
Process Theory <QPT) takes as 1ts Ilajor assuapUon that "all c:hangea in 
phys1cal systems are caused directly or indirectly by proce .... • (the sole 
Ilechants •• sauaption). QPT descr1bes physical situations in ter.s of a 
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collection of objecta, their properU .. and relationships arising betw.-t 
tb.. Proc ..... are specified in t ..... of a set of individuals (those 
object. stipulated to be affected by a given process>, a set of 
precondition. <description. about the objects and their relation.hips other 
tban quantity condition.>, a set of quantity conditions <atatements 
representing .ither tDequalJt!ae between quantities or statements about 
the statu. of proc:eaaea and individual views), a •• t of relaUon. arising 
between the par ... t .... of the individuals, and a set of influences 1mpoeed 
on tb. proce .. on the para .. ter. of the individual.. The set of 
individuals, preconditions, quantity conditions and relations make up what 
Forbus calla an individual view. Processes acting on these objects have 
variou. effect.. Soae are aodelled by using a set of quantities mapping 
to these objects which have as parts an amount and a derivative both 
represented a. nUllbera. Forbus relates the values of these numbers to a 
Quantity Space which con.lats of a set of elellents and a set of orderings. 
Values of these quantities can either be completely specified or are 
regarded aa inCOllplete. QPT can be used to determine which processes are 
active, what chan8es can happen and deduce poasibl. behaviour in the 
modelled phy.ical 8yat.a. Typically, proc..... begin and end when 
inequaliU .. change. Influanc .. are regarded as that which can cause • 
quantity to chang •. 
FrOli an ontoqical and aodelling standpoint, the constraint centred 
approach is perhaps the amplest. The physical systell i. compl.tely 
described in t .... of the set of constraints with the emphasis placed on 
tbe use of the .imulation algorithm employed. The component centred 
approach offers aore in the way of llodelling with the use of a cOllponent 
library and with the facility to .ake causal connections between such 
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cOliponents expliett. But of the three the process centred approach is the 
808t IIOph1attcated in t .... of the conceptual apparatus used. 
It 18 dU'f1cult to coapare the work done in QP with that developed in 
AF since no caueal lMChaniaas appear in the lanauage of the lat ter. 
However. AF aak .. us. of coaposeble description. that can be used as the 
basta to build a library of component parts and proce ..... and AF also 
u... an env1s1onaant to d.teraine possible chana_s in a physical sy.t ... 
It 18 int .... tina to note that a detailed representaUon of tille and 
spacs doe. not featurs much in literature devoted to qualitattve physic •. 
For example. of the three uin approache.. only Forbus actually uses 
Allen's interval logic to expUcitly represent parUal orderings of 
proc ..... , and much tapaUal reasoning in the qualitative physics literature 
a .. ua .. a ona-d1aensionel representation [Cohn 1989c p2161. 
SolI. work [Shobaa 1985., 1985b, and particularly Forbus et a1,1987) has 
been done on qualitative ldnaaet1c.. But a purely qualitative spatial 
represent.tion 18 Dot used. Reasoning from th.ir "poverty conjecture". 
Forbus .t al (1981) arsu. that any qualitative account of kinaatics au.t 
be backed up with coapLtaentary representat~s using quantitative 
informatlon. The poverty conjecture aill. to explain why little prosr ... 
has been aade in dev.loping pur.ly qualitative representations for 
aodeUinl kinematic doIIatna. This conjecture ta baaed on thr .. pointe: 1> 
that no one hae succeeded despite numerous attempt.. 11) that while 
qualitative dynaalca IUlte. much use of partial orderings and monotonic 
functions, they cannot be gracefully extended to cope with rea.oninl that 
exploits M8her d iaen& ion.. and 11i) the fact that people tend to perform 
poorly at spatlal reasoning probleas without the help of diagrams. In 
respon •• to this. numeric or alsebraic based representation. are advocated. 
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For exaaple, Forbu. et al (1987) use a lIetr1c D1agrall/Place Vocabulary 
llOdel to meet .uch deficits. 1be metric diagra. carries quantitative and 
.yaboUc inforaation and 18 used to answer geoaetric questions where 
m .. aure.ant or calculation is requlred, the latter reflect. a parUoning of 
apece, ab.tracted froa the foraer, e.g. s.parating out region. of free 
spece fro. thoee occupied by certain physical objecta. This approach i. 
easanUeUy the seae .. that outlined in Forbus'. (1980) FROB system which 
reasoned about the behaviour of a bounc1ns ball. Other work in this area_ 
include. FalUn,'. (1987) deaonstraUon of the ldneIIatics of a cog and 
ratchet aechan_ StanfW's (1985] program that reasons about pistons and 
other devices using a library of standard shapes, and loskowicz [1987] who 
discus... modelling of rotational devices. Most of the work done in this 
field uaea two-diaensional .odell1ng. loekowlcz, using a three-dimensional 
llOdel is an exception to this. Kaufaann £19911 cites a major drawback of 
the approach that uee. the Metric D~a./Place Vocabulary mode~ naaely 
that if the IIOdeI is changed only slightly Ce.g. if an escapemant wheel is 
added with just one .ore tooth) the configuration description has to be 
re-coaputed. In other words the aodel does not allow generaUsad 
deacrlpt10ne of the behaviour of (in this case) wheela. 
L1tt~ work ..... to have been done to develop an interval logiC for 
reasoning about spatial conf18uratione of objects, despite the intuitive 
possibility suggested using Allen's logic and relaxing the ordering tmposed 
on the pr1alt1ve relation Meets <x,y>. Forbus U988b] SHIIS to have 
recognised and considered thIs possibilIty, but expresses double a8 to why 
he thinks a spetial interval logic along these lines 1s unlikely to be 
productive. Ta1dn8 II and R2 to be spatial analogues of Allen'. temporal 
interval relations, Forbus argues that the degree of constraint obtained 
when coaputing the transitive closure for R, Ca,b) and Rz <b,e) rul .. out 
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fewer cas_ than the t_poral case. However, Forbus doss not consider the 
degree of constraint thet results froa iaporting geometrical. .. etrical and 
empirical inforaatfon that can be abstracted froll the lIodel. and aported 
into into the foraal theory as 18 done in AF. 
Freksa (1990) considers a one-d1mensional spatial interpretation of 
Allen's 13 interval relations where the asymmetry of Allen's IffIet. relation 
is preserved in a left-ri8ht ordering. The transition networka that appear 
in AF (which arise fro. ordering .ets of base relations -in terlls of direct 
topological tranafonaationa allowed, e.g. from DC to EC and vice-vense, 
reappears in Fret .. •• work 88 a "conceptual neighborhood". <See alao Nme.l 
1988 for a te.poral interpretation of the same structure, which too use. 
Allen'. 13 interval relations.) The paper ia informal with I1ttle analye18 
offered. FreJcaa U888 two fish A and B to illustrate tha spatial relatione 
and the conceptual neighbourhood. The model used assulles an observer-
based interpretation of the relations, and the fiah remain clearly 
separated, even when identity between A and B i8 satisfied (COllpare with 
note 6 in this th .. 18>. Higher dillensional spaces are conSidered, but not 
developed. No att~t to describe composite objects is undertaken 
(COlI pare with the interpretation given to the relations NTPP, NTS, INSIDE 
and ourslDE in AF>. 
Wort related to Frekaa's appears in Gueagen and Fidelak [1990] and 
Hern4ndez £1990]. In Guesgen and Fidelak's paper Allen's 13 interval 
relation. are given a spatial interpretation. A transivity table i. glven 
as are details for constraint satisfaction algorithlls to remove 
lnconsistenc1a. H1&her dlllenaional models are considered uaing Cart.stan 
tuples of relations. For exaaple, in 3-space. relations betw.., any pair 
of objects 01 and 02 Sa represented in canonical for. sa 01 (ll,R2,R3>02, 
where Rl, R2 and R3 represent the relations hold1n8 between 01 and 02 a. 
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viewed .long .xee x.y and z respectlvely. The \18e of • pol.r coordin.te 
reference fr... and sener.l probleae chooe~ .dequate reference or 
ori.,tation fr .... are d1ec:uaaed. Hern'ndez £1990] el.o use. Allen'. 
interv.l relat10ne .. the basta for hi. repreeentetian. In doing so he 
reduce. All.,'. _t of 13 dy.dic relatione to 5 (corresponding to the 
dy.dic relations DC. Ee. po. NTPP and EQUAL in AF - with TPP lIi.sing>. The 
cbOHn lDOdel 18 e 2D projecUon of a given 3D scene. The lDOd.ned do_in 
18 restricted to "convex" objec:ts <in '" this restriction i. Ufted). 
Projection and orientation are .ingled out a. 1IIportant .bstractione. 
"Projection" relat.. to the degree of botmdary connection between object., 
and "orientation· incorpor.ting 8 notions which include being to the front 
of, to the b.ck of. to the left of. to tbe right of. InfonDaUon derived 
fro. projection and orient.tion 18 canonically r.pruented in •• t of 
abatract .. ".. eoapoelt1on of relatione and tran.ltivlty networka for 
constant orientation and projection i. Siven and discuued. Further 
related wort can be found in Maddux [1989] where coapa.. .lgebra. are 
developed. 
An alternative w.y to repr ..... t shape and enable useful inferenc. to 
be aada about procH'" ari ... in the work of Ley ton [1988J. lAyton 
developtl a proc ... gr._ar that exploit. curv.ture extre ... to infer basic 
proc...... Tranafonaation of ahape 18 covered. but the lIodelling 18 
restricted to capturing geoaetricel features of individual hoaogeneo ... 
enUti... It 18 interesting to note the iaportance lAyton .ttach. to the 
notton of tangenti.l connection, and that auch of the upres.ive power of 
Clark .. •• calculus (upon which the pr...,t theory 18 built> deriv.. {rOIl 
tbe expUcit characterisation of boundary connection between regions. 
A general theory that aiaa to aodel our .veryday notion. about 
objects, space and tla. :1a given in Blizard (1990). A three-sorted '!ret 
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order logic Cl.e. quantifying over objects, locations and UIl .. > 18 used to 
encode the theory. Uk. AF the noUon of U •• is discret., and objects are 
indexed to locations. S.aU and larse objects are conaldered (though the 
latter require quantificaUon 09er sets of location points) and SOlI. 
dynamic aituatbs are dlscuaaed, •. S. fusion and nasion <"aplltt1nS">. No 
att •• pt ia made to describe coaposite an-angeaaents of objects. The theory 
1a ataply presented as textual - coaputattonal qu .. tions involved in 
1.aple.enting the th~ are not addressed. In contrast Kaufman's [1991J 
theory which atas to aodel everyday concept Ion. about phyaical syat •• s, 
develops Hay'" [1985] suggestion that co.monaense reasoning about space 
might be better aodelled u.lnS tolerance apac .. rather than as.uatns a 
metric. He usee b1& foraal1aa to deacribe the behaviour of .trtns l1ke 
object. (that can pull but not puab other objecta>, and tbe uni-d1rectional 
propert1aa of a ratchet wheel. Kaufaan'. theory 1. particularly 
interesting for his use of induction to aecure h1a proofs. 
While little publ1shed work in AI baa concentrated upon topological 
descriptions for reaaontns about space, much work has been devoted to the 
use of interval IOSics for reaaon1n8 about tta.. 'nle much cited work of 
Allen [1981,1983] and Allen and Hay_ (1985,1981] develope a theory of tiae 
that exploits topological relatione between one d1.llenslonal objects -
although Hamblin (f969,1911J ..... to have produced an identical ayate. 
much earlier [see Oelton 1990). Hasblin's work 1& presented as a piece of 
philosophy/logic. An axto.at1sation of an interval logic 18 liven, but 
(understandably> coaputational questiona are not con.idered, i... Allen's 
[1983] aethod of con.traint propesation and u.e of a transitivity table. 
Allen'. ontology support. intervals, ao.ents and points, and the 
topological relations between seta of intervals are related to etat_, 
events and proc ..... j moreover the logic bas been iapleaented. Oelton 
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(1990] discu .... the difficulty posed by Allen'. logic to deal with 
continuous change and reviaea the theory to allow for thi.. Other work 
developtns the repreeenteUonal side of Allen'. basic theory appear. in 
Sadri (1987]. The cloM correspondence between Allen'. logic and the 
temporal sub-theory deacr1bed in thta th .. 1a i. covered elswhere. It i. 
notable that Allen does not incorporate either Boolean or topological 
operators within hta IOSic (although it 18 intere.ting to note that Galton 
[ 1 ~90J rev1aton of Allen'. theory, introduces and use. a JOIN <5, T) operator 
which returns that interval which ie sua of S and T when S and T aeet >, 
nor i. any atteapt .ade to develop a unitary foraaliaa that can support 
both a spatial and/or teaporal interpretation. 
Moving out.ide AI p-oper, Woodger (1937,1939] aake. a significant 
att.apt to ronaaU .. an eap1rlcal science. He develops a (orullam 
including the IHreOloglcal part/whole relation to capture many concepts 
central to biology, e.g. cell diviaion and fusion and the description of 
hierarchical relations. He recogn1aecl the importance of ua1n8 a forlDal 
language to describe a chosen doaain and regarded hta Axioaatic Method in 
Biology sa an exper~t in ordering blolOSlcal knowledge. Although 
syabol1c calculat10n within a .echanised fra •• work was env1Hged [Woodg.,. 
1939J, co.putational questions ra:laed within the dcaain of autoaated 
theor .. proving were understandably not addraeaed. Woodger dOH not 
tntroduce any aereoloslcal relation weaker than the chosen prlait1ve 
relaUon of pert to whole. and the temporal relation of one ewrnt be1n6 
before another. He does not develop a rich theory of space and U.e but 
concentrat.. upon the task of defining hierarchical relatione and processes 
using a spaUoteaporal ontOlogy. It should be noted that by the u.e of 
the tera -spetiote.poral-, Woodger does not a.sume a relativtatic physic. 
<and a 81ailar point appUe. to Hay_ [1985bl with hi. spatiot_poral 
- 200 -
ontology of h1atoriH). Woodger'. relation 'C(x,y>' (of coincidence in time) 
1. transitive and .~tr1ca1 <hence 1. an equivalence relation). The 
underly1ng physics 18 consiatent with a Newtonian world view that treats 
U .. a. a~olute. In contra.t Clarice'. [1983,1985) spatiotemporal ontology 
support. a non-traneitive reading for cont_poraneous event., and thus 
a1tsns with a relatlv18tlc physiCS, although this in turn is a point of 
difference between Clarke'S theory and AF where tiae is taken to be 
absolute. earnap (1958) provide. a 8tapl1f'1ed axiomaUsaUon of Woodser's 
(1937) work and a180 includes a comprehensive selection of axiomatic 
theories coverinS dOlHin. euch as set theory and arithmetic, seometry, 
phYSiCS, and biolosy just cited. These axlolll systells provide a good 
hunting ground for anyone interested in building non-trivial deducUve 
theories. 
tbe UN of the part-whole relation :in seoaetry also appeara in de 
Laguna [19221, Ter.i'e (19561 axiomat1aaUon of solid body geo •• try, and in 
Whitehead'. £1919,1920,1929,1918) sustained aUeapt to build a 
comprehensive deductive theory of geo •• try. Originally this latter work 
wa. to have been incorporated into a projected fourth volume of Prlnclpll1 
(Russell and Whitehead 19101. This project had been left to Whitehead, but 
it was never eoaplated and the boob followed. Clerke's [1981,1985) 
calculus utilise. aeet of Whitehead's Iler-eclogieal definitione, but differ. 
with the inclusion of quaSi-Boolean and quaSi-topological operators and 
predicates, and 80 relaxing the assumption that 1ndividuals be continuous. 
Clarke and Laguna's calculi are alao closely related. However, beyond 
defining the basic set of relations defined on solids <Laguna), and 
spatiotemporal regions (Clarke), the differences soon become immediataly 
apparent. For exa.pla, Laguna does not introduce teaporal paraaeters into 
hi. formaliaa <being a geo •• trical exposition) while Clarke does (assuaing 
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a epatiot_porel ontology>; Laguna introduces the concept of diatance 
between solids into hi. f'oraeliaJl, while Clerke doe. not but develops a 
eet of Boolean end topological operators, atuing in Laguna. Laguna'. 
pr1lattiYe relation ·can COMect· coaparea with Clerke'. prlaitive relation 
C(x,y>, excepting that Laguna introducell aodalit)' into the interpretation of 
hi. pr1aitive relation, which 1a absent in Clarke' •. 
In AF the spattal and teaporal ele • .,t. of the theory are aeparated 
out, and an additional axioa <A8> <aissing in Clarke 1981,1985) i. added. 
Thie axioa guarantee. that every .tandard regiOn is embedded in another 
as ita externally connected 'coaplement'. Thi. avoid. an unintultive result 
that can ari ... in Clarke'. theory (given a spatial reading> where a modal 
can be con.tructed that allows a chanae froa NTP(a,b) to TPCa,b> to take 
place, with no change in the relative position. between regions a and b -
as wh., a is part of b and in boundary connection with b, and when 
another body c 'bua.,.' into both b and a as b'. part. In th1e three-body 
universe the relation between a and b will change frOil lITP<a,b) to TPCa,b). 
Of course given the explicit representation of logical possibility a8 the 
sentence foraing operator 0, the definitions could be re-worked aa: 
TP(x,y> !!del'. P<x,y> " 03z[EC<Z,x> " ECCz,y>], 
NTPCx,y);Edf. P<X,y> " .. 03z[EC<Z,x> " ECCz,y>]. 
1... x ie a tanaenttal part of y iff x is a part of y and it ls i. possible 
for there to uiet a z such that z externally connects with both x and y, 
and x is a nontangentlal part of y iff x is a part of y and it 18 not 
possible for SOlIe z to exiat such that z externally connects with both x 
and y. But th1e 1a neither de.freeble <given the additional fOnllal 
machinery required to deel with the operator ... and anticipated 
computational cost incurred> nor necessary. 
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Other foraal work in geometrical vein includes Taraki'. (1959J first 
ordar axtoaatiaatton of eLeaentary geometry using points and two 
relations: a ternary between .. s relation and It quartenary equidistance 
relation. Tarati'. work i. al.o aentioned by van Benthell (1982 Appendix 
Al. 
7.3: 9 • ..., 
It is to be expected that any theory that takes space and t~e as it. 
subject, will give r1ee to an extensive body of literature thet can be said 
to be related. While thi. survey is representative of the main strands of 
work that appeara in the literature, it cennot be regarded as exhaustive. 
Up until fairly recently, rich formali8ms for descrlbing space have 
been lacking in AI l1terature, although a. has been ahown, this i& not so 
in phll0a0phy. In contrast the {onaal representation of time has been well 
researched in both AI and phllosophical l1terature. The theory described 
in AF develops particular eluents suggested in Hayes' Nalve PhY8ics 
progra_e, but differs in the emphasls given to the relationship betWea"l 
ontological, representational end lIlplementational point.. I argue that 
-reducUontsa·, 80 prevalent in early axiollatic treatments of subject. is 
desirable, and that the rigour shown in such work i8 of great importance 
10 general AI end Cognitive Science. 
The following, and final chapter, discusses future work. The thesis i. 
drawn to en end with a suuary of the central contributions made. 
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Chapt.- 8: FutW'e work and conc1us1ana 
8.1: Introduction 
This chapter splits into two aain part.. The firat part suggests waya in 
which the theory could be forseeably extended, ref1ned and used. The 
second part concludes the chapter with a suamary of the thesis. 
8.2: Fut .... Wort 
8.2.1: Exteodlllg the nuaber of subeort. of physical object 
It would be useful to increase the nUJIber of subsorta of PHYSOB frOil 
those auaaested and used in Olapter 5's modelled doma1ns. A simple 
classification hierarchy that miBht prove useful would be to encode 
dispositional properties aa well as s:laple taxonoaic categories in terms of 
sorta. Knowing for exaaple, that an object is riBid (and not deformable) 
or is fluid or gelatinOUS <and is deformable), i_ediately sugg .. ts ways 
of linking the bearers of these properties to other parts of the theory. 
For exaaple given that an aaoeba is a cell, which is gelatinOUS, which can 
defora, and that d.fonaation iapl1es a change in shape, can be readily 
acco •• odated in the theory. In this case AMOEBA, CELL, GELATINOUS_OBJECT 
and DEFORMABLE_OBJECT would appear as sort.. However, the reader should 
not be lulled into thinking that dispositional properties (appear1ng aa 
sorts) can be Msily defined. 
It 18 well known that dispositional teras commonly used in acience 
restat being given explicit foraal definitions. For example, take the 
property of being soluble (in water). It is not enough to say x is soluble 
iff, if it is placed in water it will dissolve; since the implicit use of a 
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uterial conditional in the consequent would aean that not only i. the 
sentence true if x were neyer placed in water, but also for any other 
8ubatence not placed in water [Flew 1979 p2791. A solution suggested by 
Camap [cited in Flew 1979 p2791 makes use of reduction sentences (betns a 
reduct ion of the sense of such terms) which is used in place of 
definitions. Thus, for ex_pIe, being soluble in water 18 expre .. ed as 'if 
a substance 18 placed in water, then it is soluble iff it dissolves'. In 
this case, being soluble is not defined, but co.ndit1ons are given under 
which soaethins 18 either soluble or not soluble. The &aile principle can 
be extended to cover other dispositional properties where in each case the 
conditions under which SOlIe object either has that property or not, 18 
spec1fied. 
Note that while naMd sort intersections for special1satioos of the 
sort REGION are cOilaonplace, the same does not arise for subsorts of the 
sort PHYSOB. There are two main difficulties which ari_ here. Fir.tly, 
if, as is suggested aboYe, dispositional properties are to be •• bedded in a 
sort lattice, then forael definitions are difficult to secure. Secondly, if 
the dOliain betna modelled is particularly rich Cas -would be the cue if 
the real world were used as the lIIodel>, then the denotation of two sort. 
Ilay well prove to be a sub •• t of the intended sort dOMin. For example, 
while Cohn (19871, takes the sort INSECT to be the sort intersection of the 
sorts COLD_BLOODIED_ANIMAL and WINGED_ANIMAL, this faU. to be true if the 
domain includes extinct anilllais and includes 'flying lizards'. Thue 
although the use of a glb operator lIay allow lIultiple inheritance 
hierarchies or tangled hierarchies to be represented, in practice the 
Boolean sort lattice forces severe demands on the theory builder. This 18 
especially so if the encoded theory usee the real world as a aodel, and 
aims for the coverage suggested either by the Naive Physics prograDUlle 
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(Hayea 1979,I985a1 or that aiaed for in the eye project [Guha and lAnat 
1990), The lattice requireaent for LLAMA is, as Ilentioned elsewhere, 
relaxed in Cohn £1991J. 
8.2.2: 1Iodell..tDs flltrattm end 08lI0818 
Filtration and 08110818 can be effectively llodel1ed in the extant tbeory. 
One exaaple of ~tic diffusion ia uaed by the aaoeba where the nutrient 
having been released froll the ingested food ia absorbed into the cell body 
through the vacuole ae.brane. The aodel used in chapter 5, treated the 
nutrient aa a bounded reston that was allowed to overlap the vacuole 
Ile.brane and pa.. into the cell body Ilaterial. But another aore deta1led 
model could have been used. In this case the food is represented aa 
conaiat ing of nutrient and waste parta. The nutrient i. then characterised 
aa 'uall parta' and the waste or residual aaterial left over frOil 
digestion 'large pert.'. After digeation the nutrient i. treated aa a 
disconnected region, where each separated part is attributed a particular 
size. The vacuole's a .. brane ia then described aa a Ilultiply connected 
akin, whose intersticea are large enough for the _all part. to pe_ 
through but too ... 11 (or the large parts to pass through. The paaaage o( 
the nutrient frca the vacuole into the cell Ilateriel follow. the usual 
method of lIOdeUing passage of one body throush a portal. 
Filtration can also be aodelled along these line.. 'Sllall perta' could 
ether be treated aa atomic parta or notions of relative .1%e between 
nutrient parts and waste aaterial could be introduced and expoited, along 
the salDe lines as that described in section 3.9 where an ordering of size 
between the uoeba and ita food was exploited aand related to the 1neide 
relations. 
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8.2.3: Addms arcIar1ns relatione in apeoe end uafns str~ 
Given that ti.e has one d:lJlension and has one ordering relation B, it 
would see. plausible to extend this to space, which has three d1mensions 
and by analogy, three order~ relations (with their inver ... ) 
corresponding to, for exuple, being in front (to the back) of, being to 
tbe left (to the right> of, and being above <below). The use of orderq 
relations in space appears in £Gueegen and Fidelak 1990] using Cartesian 
tuples of relation., and in Hern6ndez [1990] using projection and 
orientation relations - see Chapter 7. 
The introduction of ordering relations in space laaediately require. 
one to decide what reference fralle should be used. For exallple, the 
reference fra.. aay be intrin.ic (where the orientat Ion 18 given by 80me 
inherent property of the reference object), extrinsic (where external 
factors impo •• an or1entatial on the reference object) or deictic (where 
orientation is related to a particular viewpoint) - see Hem6ndez 1990. 
The relation of being in front of is a case in point. For exaaple, if an 
intrinsic reference freae is envisaged, the relation Is non-transitive (as 
when. cars .. y be arranged 'no.e to taU', and foraing a Circle, but 
transitive if extrinsic (a. when the cars are engaged in a race). 
An indication of the utility of adding ordering relations in epace in 
the current theory can be seen in the following sketched exaaple. First 
the relation 'ABOVE <X,y)' i. introduced reed as 'x is above yo. This 
relation is understood to be irreflex1ve, aSYllllD8trical and non-transitive. 
Next a vertical 8tring of atoa. 1a defined, in this cas. 'V_String (x). Is 
read a. 'x 18 a vertical string': 
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V_String<x) adef. String(x) 1\ Yy[C_Atom(y) 1\ P(y,x)j ... 
Vz[[C_Atom<z) 1\ 
[ABOVE<z,y) v ABOVE<y,z)] ... P(z,x)] 
A new constant called 'base' 1.8 added. The be.. is a region of apace 
conceived to be a flat region - Convex(base) and Convax(clCcomplCbaH»)? -
such that every region that i. discrete from the ba.e 1& axiomatiaed to be 
above the base. Every vertical string overla~ the baH, and every region 
has a string that overlepa it. Distinct vert ice I strings do not overlap 
each other, and if either of two regions the one 1s above the other, sOllie 
string overlaps them both. No string extends above another string, and 
sOlie string extende above every 'nonaal' region. Vertical strings could be 
used in saverel ways. Firstly, to indicate possible pathways for lazy 
fluid flow in free apace, and to provide so.. way to relate pressure 
variations of liquid with depth. 
Str~ prove to be particularly useful basic objects for de.cribing 
Dany useful properties of space and the 1I0tion of bodies through space. 
This has been noted by Gardin et al [1986] and Gardin and Meltzer [1989] 
who use atr1ngs as basic objects in analogical lIOdellinl. 
Intuitively, a string naturally suag_ta a possible pathway along 
which a body can pess. Moreover, a string provides a useful way to 
describe a .ealed body, since all ana needs to say is that body x 18 
sealed (in the sens. of a sealed container>, if and only if for every atom 
which i. part of the inalde of X. end for every atoll that 18 part of the 
outside of x, th .. every string which overlaps both atOllS, overlaps en 
atoll of x. If now we sUpulate that x 1& solid (and where all it. parts 
are solid), then on the stipulation that all 1I0tion in apace follows a 
string, or a string bundle - where e string bundle has a proper regIon for 
every pert, then it becolles clear how one can expr .. s the fact that when a 
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body ia ... led, no other body can either pass into it, or out of it. 
Gardin and Meltzer UH strlogs to find configuration paths through two-
dlllensional .aze8i the idee of using strings to define sealed bodies works 
on tbe .. a. principle - in th1a case, estabUshing that no connectlog path 
exists. 
Given the definition of a vertical atring. it should be obvious that 
definitions for other variants of strings us~ the other ordering 
relations for space are forthc:oaing. Agalo thia has an iamediate 
foreeeable uae. For ... pIe, one can then e8811y define planes «(roil which 
the notion of a net body or surface ia iluDediately forthcoming> and 
coaposite laatnar like regions, arrqed rather like rock strata. 
That laaina ..... frequently used 10 Fluid Mechanics to describe and 
lIodel fluid flow along conduits or across a surface auggests a natural 
way forward for using leaina to describe the behaviour of liquid 10 force 
puap aa it is sucked into the aain chaabar and then expelled. Horizontal 
lamina provide a powerful freaework with which to describe the 
observational fact that water find. ita own level a. it fills a container, 
and filling as the 'fUling' of layera of connected laaina. 
a.2.~: Jncorporattms IIOUan and force into the tbearJ 
Given the _ph asia glven to the representation o( topological and 
geometrical inforaatlon in this theory, the need to incorporate notions of 
IIOtion and in particular force did not arise. However, once an explanation 
ia sought for why a particular state of affairs has come about, such 
explanations will tend to aake an appeal to such notion. aa force, 
influences and dlapositional properties o( particular bodle.. Thls beeomes 
particularly iIlportent lf, (or exaaple the theory described here 1& to be 
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used with plann1ng 1n .1nd, or for abductive reasoning where one needs to 
reason reatrospectively why aome particular state came about, or what 
dynamic factors are required or were required in order to bring about a 
particular atate of affaire, an event or a procesa. 
Presently constructed, the theory relates material bodies to the 
spac.. they occupy. Any notion of movement is treated by describing a 
change 1n the degree of connectivity between bodies (or rather the spaces 
they occupy) over U.e. However, a staple theory of motion can be 
acco.modated by the theory. which I outl1ne here. 
Firstly. for a stationary body, all one needs to say is that that body 
OCCUpi88 the .... region of space over tae, or over some specified period 
of U.e. There are noted complications once rotational motion is enVisaged 
and where the body in question ia sy.metric about that axis of rotation, 
s1nce one would need to say that all the parts of that body occupy 
different locationa in apace over consecutive .oments 1n ttaej but the 
fonaal1sm can acco_odete 8uch variant •. 
In order to say some body, object a, is stationary for all time (or for 
ao.e spec:1fied period), th1a is described aa follows: 
'he EQUAL (al x,al next (x», or EQUAL (al tt,al t2) respectively. Conversely, for 
continuous motion this i8 expressed as \he ~EQUAL (al x,al next (x». In order 
to get continuity in .otion through spece (and thereby di8sallowing 
-jumps->, one could then give the global condition 'dxy C(xl y,xl next (y». 
Thia condition actually appears 10 the assumption of continuity via 
connect ton built into the envieion.ent axioms described in Chapter 3. Note 
here, that if x 1& a body that occupies an atomic region of space (and 
where the condition Yxy C be! y,x! next (y» holds), then that body cannot 
occupy different regions of space over tille. That this is 80 1& forced by 
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the condition that connectedness between atolls iJapl1es their identity <see 
T53). The saae does not apply for closed atolls however, since the 
closurea of atOlls can externally connect <1'59). But note that if we go on 
to say that EC (811 x,al next (x), where object a 18 atoafe, then given the 
generalised notion of a .tring <of ato..) we can see the beginnings of 
describing continuous aotion for a closed atom along a string. 
For rotational aotion, the addition of the ordering relations for apace 
can be effectively exploited. For exaaple, one could describe the .otion 
of door2 of valve2 in the force pump by first defining the relation 
'ROTATE_RIGHT _UP <x,y,z)' read aa IX rotates towards the right and upward 
throughout period ZI, as: 
'ROTATE_RIGHT_UP(x,y> :def. Yzu([P<z,y> 1\ P(u,y> 1\ B<Z,u>] .. 
~[[C_Atoll (y) 1\ 
P(vlz,xlz) 1\ P(Ylu,xlu>l] .. 
RIGHT (vi z,vl u) i\ ABOVE (wi u,wl Y)]]. 
8.2.5: Factor1na out additional latt:lcea 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, further work needs to be done in orda- to 
tranalate each aonadie predicate into a sort predicate, and clo.. the 
extended sort lattice. As argued in Chapter 2 and 5, this 18 not an eaay 
task. The sa .. principle and difficulties carry across to eets of 
relations that can be factored out and .. bedded in lattice structures. 
The lat tice that encodes the set of relat ions defined solely in ter .. 
of the relation Cex,y> has been completed. But others, in particular the 
set of relations expressing the inside and outside relations will require 
lIany more relations to be defined, than the set given. Unlike the set of 
relations encoded in the I.e lattice, most of the pairs of named relation. 
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that are defined hay. non-empty intersections. This is not helped by the 
fact that moat of the defined relationa are not symmetrical, e.g. 
W_OlTfSIDE(x,y), since unlike any sy_etricel predicate, an inverse case will 
need to be defined. So •• work developing these relations can be found in 
Randell and Cohn [1991], but the lattices shown there are strictly only 
partial, i... the set of baae relationa expand once inverses are taken into 
account. 
8.2.6: El1IIfnaUng reduncIancy in the eet of del1nfng ano.a 
Careful inspection of tha set of clauses defining the theory reveala aOlle 
redundancy. Two exaapl .. are given here. For exaaple, given EQUAL is 
defined. ax10ll A3 (which appears in Clarke (1981]) can be excised, aince it 
can be proved as a theor... Siailarly, the clause set defining prod <x,y) 
(nullbering four clauses): 
(1) "CCu.prodCx,y» v P(f6(x.y.u>,x) 
(11) "'CCu,prodCx,y» v P(f6(x,y,u),y> 
(111) ...c(u,prodCx,y» v CCu,f6 (x,y,u» 
(Iv) ... PCv,x> v ... P(v,y> v "'C<u,v) v CCu,prodClC,y» 
can be reduced to the three clauses: 
<1') P(proc:l(x,y>,x) 
<U') P<prod <x,y>,y> 
(11i') "'P(v,x) v ... P(v,y) v ... C<w,v> v CCw,prod<x,y». 
In this case the function prod<x,y) is substituted for the akole. function 
f6 (x,y,u) - where the region prod <x.y) is taken to be the part held in 
common between regions x and y. In that case one can see imllediately 
that clause (111) is tautologous, and hence can be eliminated. Then we 
not. that the literal •• P(prod Cx,y>,x) and P <prod Cx,y),y> are theorems, hence 
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claus88 (1) and (11) can be respectively 8implified to clauses (i') and 
<11'). 
It would be useful to reduce the set of defining axioms to a BlinimUIII, 
though establishing independence of clauses in a large axiomatic theory is 
recosnised a8 a particularly difficult task. 
8.2.7: Eatabltalrlns CXJnSiatenqr ill larp ano.at1c theories 
Hayes U985al acknowledged the difficulty facing any person building large 
scale fOnlal theories, namely that establishing conSistency for large 
axiomatic theor1ee is a non-trivial task. Cunningham's [1985a1 thesis, that 
of constructing a lIodel bulding program for first order theories, was also 
mottvated by this sense of unease. 
In general, tbe existence of a lIodel that interprets a first order 
theory guarantees it. consistency - at least relative to the model - for 
the lIodel itself aay have deeply embedded inconsistent notions. However, 
given a ffrat order axiomatic theory, techniques exist to prove the 
existence of a logical model (if a finite model exists), hence estabUsh ita 
consistency relative to that model. However, just because a finite model 
can be eatabl1&hed, that model may not be the intended one. Hence the 
laportance for inaisttns that the expressions in a formal language can 
support clear semantic reading8 in the metalanguage - for by doing thi8, 
the intended model used to interpret the theory establishes the relative 
conSistency of the axiomatic theory for that intended Blodel. Without this 
condition being satisfied, a logical model may exist, but the theory will 
fail to be a theory of the intended domain. 
Work haa already been done to automate model buUding (see e.g. 
Cunninghaa Cl985a.bJ, Manthey and Bry (1988] and Winker [1982». It would 
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be useful to .mploy such specialised programs to repeatedly test an 
expanding theory for consistency. or for deaonetrating counterexamples for 
satisfiable set. of c1au&e8 that were originally thought to be 
unsatiefiable - as may arise when an axiom is mlss~ making the 
interpreted fonaal theory. incomplete. 
8.3: Conclus100e 
It 18 useful to su_arise the thesis and highlight the main pOints and 
contributions aade. 
IletbodoJasical CODtrtbutlons 
I show that a fruitful approach for modelling the everyday world needs to 
be grounded In an ontology that is directly related to perceptual 
experience. TopologiCal InformaUon is especially Singled out. Topological 
relationships between objects remain relatively stable over useful 
stretches of Ume and indicates the nature of the type of regularities and 
invariants we should at tend to and ground in a theory of cogniticn. I 
show that the differences :in connectivity between regions are a useful 
abstraction with which to model space, and that changes in the degree of 
connectivity between objects can be used to explain the manner in which 
one state chana •• into another. 
I show how naive theories. or theories of the cOlDJlonsense world must 
be expected to be as complex as any other theory gainfully used :in the 
sciences, and that a difficulty in the past has stemmed froa inadequate 
tilDe and attention given to the nature and scope of common sense 
knowledge. In this respect I show that the idea of commonsense knowledge 
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as "deep knowledge" 18 at best a misleading metaphor, and that the cOllmon 
distinction drawn between an "engineering" and "psychological" solution to 
program design and validation 18 not parUcularly useful. 
The important conceptual distinction between a theory and how it IIIght 
be used and iaplemented is drawn out. Problems stemming froll the popular 
acceptance of representational theories of mind in AI research are 
highlighted. A recognition of sol1ps1sll in the literature aa a working 
assulllption is found to be particularly troublesome. This is cOnsidered to 
be of .. peelel iaportance for the future of AI, if AI is to lIlake progress 
either in its attellpts to understand cognitive functioning, or in bUilding 
Intelligent program driven machines. 
Foundaticnal c:cntrfbutions: 
1be forlllal theory described provides the lIeans to describe lIuch intuitive 
spatial and temporal knowledge associated with the everyday world. This 
addresses a distinct lacuna in the literature, especially where rich 
formalisms for describing space are concerned. The theory requires 
remarkably few priaitives in order to lift up a particularly rich theory 
describing space and tille in terms of resions. The formal nature of the 
work lIakes all the descriptions co.posable. The theory saUsf1ee Haye.' 
requirement that the theory be broad and dense, and in this context 
provides a good test bed for evaluating the computational adequacy of a 
theory that 1& representative of the Naive Physics programme. 
On the inference side, I show how hybrid reasoning can be gainfully 
employed using a rich theory in an autollated reasoning setting. In 
particular, the computational benefits that arise from using lattice 
structures for encoding lBOI"Iadic <sort) and h1aher arity predicates is 
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demonstrated. An extenaion of Cohn's (1987) rule of characteri.sti.c 
resolut1on 1s given for lattices encoding sets of relations of any degree 
of polyadlcity. 
The importance of abstracting out differences in the degree of 
·connectivity- between regions in space 1& drawn out and demonstrated in 
the development of a comprehensive theory. Staple process descriptions 
are shown to be oonstructable from specifying transitions between state 
descriptions - where each state 1& formally described in terms of spatial 
relations holding between objects for a period of tllle. 
Transition networks governing legitimate changes in the degree of 
connectivity between regions are developed and used to constrain projected 
envisionments for a given modelling problem. 
Clarke's [1981,1985] theory which lies at the foundation of thia theaia 
is modified and 8ubstantially enr1ched, and is expressed in a sorted logic. 
Appllad contributions 
Partial axloDatiutions of two doaains are given: lIOdeUing cell behaviour 
of phagocyte., end describing processes associated with a working force 
pump. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this thes1s, I have shown that a key to understending the 
f 
nature and grounds of commonsense knowledge 11es in abstracttna out 
useful invariants grounded in perception. Also, the explicit representat10n 
of varying topological relationships between object. in space ..... 
particularly important. It i8 interesting to note, that Clarke'. £1981,1985) 
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axioaatic theory upon which the current theory is built, takes Whitehead'. 
theory of EXTENSIVE CONNECTION outlined in Process and Reality [1929,1978] 
as his main source. Clarke expressed the thought that having axiOilatised 
a theory that captured "eo much topology... with such 8in1Jlla! 
assumptions-, boded well for Whitehead's over-all project to found geometry 
on such a bes1a [1981 p216). Whether or not Whitehead had thl. In aind 
when the quotation with which this th_le begins was written, I do not 
know. What I do know, and_ hope to have shown, is that by using Clark.'. 
(1981,1985) calculus of individuals (which in tum us .. Whitehead's 
Ilereologlcal definitions), a rich theory can be constructed embodY1n8 auch 
commonsense knowledge about the nature of space and time. 
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(1) The individual constants include both proper and arbitrary names. 
(2] RusseU's (1905] theory of descriptions (which provide. a general 
framework for contextually elt.1net~ definite descriptions in teras of 
bound variables, predicate. end identity> is not assumed her.. The 
inverted 10ta sy.bol I,' used in this forasli •• , appears in the 
metalanguage only where definitions era introduced. Th. aetalinguistic 
scheaa a(l> =d.f. "YC.Cy» used in this foraalism i. translated as 
VI .(aOl»: thus e.g. the definition: 
(1) sum{x,y> =def. 1Z[\N[C(w,Z) f--+ [C(w,x) v C(w,y>J]], in the 
metalanguage, is translated as: 
(ii) 'lxy[Vw (CCw,sua<x,y» .-... CC(w,x> v C(w,y>]}] 
in the object lquap. . 
(3) The metalinguistic E-shrisk operator '3!' is defined as followa: 
3!x[.(x)]' !!def. 3x[.Cx) 1\ 'I)'[.<y> ... EQUAL(y,x>)]. 
The E-ahriek operator is staply used a. notational shorthand for the 
expansion expressed by the definitiaruh 
(4] In Clerke (1985 p70] an additional conjunct '-.C(x,y>' appears in what 
would be the the antecedent ofax1oll CAS>, i ... IIxy[[S(x,y> 1\ -.C(x,y» ... 
• j. This is dropped in axiom <A6> because te.porel regions ere 
restricted to open resion. in the preeent theory, which aak.s the 
additional conjunct redundant. Clarka'. reading of the relation S(x,y> a. 
'X i. wholly before l' 18 siaUerly changed to 'x is before y'. Given two 
temporal regions that either abut (i... have no region between thell) or 
have a region separating thea, in both cases, no incident point 18 h.ld in 
common. Thi. justif1_ the readtns given for B ex,y) in this theory as 'x 
1s before y'. 
[51 In general, when using u..AMA, the set of constant., function. and 
predicates supported by the theory are actually defined on the .. t of 
base sort. of S, and not on much weak.r sorts a. he. been don. here. 
Thus e.g. taking the predicate C defined on .patial region., this would 
actually be expr ••• ed in u..AMA a.: 
type C(d,d):Tr 
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type CC'tl,~):17 
type CC~,'tl):17 
type CC't2,'t2):W, 
where d a SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, and 't2 = SPATIAL \SPATIAL_UNIVERSE. 
The weaker sort daclarat~s are ueed stBply to aid the readability 
of the forael theory, though an tapI .. entation of the theory would 
normally use the aore specific declarations, in order to fully explott the 
sortal infaraaUon embedded in the theory. Note the appearance of the 
80rt 17 indtcattns logical truths :In the theory - :In this case 
corresponding to the eet of theor .. s: C<u.,u.>, 'he CCu.,x) and 
Yx CCx,u.). 
(6) Althoush the formaUsm is used to describe relations between 
physical objects embedded in 3-space, it i. worth pointing out that a 
part of the calculus may well support a model in 2-space where the the 
relation of connectivity i. under.tood to be optical, relative to an 
observer rather than actual, as in the d18tinction drawn in astronomy 
between optical and actual binary star .yt.... Some modification of the 
1nterpretllUon of the EQUAL relation would be required to support the 
optical interpretation of connectivity, since it would cea.. to be true 
that two spatial regions would be identical Just becauae they share the 
8alle connectivity with other region. Ce.g. when one exactly occlude. or 
superiapoees another). 
(7) Strictly speaking the ralat~ of being a part used in the formalism 
is not defined on physical objects but on the regions of space they 
occupy at any given .oment in t1aa Cs .. section 3.3). 
[8) Relation R 18 weakly reflexive iff Yxy [R (x,y> -+ R (x,x)] , and totally 
reflexive 1ff 'he RCx,x). Most reflex1ve relations are in fact weakly 
reflexive and not totally reflexive. 'Ibe relation '18 identical with' 18 
clearly totally reflexive, but the relation 'we~s the same as' 18 not for 
it does not relate every object :In the dOllain to itself; e.g. numbers 
(Anderson and Johnstone, 1962 p200J. A weekly reflexive relation is 
rendered totally reflexive if ita doIIain is suff1ciently constrained. 
Thus e.g. the relation 1P would be totally reflexive if the only regions 
it were defined on were closed. 
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(9) Strictly speaking the dOll8in referred to here will be sub-doaain in 
practice. The sorted logic asauaed in this axioaatiaaUon requires each 
Bort to be non-empty. This aeana that once additional subeorts of 
SPATIAL are introduced, e.g. the sorts OPEN AND CLOSED, only a sub-doaain 
will support a .odel where the intended interpretation is a set of open 
regions. 
(10) Clarke [1985) p68. 
(11] The siailarity of aareology to COIlplete Boolean A~ebras has been 
commented on by .any other authors, e.g. Eberle £1970], Clarke (1981l and 
Roper (1983). Taraki (1935) pointed out that the relation of part to 
whole taken as a prmiUve in the system had a correlate with the 
Boolean-a~ebre1c inclusion operator. Grzegorczyk (1955] developed this 
idee statina that the .odels of .ereology and those for a coaplete 
Boolean algebra with the zero (null> el8llent .i88ins were identical. Clay 
(1974] provide. a detailed rebuttal of this. One central point being that 
Grzegorczyk's .yst... described as aereclogy i. not idenUcal to 
Lesniewski'. of the .... Mae. Th. question a. to whether th •• e other 
systeas also called aereology <now denoted as .... ereology.·) can or can 
not be regarded as having identical models with Boolean a~.bras having 
the z.ro .l •• ant aissing reaaina an open one. So.e '.ereologicel' 
systea. include a correlate of the null ele.ent, •. g. Martin (1947] 
calculus and Bunt's (1985] Ensoble Theory includes an empty en88lllble 
(objecU, although Bunt glv .. reaaons why hi. sy.tea should not be 
formally idenUfied with aereology <which would include •• ereologyt>. 
Bunt actually giv.. ... ... bIa analogues of the cIassical elements of a 
complete Boolean a~ebra. 
( 121 It 1& cOlUDOn practice to find among calculi of individuals a 
distinct refusal to adaft an individual that functions not unlike the null 
element in a Boolean algebra and null set in cla.sical set theory. Thi. 
metaphysical stance ha. strOll8 assoc1.etions with nominalisa and 
contructiv1all. While it is difficult to find a comllon ground among the 
numerous positions now clataing to be nominalistic [Eberl., 1970 p.l0] tha 
trend towards parsmony and the clear distrust of certain categorle. of 
entities r .. ains constant. The work of Lesniewski [1927-19311 {alla into 
this category. According to Eberle (Eberle 1970 p71, Lesniewski adopted a 
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stongly no.~I1at1c pos1ti~ refusing to countenance 'general objects' 
t.e. those objects bavm, all and only thoae properties cOllmon to several 
lndiv1clual., an .pty set, unit sets differing trOll their elements and 
sets of indivtduals that wee not itself a individual. It was Lesniewski 
who constructed the first logical .ysta dealing witb the part/whole 
relation (called by hla 'Mereology') that has become mistakenly identified 
with the calculus of individuals developed independently by Goodman (see 
Eberle 1970). 
It 18 noteworthy that with standard eet theories it is inconsistent 
to deny that there is a such an object as the set without member., hence 
the null eet .ust be included on pam of contradiction. In contrast it is 
inconsistent with standard calculi of individuals to affirll the existence 
of an individual without part. (i.e. without content). A resolute 
na.inalist .~t well argue that the fact standard set theory allows set. 
without .eaber8 without contradtction, while calculi of individuala do 
not, indlcat. the exotic nature of the former in cmtrast with the 
latter. 
(13) Finding a set of criteria wh1cb can effectively choose between 
predicate and funct10n notation has been put forward as an open research 
prabl.. by Larry Was in 'Auto.ated reasoning: 33 Basic Research Problems' 
(Woe 1988. p.I601. A related open problem 11ea in selecting criteria 
which can effectively chooae between using and avoid~ equality 
predicates (Woe 1988. p.611. 
Woe po1nta out that the choice of a particular notation in automated 
reasoning can haft e marked effect on the performance of a prograIB, not 
unl1ke the peforaance of a person trying to find hand built proof. uatns 
alternative notat1ons (cf. witn .. s Anderson and lohnstone'. (Anderson and 
lohnstone 1962, p.241) com.ent that using a Russe1l1an analysis of 
descriptive functions -18 not altogether practicaL-). No aiaple solution 
to this probl_ 1a expected. Woe point. out that tne effects of 
representation, inference rule and strategy are tightly coupled and the 
criteria chosen would most certainly reflect this. This point is 
discussed further in Chapter 5. 
( 141 There exiat logics known as 'Free logics' e.g. Schock C 1968 ] and 
Tennant (1978) which allow non denoting singular terms into the forllal 
language. Functional expression. and definite descriptions are treated as 
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-inSular ter.s and aanipulated as naaes. Free logics avoid the 
pr .. supo.iUon that 81n&Ular teras (i.e. functional expressions, definite 
descriptions or proper nalles) aust denote, found in standard predicate 
logic. Rules of inference governing the quantifiers are consequently 
complicated by this laOye. e.g. in Tennent's logic 3xF(x) cannot be inferred 
froa F Ct> alone but requires the premiss 3x [t=x J . There appears no 
~iate difficulty incorporating the.. rules of inference into a 
resolution based aechan1eed logic. The practical gain that would ari .. 
using an autoaated free logic reaains an open question. 
(15) See Geacb [1980J who offers a humorous yet instructive point that 
the teaptatlon to treat "nothing" as a nue opens the way to innnllerable 
fallacies. 
[16] AlternatiYe definition. for prodCx,y> and dHfCx,y> could be given in 
teras of sua, compl and EQUAL, i.e.: 
prodCx,y) "daf. 1X[EQUALCx,coapl<suaCcoapICx),compl<y»»)] 
diffCx,y> =def. 1X[EQUALCx,prodCx,collpl<y»)] 
while the definitions are fonaally equivalent it raises several 
computational questions e.g. when to select suitable sets of definitions 
for a given class of theorems to be proved, when to add such identities 
to the deaodulator 118t and when to add redundancy into the clausal set 
by including lemaas - see Chapter 5. 
[11] Given thi_ theory is lIeant to reflect a naive theory of the world, 
the ract that coapI Cx) is defined on u.s might be taken be be at variance 
with the the staple intuition that the physical universe has no (obvious) 
spatial coaplement - thus it lIight be thought coapl<u.> should return .1 
and not NULL. The decision to declare NULL or .1 for iIlproper functions 
aust in part depend on the number of theoreJIIs one wishes to prove in the 
logic - since declaring .1 rather than NULL for the result sort results in 
a larger nUllber of ill-sorted tera. arising in wff's. 
(18] It should be pointed out that the wff: 
Yx [EQUAL (aua (x,coapl Cx»,u..> 
x,coaplCx):SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, sua (x,coapI (x»:SPATIAL_UNIVERSE, 
u,.:SPATIAL_UNIVERSE 
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is a theoram in thta Iosic, but that x cannot be instantiated with Us 
without the literal being ill-sorted. 
[19] See Clarke [1981, p.216, note 3]. Froll another standpoint the 
definition for P in tha classical calculus of individuals: 
P(x,y> 5def. Vz[O(z,x) ... O(z,y>] 
cannot be used to characterise the interior of a closed region. While it 
i8 true that every resion that overlaps the closure of a region, overlaps 
Us interior, it doesn't follow that tha closure of a region is part of ita 
interior. Hence the cited definition fails. 
(20] This interpretation is a little opaque: IIxy[C (x,y> ... O(x,y>] 18 
eqUivalent to Vxy[ "ECCx,y>], ""-3y[EC<y,x>, IIx NTP(x,x), "" EQUAL(int (x>,x), 
hence Open (x), 1.a. in the absence of external connectedness in the domain, 
x and y become open regions. 
(21) That the cony .... case i8 not a theorem can be recognised froll the 
fact that the closure of a region and its interior contains identical 
atoaic pert., but that the closure of a region and its interior are not 
necessarUy identical. 
(22) If points are added to the forllaUam by introducing a new sort 
POINT (sUpulated to be pairwise disjoint with the aorta REGION and NULL) 
convaxity, and the convex hull of a region could be defined along the 
following linea: 
Convex(x) !idef. Vyz[(POINT(y> 1\ P01NT(z) 1\ 
IN<y,x> 1\ lH(z,x> 1\ -EQUAL(x,y>] ... 
Yu[[POINT<u> 1\ Coll(y,z,u) 1\ B<u,y,z>] ... IN(u,x>]J 
where, CoIlCx,y,z) eabodies the notion of three points being collinear, and 
8<x,y,z) that of one point being between two others. 
[23] The definitions fer INSIDE(x,y>, OUTSlDE(x,y> and P _lNSIDE(x,y) used 
here replace the set given in Randell and Cohn £1989a,b,c]. The original 
set of definitions (which used the conjunct -P (x,y> instead of the conunct 
-O(x,y> used here', fail to exclude unintended models where x overlape y 
but is not part of y. 
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(24] In contrast to the ax10llla given in Randell and Cohn [J 98gb] th1a set 
admits only solid apheres as a model for the predicate Ball (x), •. g. the 
previous axio.a admltted cubes as a aedeL 
(25] Here I depart fro. van Benth .. •• axioaatisation by adding the 
diSjunct C(cl<x),cl<y». Given two regtons that are non-identical. •. g. 
EC <a,b), it does not follow that b is nearer to a than • ia to itself. 
Wlthout this restriction, a contradictlon is ~aediat.ly derivable within 
the theory: EC(a,b> iapUes C(a,b), which tapUea C(clCa),clCb», which 
implies EQUAL<dCa,b),O). But given that ECCa,b) clashes with EQUALCa,b), 
this resolve. into NCa,a.b>, which in turn tapUn dCa,aXd(a,b>, hence 
dCa,a)(O and "[d<a.anO). Howe".., by <A29) dCa,a>~ - contradlction. 
(26] Note that LLAMA does not require any restriction to be lIade here in 
the way of a conditional atatement, i.e. lixy( [NUMBERCx) " NUMBER<y» ~ ,l. 
The aorting function for disjunction <the sy.bol: 'v'> ls strict, lleentng a 
clause is 11180rted (and BE) if any literal in that clause ls of aort BE. 
Glven, a sort environ.ant where x,y:T\NUMBER, either of the dlsjunct. x<y 
or y>x are evaluated aa EE, and the whole clause 1. ill80rted. Thus, the 
only interpretation allowed :Is where the variables are place hold.,.. for 
nuabers. 
(27] Given that teaporal reglons are stipulated to be open, relations 
reqUiring the satiaf1ab1llty of EC in the doaain are excluded froa these 
definition.. One could iaprove the coaputational effidency of the lOS1c 
by re-defining the flI'P relation a8 follows: 
NTPCx,y> edef. PCx,y) 1\ .. 3z[C(z,x) " .. O<z.x) 1\ C(z,y) 1\ "O(z,y» 
then declar1n8: 
type Be ('t,'t):UU, 't .. SPATIAL 
Presently defined, Open (x) 1. defined in tena. of the int (x) function. and 
that in teras of the C and NTP relation. 'nle definition for NTP usee the 
relations P and SC. Thua the sorting function for EC lIust be well-sorted 
when defined on periods (which lt i8>, even though any Uteral of the 
fona EC (x,y> will be falee where the sub8tiuenda for x and yare perlods. 
It la worth aentioninS that the forul1a. could concelvably .upport 
either closed (or clopen periods) if required, although th18 introduce. 
additional cOlllplexity in the deflnitiona, and aay generate conceptual 
abaurdiU .. given dlsconnected periods; e.g- for closed regions the 
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definitions for Meets and Starts would assWie the following forll: 
MEETS<X,y> :df. S(x,y) " EC<x,y> 
STARTS<X,y> Edf. TPP(x,y) " 3z[MEETS<z,x> 1\ MEETS(z,y>] 
eoapl1caUons ar1ae with clopen periods, since the ordering, i.e. the 
sequence ---[ )[ r-- or --- ( ] ( ]---. would first need to be 
specified. Additional coapl1cations then arise for mo.ent., since initial 
110aents for the first sequence would have to be cl08ed, and open for the 
final aament, and open for the f!ret, and closed for the latter sequence 
respectively. 
[28] The problea ar1see when intervale are construed as sets of pointe 
and where proposiUons are indexed to individual point., or .ets of the.e 
points and where we wish to to model soae event where a change arlsea, 
e.g. in a light being on then being switched of{. This require. either a 
decision about whether truth value gaps are to be allowed, or what 
topology intervale should have. 
[29] Clarke [1985] uses • different .et of relations to deacribe t8lllporal 
position than the set used here. Clarke assua .. a spatiote.poral 
interpretation for his regions and points wher .. s the spatial and 
teapora1 eleaent. are clearly separated in this foraalisa. The equality 
relation defined above is transiti~ which in a teaporal setting assumes 
a model of t1Jle that 18 absolute. In contra.t Clarke a .. WlS. a 
relativistic notion of t1Jle which 1a mirrored in the definition he sets up 
for conteaporanelty between spetio-teaporal regions which is carefully 
fonaulated to be non-tran61t1ve. 
[30J It should be noted here, that in actual fact, the reetrlctione on x 
need to be tighter than thoee stipulated. 
Given the fact that this theory admits a universal period of which 
every period Is Ii part, and that teaporal functions corresponding to the 
initial, final and next aOlient of a given period are subsequently defined, 
some additional restriction on the type of periods supported by the 
theory 18 required - na.s1y that periods be either bounded above, bounded 
below or both bounded above and below. For exaaple, given the universal 
period 18 unbounded in the intended lIlOdel, it does not nec •• ear1ly follow 
that if x ia not Identical to the period univar88, that x haa either an 
upper or lower bound, and a fortiori a final or initial .o.ent. Hence the 
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fonaal theory needs augmenting w1th defined periods that are bounded 
above, bounded below, and both bounded above and below. By x being 
bounded above, I .ean that period x has a moment y such that that every 
other moment of x is before y, and by period x being bounded below, that 
x has a moment "I such that y 18 before every other moaent of x. This 
restriction also carries acrosa to definitions <088), (089) and CD90). In 
th1a case, the function in1tial<x) needs to be restricted so that interval 
x 18 bounded above. and for the function final (x), that interval x be 
bounded below. For the function next, period x Ilust be bounded above. I 
am indebted to Zhen Cui for pointing out the need for this additional 
restriction. 
[31] Given the closure function (which appears in the definition of the 
relation SEPARATEDCx,y> and implicitly in the definition of Connected(x» 
is not defined Oft periods, these relations cannot be used to define 
disconnected periods - hence the new defintion. 
As .entioned earlier in the text, one could weaken the sortal 
restrictions to a~ either open or closed or clopan regions to be 
periods, but the increase in expressiveness (without any real practical 
gain required by an interval logic> would slaply reduce computational 
efficiency by allowing fewer cases of Ulaorted terms and formulae in a 
proof run to cut down the search space. 
It 18 also possible to allow a new sort Periodt defined on both open 
or closed regions that is more seneral than Period, and define 
Connected <x) on tbis sort. The laple.ented logic could then be taUored 
to only allow the user acces. to periods proper; the sort Period* only 
being allowed internally within the system for the purpos_ of .. tt1ns up 
the definition. 1b18 option 1& not used in the interests of a slapler 
ontOlogy. There reaeins a separate and open question as to the 
computational coat of the selected and alternative option. 
[32] Given a clear distinction between states, events and process •• , each 
could be nailed and assigned to a sort in this logiC, if required. This 
possibility is discussed later on in this chapter. 
(33] That is to say each function of the fora ,<x,y) would need to be 
assigned to an axiOil that gives the conditions when ,(x,y> holds and when 
,<x,y> does not hold. That, for example c(x,y> is an laproper function, 
- 226 -
can seen in the posa1ble eas. where objects a and b do not connect for 
all t1Jle. One could extend the interpretation of the sort NULL to cover 
such lIlproper cases. 
(34] One could extend the sort PHYSOB to include two new sort. STUFFS 
and THINGS, and then stipulate that the sort WATER is a subaort of 
S'ruFFS. In this ease the function suaCx,y> could be defined to be well 
sorted and well foraed when defined on argulDent sort. of the aame stuff 
type. 
- 227 -
Abrams, C. and Frisch, A.M. (19911, 'An Examination of the Efficiency of 
Sortal Deduction', Internal Report, Dept. Comp. Sci., University of Illinois, 
Alabama. 
Art-Kaei, Ho, et al Cl989], 'Efficient IlIplementation of Lattice Operations', 
ACIt Trans an i'r'ofJrtuu6J.ng Langu.- and Syst .... 11<1> l15-146. 
Allen, I.F. Cl9811, 'A General Model of Action and Tille', Tech. Report 97, 
Computer Science Department, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14621. 
Allen, I.F. £1983], 'Maintaining Knowledge about Temporal Intervals', CACt< 
26 (11 >, 832-843. 
Allen, I.F. [198'], 'Towards a General Theory of Action and Time', 
Artlflc1al Intell18ence, 23, 123-154. 
Allen, I.F. and Kautz, H. [1985), 'A Model of Naive Temporal Reasoning', in 
Hobbs and Moore eels. £1985]. 
Allen, I.F. and loollen, I.A. (1983), 'Plann1n8 ustng a teaporal world lIodel' 
Proc. 9th litt. joint conf. an A~ 14-1-141. 
Allen, J.F. and Haye., P.l. £1985], 'A CoIlmon Sense Theory of Time', Proc. 
I1CAI-8', Loa Angeles, Cal1fornla, 528-531. 
Allen, J.F. and Hay", P.l. £1981], 'Moments and Potnts in an Interval-based 
Temporal Logie', Tech. Report 180, Dept. Comp. Sct. and Phil., University of 
Roch_t ... 
Anderson, I.M. and lohns t one, Ir, H.W., (1962), Natural Deduction: The 
Loslad Basls of Axloa 5)at .. ~ Wadsworth PubUsh1n8 Company, Inc., 
BelIIont, California. 
Barr, S. [1964], Expet":t.ents in Topology, lohn Murray, London. 
Bledsoe and Tyson Cl975], 'The tIT Interactive Prover', Tech. Report ATP-I1, 
Matheutics Dept., University of Texas. 
BUzard, W.O. £1990], 'A Formal Theory of Objects, Space and T1IIe', The 
Journal of Syztbol1c Log1e, 55(1), 14-89. 
- 228 -
Boniasone P.P, and Valavania I.P. £1985], 'A ComparaUva Study of Different 
Approach .. to Qualltative Physics Theories', in Second AI Applications 
Conference, IEEE. 
Bunt, H. [1979), 'Enaeables and the Foraal Semantic ProperUes of Mas. 
Ter •• ', in F.1. Pelletier (ed.) (1979]., 249-277. 
Bunt, H. (1985a1, 'The Foraal Representation of <Quasi-) Continuous 
Concepts', in Hobbs and Moore eds [19851. 
Bunt, H. U98!5b], II ... Tar •• and lIOdel-theoretic seJllantics, CaabridSe 
University Press, CaabridSe, England. 
Camap, R. [1958], Introduction to SY_bol:lc L08ic and its applicationa, 
translated by Wl111aJa H. Meyer and John Wilkinson, Dover Publications, Inc., 
New York. 
Chang, Chin-Llang and Lee, Richerd Char-Tuna (1973), 'Symbolic Logic and 
Mechanicel Theorea Proving', Academic Preas, London. 
Clarka (1970], 'Mas. Teras a8 Subjects', Phil. Studies 21(25). 
Clarke, B.L. £1981l, 'A Calculus of Individuals based on 'Connection", Notre 
Deae Journal of FONIal Lo8ic, 22 (3), 204-218. 
Clarke, B.L. (1985), 'Indlvidual. and Points', Notre [)eae Journal of FortIJal 
Log:lc, 26(1), 61-75. 
Clay, R. U9Ul, 'Relation of Leanieski's lDereology to Boolean Algebra'. 
10urnal of S1.bolle Logic 39, 638-648. 
Cohn, A.G. [1983], 'Mechanising a particularly expresslve many sorted 
logic', Ph.D. thesi., Univeraity of Essex. 
Cohn, A.G. [1987], 'A More Expressive Formulation of Many Sorted Logic', 
Journal of Auto.ated Reesonq, 3, 113-200. 
Cohn, A.G. [1989a], 'Taxonoaic Reasoning with Many Sorted Log ica' , 
Art:lficlal IntellJ&ence Rev:letl, 3, 89-128. 
Cohn, A.G. £1989bl, 'On the Appearance of Sortal Literals: A Non 
Substitutional Frallewort for Hybrid Reasoning' in, Proceedings of the 
First International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Repres.ntet1on 
and Reasontn8, ed. R.I. Brachllan, et al, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, 
California, 1989. 
- 229 -
Cohn, A.G. U989c], 'Approaches to qualitative reasoning', Artificial 
Intell18enc. Review, 3, 177-232. 
Cohn, A.G. (1991), 'Colipleteing Sort Heirarchies', Co,.puters with 
/fIath_aUca and Appl1cet1ons, to appear. 
Cunningham, J.L. [1985], 'A Methodology and a Tool for the ForlDal1aation of 
"comllon aense" <Naive Physical> Knowledge', PhD Thesis, University of 
Essex, England. 
Cunninghaa, J.L. [1985], 'Comprehension by Model-Building as a basis for an 
Expert System'. in Merry ed. Expert Syst_s B5, 259-272. 
Davidson, D. [1984], • Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation', Clarendon 
Preas, Oxford, 19. 
Davis, E. [l988].'A Logical Froework for Co.monsense Predictions of Solid 
Object Behaviour', Artificial Intelligence in Engineering, 3(3), 125-140. 
Davis, E. £1990]. Representations of eo-onsense Knowledge, Morgan 
Kaufmann, England. 
de Kleer and Brown (984). 'A Qualitative Physic. based on Confluenc •• •• 
Art1ficial Intelll8gence 24, 1-83. 
de Laguna, T. [1922), 'Point, line, and surface, as sets of solida', The 
Journal of Philosophy, 19 (17), 449-461. 
Di Manzo, M. and Trucco. E. U987], 'Commonsense reasoning about flexible 
objects: a case study', in Proc. 1987 USB Conferenc •• University of 
Edinburgh, 6-10 April. John Wiley and Son8. 
Eberle, R.A. £1970], ~:lnl!ll:1st1c Systeaws, Synthes. Library, Reidel, 
Dordrecht. 
Enderton, H.B. £1972], A Nathtmlltical Introduction to L08iC, Academic Pr .... 
London. 
Faltings, B. 11987], 'Qual1tative KinemaUcs in Mechanisms', in Proc. UCAI 
1987, Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos. 
Flew, A. (ed) £1979], A Dictionary of Philosophy, Pan Books. 
Forbus, K. (1980], 'Spatial and qualitative aspects of reasoning about 
moUon', Proc. MAl-BO, Palo Alto, CeUfornla. 
- 230 -
Forbus, K. [1984) 'QualitatiYe Process Theory', PhD Theais, Dept. Electrical 
Eng. and eo.p. Sci., M.LT. 
Forbus, K. (1985), 'The Role of QualitatiYe DynamicB in Naive Physics' in 
I.R. Hobbs and R.C. Moore (1985], 185-226. 
Forbus, K., Nielsen, P. and Faltings, B. (1981), 'Qualitative Kinematica: a 
fruework', Proc. IXAI-87. 
Forbus, K.D. (l988a], reoamonsense Physics: A Review', Ann. Rev. Coaput. Sct., 
3, 191-232. 
Forbus, K.D. [1988b), 'QualitatiYe Physics: _ Past, Present and Future', in 
ExplorJ.n8 A~ H.E. Shrobe (ad) AAAI. Morgan KAufman, San Mateo, p239-296. 
Freksa, C. (19901, 'QualitatiYe Spatial Reasonin8', Workshop RAUM, 
Uniyersity of Koblenz. 
Frisch, A.M. and Cohn. A.G. [1990], 'Thought and Afterthoughts on the 1988 
Workshop on Principles of Hybrid Reasoning', AI Magazine. 
Galton, A.P. £1964], 'lbe LOIJlc of Aspect. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Galton, A.P. ed. (1987), Teaporal LOIJ:1cs and their ~ppllcat1ons, Acadeaic 
Press, London. 
Galton, A.P. (1990), 'A Critical Examination of Allen's Theory of Time', 
Art1flcal Intelligence '2, 159-186. 
Gardin, F., Meltzer B. and Stofena, P. [1986), 'The Analogical 
Representation of Liquids in Naiye Physics', in Proc. SCAI-86. 
Gardin, F. and Meltzer, B. [1989], 'Analogicsl Representationa of NaiYe 
PhYSiCS', Art:1f:1c:1al IntelJ.i8ence 2'. 139-159. 
Geach, P.T. £1980], Reference and Generality. 
Gentner, D. and Stevens, A.L. (1963J, Mental Models, Lawerance EaribaWl, 
New 1ersey, U.S.A. 
Giunchtgl1a, F. and Walsh, T. (1968), 'Theona Proving with Definitiona', 
Research Paper, Dept. of Artificial Intelligence, University of Edinburgh. 
Giunchlgl1a, F. and Walsh, T. [1989], Theorem Prov1n8 with DefinUons', in 
Proc. AISB 89. 
Goodman, N. £1951l, The Structure of Appearance, 2nd edition 1966, The 
Bobb_Merr111 eo. Inc. 
- 231 -
Gregorczyk, A. (1955], 'The syet ... of Lesniewsld in relation to 
conte.porary logical research', Stud1a Log1ca, 3, 77-95. 
Ouesgen, H.W. and Fidelak, M. [1990]. 'Towards Reasoning about Space and 
Time', Workshop RUAM, University of Koblenz. 
Ouha, R.V. and tenat, P.B. £1990), 'Cyc: A Midters Report'. AMI Fall. 33-59. 
Hager, O. £19851, 'Naive Physics of Materials: A Reeon Mission' in I.R.Hobbs 
et al Cl9851. 
Hamos, P.R. £19601, Na1ve Set Theory. D. Van Nostrand Coapany, Inc., 
Princeton, New lersey. _ 
Hamblin, C.L. [1967], 'Starting and Stopping', The lton1st. 410-425. 
Hamblin, C.L. £1971l, 'Instants and Intervals', 5tud1ua General .. 24. 127-
134. 
Hayes, P.I. (1977], 'In Defense of Logic', in Proc. IJCAI 5, Morgan KaufllaM. 
Hayes, P.I. Cl979a], 'The Naive Physics Manifesto', in Expert Systas 1n the 
",:Lcro Electron1c Aaet ed. D. Michie, Edinburgh University Press. 
Hayes, P.I. (19858], 'The Second Naive Physics Manifuto', in ad •• I.R.Hobbs 
and R.C. Moore, £1985], For.al Theor1es of the Coaaon Sen .. Wo..-l" Ablex, 
Norwood, New lersey. 
Hayes, P.I. Cl985b], 'Ontology for Liquids', in eels. I.R. Hobbs and R.C. Moore 
[1985], Foraal Theories of the COlI_on Sense World, Ablex, Norwood, New 
Tersey. 
Hayes, P.I. U985cl, 'The Logic of Fraaee'. in Rel!tdinp 1n Knoflledp 
Representation, R. Brachaan and H. Levesque Ceds), Morgan lauf.an, Lo8 
Altos, California. 
Hayes, P.I. and Allen, J.F. U987], 'Short tae periods', Proc. UCAI-87, 
Morgan Kaufmann, Loa Altos. 
HernMdez, D. (1990], 'Using Comparative Relations to Represent Spatial 
Knowledge', Workshop RUAM, University of Koblenz. 
Hobbs I.R. et a1 (1985], CoIIuJonsense Su.-er: FInal Report. CSLI Report No. 
CSLI-85-35, Leland Stanford lunior University. 
Hobbs, I.R. and Moore, R.C. £1985], "Forllal theories of the Commonsense 
World', Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New I .... ,.. 
- 232 -
loeJtowitcz, L. U981], 'Shape and Function in Mechanical Devicee', in Prot:. 
of the MAl; Morgan laufan. 
Kautz, H. (1985), 'Foraal1a1ng SpaUal Concept. and Spatial Language', in 
I.R.Hobbs et al £1985]. 
(aufman. S.O. [19911, 'A Foraal Theory of Spatial Reasoning', to appear in 
PrOCeedings of the 2nd International Conference on Principlea of 
Knowledge Representation and ReaaoninS. 
(suneke, A. and Alleaang, D. [1989], 'Exploring the No-Function-In-
Structure Principle', J. Expt. TIHIor. Art:lf. In tell. I, 79-89. 
Kuipers, B. (1986), 'Qualitative S1JIUlatton', ArUNdel Intell18ence 29, 
289-338. 
Kulpere, B. and Levitt, T. S. [1988), 'Navigating and Mapping in Large-Scale 
Spece', AI Nqaz1ne, 9(2), 25-43. 
Lacey, A.R. £1976], A DIctionary of Phllosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London. 
Ladkin, P. £1986a], 'Pr1JliU".. and Unit. for TiDe Specification', Proc. of 
AMI-86, 354-359. 
Ladkin, P. (1986b], 'TiDe Representatfal: A Taxonomy of Interval Relationa', 
Proc. of AMI-86, 360-366. 
Laguna, T. de Cl9221, 'Point, Line, and Surface as Set. of SoUd.', The 
Iournal of Philosophy, 19, 449-461. 
Leban, B., McDonald D.O. and Foreter D.R. (1986), 'A Rapreaentation For 
Collection. of Tuporal Interval.', Proc. of AAI-86 , 367-371. 
Legrenzi, P. and Sonfno, M. [199lJ, 'The Formal Representation of Naive 
Physics', in Proceedinga <internal> of the First European Workshop on 
Qualitative Reasoning about Physical System., Genova, Italy 24-26th 
1anuary 1991. 
Lenat, D.B., Prakash, M. and Shepherd, M. (1986), 'eyc: U.tns Com.on Sense 
Knowledge to overcoae brittleness and Knowledge-Acquisition Bottla'!ecka', 
AI Nagazine. 6, 65-85. 
Lenat, D.B., Ouh., R., Pittllan, 1" Pratt, O. and Shepherd, M. [1990], 'eye: 
Toward PrograJI8 with CO.1Ion ..... e', Collmunications or the ACM, 33 (8), 
- 233 -
Leonard, H. S. and Goodaan, N. [19.0], 'The Calculus of Individuals and it. 
uses', The Journal of SyabolJ.c L08J.G 8 (2 >, 45-55. 
Lesniewski, S. (1927-1931l, '0 podstawaclc JlateJlatyki', Prezeglad 
F110tloflcnzny, 30-34. 
Leveaque, H. ed. [19871, 'Taking IsauelF'orull: a Critique of Pure Reason', 
Coiap. Inte1., 3(3), 149-237. 
Ley ton, M. (1988), 'A Proc .. s-Gra_ar for Shape', ArUfJ.cJ.al Inte1li8ence 
34, 213-247. 
Lusk, E. end OVerbeek. R.A. £1984], 'The AutOllated Reasoning System ITP, 
Technical Report ANL 84 27, Argonne National Laboratory. 
McCarthy, 1. [1959], 'Program. with Co_on Sense', :In M. Minsky (ed.), 
Seaant:lc Inforl.atlon processJ.ng. Cambridge MA, MIT Prese 403-418. 
Martin, R. M. £1965), 'Of Tille and the Null Individual', The Journal of 
Philosophy, 62, 723-736 
McCune, W. (1988), 017'ER Us .... ' Guide, Argonne National Laboratory. 
Maddux, R.D. (1989), '5oM Algebras and A180rittuaa for reasoning about 
tilDe and space', Internal Paper, Dept. of Math_atica, Iowa State 
University, Alaea, Iowa. 
Manthey, R. and ary, F. (1988), 'SATCHMO: a theorem prover 1Ilplellented in 
Prolog', CADE-9, 415-434. 
Marr, D. [1982] V:J.slon: A CoItputat1onal Inveftt1gaUon tnto the Huaan 
Representatton and ProcHs1n8 of V1sual Infor.aUOtJ, V.H Freeman and Co., 
San Francisco. 
Martin, R.N. (1947), 'Of time and the null :Individual', The ]'ournal of 
Phll0tS0phy. 62, 723-736. 
Moravc:s1lc, 1. (1973), 'Mau teraa in Engl1sh',in H:lntinkka et a1 Ceda>, 
Approaches to natural lang~ Dordrecht: ReideL 
Minsky, M. (1975), 'A Frallework for Representing Knowledge', in The 
Psychology of Ca.puter Vision, ed. P.H.Vinston, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Newman, I.R. ed. (1956) The florId of lIathMat1cs, Volum .. 1-4, George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 
- 234 -
Nme.I, K. (1988), 'Convex relationa between T:lae Intervala', SEKI Report 
SR-88-17. 
Parson a, T. £1970]. 'Masa teras and aBlOunt tenas', Found. of Language. 6 
363-388 
PeUetier, F.J. (1974), ~ aome proposals for the ... antics of lIa88 terma', 
Journal of Pllilosoph1cal Logic, 3, 87-108. 
Pelletier, F.J. (ad) £1979], NaBS ter:a .. Reidel, Dordrecht. 
Pentland, A. (1986), 'Perceptual OrganizaUon and the RepresentaUon of 
Natural Fora', ArUf1c1al Intell1genca 28, 293-331-
PIUllmer, D. (19871. ()azlnB: Controll1nt1 the use of rewrite ruIN, PhD 
t.heai., Dept. of Artificial Intelligence, University of Edinburgh. 
Quine, W.O.V. (1960), fiord and Object. The M.LT. Pre.s. 
Randell, D.A. and Cohn, A.G. U989al, 'Repr..enUng Topological and Metrical 
ProperU .. in Ph)'1l1cal Processes', 6th Alvey DKBS Workshop, Sunderland 
Polytechnic, England. 
Randell, D.A. and Cohn, A.O. (1989b), 'Modelling Topological and Metrical 
Properties in Physical Proceaaes', in Proceeding. of the Firat 
International Conference on Principl .. of Knowledp Representlltion lind 
ReasoninBt ed. R.I. BrachJlan, et aI, Morgan KaufllaM, San Mateo, California, 
1989. 
Randell, D.A. and Cohn. A.G. (1989c], 'Exploring Naive Topology: modell1ng 
the force pump', 3rd Qualitative Physics Workshop, Stanford. 1989. 
Randell, D.A. and Cohn, A.G. £1991l, 'Exploiting Latt1ces in a Theory of 
Space and Tille', to appear 1n Computers and IIl1the.lltica fI1th Applications. 
Randell, D.A.. Cohn, A.G. and Cui, Z. [1991], 'Naive Topology: modelling the 
force pUllp', to appear 1n P. Stru •• and B. Falting. (eels) £19911. 
Rayner, M. [1989], 'Did Newton solve the "Extended Prediction Probl_,,?, 1n 
Proceed1nga of the F1rst International Conference on Principles of 
KnowledBe /iepr"esentllUon and Reasoning, ed. R.I. Brachman, .t al, Morgan 
Kaufmann, San Mateo, California, 1989. 
Relchgelt, H. 11987], 'SeIDanUC8 for Reined Te.poral Loglc', 1n AdvanCflfl :in 
ItrUf1c1111 lht.ll.,."ce, edited by J.Mana. end C.MeIl1sh, Proc. 1987 AISB 
Conference, John Wiley and Sons, Chlchester. 
- 235 -
Reacher, N. and Urquhart, A. [19111, Teaporal Logic, Springer Verlag. 
Robinson, I.A. (1919), LOtJiC: For-. and Function, Edinburgh University Press. 
Roeper, P. (1983], 'Semantics for Mass Teras with Quantifiers', Nous 
17,251-265 
Russell (1905), 'On denoting', Kind, 1 ... 
Russell,B. and Whitehead, A.M. (1910), Prlncipia Kathetllatica, Cambridge 
University Prees, Caabridge. 
Rutherford D.E. [1965], Introduction to Lattice Theory. Oliver • Boyd, 
Edinburgh. 
Sadri, F. (19871, 'Three recent approaches to temporal reasoning', in 
Galton, A. (1987). 
Scott, D. [1967], 'Existence and Description in Formal Logic', in Bertrand 
Russell: Ph1loeopher of the Century, ed. Ralph Schoenaan, George Allen • 
Unwin Ltd, Londen. 
Schaldt-Schaus., M. [19881, 'CoIIputational Aspects of an Order Sorted Logic 
with Tera DeclaratiOl'l8',SElCI report SR-88-10, Universitaet Kaiser.lautern. 
Schoclt, R. [1968], LogiCfl without Exlstence AsslUJpt1ons, Almqvlst and 
W1kael1. 
Shobua £19851, 'Naive lineaatics: Two Aspects of Shape', in Hobbs at al 
(985). 
Shobua [1985a), 'Nalva Kine.aUcs: one aspect of shape', nCAI-8S, 436-4.42. 
Shobaa, Y. (1985bl, 'Naive lineaatics: Two Aspects of Shape', in J.R. Hobbs 
et al (1985) 
Shobaa,Y. (19881, RNson1nB about ChIJfJ88, M.I.T Pre •• , Cambridge, Ma ••. 
Shaho, Y. and McDermott, D. (19881, 'Problems in Foraal Temporal 
Reasoning', Artificial Intelligence 36, 219-331. 
Simpson, A. £1988], 'Grazing: A stand alone tactic for Theoretical 
Inference', Master'. thesls, Dept. of Artificial Intelligence, University of 
Edinburgh. 
Stanf1l, C. [19851, 'MACK: a program whlch deduces the behaviour of 
Ilachine. froa thair foru', SIGART Newsletter, 93, 12-16. 
- 236 -
Stickel, M. lI985a), 'Autoaated Deduction by Theory Resolution', j, 
.4utoaated Reeson1n8, I, 333-335. 
SUckel, M. 11985bJ, 'Schubert's Steamroller Proble.: Formulations and 
SoluUona' SRI INternational. 
Strawaon, P. F. U 959), Indl,,1dualll. Methuen. 
Strus., P. and FalUll8s, 8. <ada) £19911, 'Recent Advances in Qualitative 
Physics', MIT Pr .... 
iarak!, A. (1956), 'Foundation. of the geometry of solids', in LOBle, 
Seaanttcs, lIetalJath .. aUca. tran.. 1.8. Woodger, Oxford Univarsity Pre •• , 
Oxford. 
iaraki, A. (1959], 'What 18 Elementary GeoIIetry?', 1n The .4x1ollat1c Nethod, 
wtth special Reference to (;eo.etry and Physics, L Henkin, P. Suppes, and A. 
iaraki CedI), North Holland, Amsterdam. 
iennant 11978], Natural LOBlc, Edinburgh. 
iurner, R. [1984), LOBlct1 for Art:J.f:J.c1al Intelligence, Ell1a Horwood Ltd., 
Chichest ... 
van Bentha., 1.F.A.K. (1982], The Logic of Time. Synthese Library vol 156, 
Reidel, London. 
Warren, I. U987), 'Iaplementatton of a Definition Expansion Mechan1 •• in a 
Connedian Method Theora Prover', Master's ThesiS, Dept.of Artificial 
Intell18ence, thlversity of Ed1nburgh. 
Weld, P.s. and de Kleer, J. (ada> 119901,'R.adtna. in Qualitative R.asoning 
about Physical Systeas', Morgan Kaufman Pubs., England. 
Welhu, B. and Hayes, P.l. (1984), 'Notes on Naive Geometry', liP Laba 
Br18tol and Schlullberger Palo Alto Research Labs. 
Woodger, 1.H. £19371, The Axtoaat:J.e lIethod 1n Blol08}', Cambridge University 
Press, Caabrldge, England 
Woodger U9391, 'The iechnique of Theory Construction', in International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, n (5), University of Chicago Pres •• 
Whitehead, A. N. (19191, An Enqu:J.ry Concerning the Pr:Jnc1ples of Naturla 
Knowled8et Ca.bride lkliverslty Press, Ca.bridge. 
- 237 -
Whitehead, A. N. [J 9201, The Concept of Nature, ea.bridge University Prese, 
Cambridge. 
Whitehead [1929], Process and RealJ.ty, The MacmUlan Co., New York. 
Whitehead, A.N. (1918), Process and Reality: Corrected Ed:ltion. ed.. 0.1. 
Griffin and D.W. Sherburne, The Free prese, Mac.Wan Pub. Co., New York. 
Will1all., B. C. (1984), 'Qualitative Analysis of NOS Circuit., ArUflc1al 
Intell:l.gence 24, 281-346. 
Winker, S. (19821, 'Generation and Verification of Finite Models and 
Counterexamples Using an Automated Theorem Pro.Y8r Answering Two Open 
Questions', Jml of the Assoc. for COII/p. lIach., 29<2>, 273-284. 
Woe, L., Overbeek, R., Lusk, E. and Boy I., 1. (1984), 'Automated Reason1ng: 
IntroductJ.on and Appl:lcllt:lons, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, HI. 
Woe. L. £1988], Auta.ated reasoning: 33 BlIs:lc Research Probl_s, Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey. 
- 238 -
Appendbr A: GI08Slll, of 8pedal spbols used. 
Below are asse.bled together all the d1stingu1shed constants (1.e. 
constants excluding individual constants such as "amoeba1" ... a in-chamber" 
and "valvel "), functions, predicates and specially defined syabois used in 
the theory. Each symbol 1& given with its linguistic readtns in 
parentheses (where thi8 is given in the text) and the page number (s) where 
it 1& first introduced. 
ABOVE (x. y> ••..•..••••.•.•.•.•.•.•••.•.••••..• f •••••••••••••••••••• 207 
ABSORBS (x. y, z) ........................................... ,........ 135 
AM:>EBA or AMOEBA (x) •.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 119,130 
atc,(x),y) ('.ex) at y') ......................................... 110 
Atom(x) C' x is an atom') .......................................•.. 65 
B (x, y) (' x is before y') ...•.•.•••.•.••.•.••.....•.•.••••..•.•• 42.89 
Ball (x) ......•...............• , ...•..•........ ,................... 85 
base •.••••••.•.. , •••••.•.•••••.•••.•.•..•.••.•.•.•.•.• ,.......... 208 
BEFORE (x, y> ........•...............•.............•....•..•...•...• 89 
B-' (x, y) .•...•.....•.....•.•.•.•••.•........ , .•. t • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 89 
BEFORE-l (x, y> ..........•.............................•.•.....•...• 89 
C (x, y) (' x connects with y') ....................................•• '2 
C...,Atom(x) (' x i8 8 closed atoll') .....•...................•........ 61 
CELL-MEMBRANE or CELLJMEMBRANE(x) ...............................• 130 
cl (x) C'the closure of x') .......•....................•..........• 60 
Clopen(x) (·x is neither open nor closed') .......•....•..•.•.••.•• 60 
Closed(x> (. x is closed' > •..........................•.........•... 60 
compi <x) (' the complement of x') ......•....................•.••... 54 
COMPONEHTJART(x, y> ••.••••••••••••.•.••..•••••••.•••..•.••••••••• 151 
Concave (x) (' x is concave') ....................................•.. 80 
CONCENT_PART(x,y> (. (ball) x 18 a concentric part 
of (ball) y') ........................•...•.... 85 
Connected (x) (' x 18 connected') ..................•...•.•.•.•.•...• 63 
Connected_Period Cx) ••.••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••• 92 
CONNECTED YORTAL (x, y) ....•............•..........•.•..•.••....... 
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CONSTANT(x. y) e' x is constant over y' > ........................... 110 
CONTAINER (x. y> .....•........•..••..•......•......•............... 151 
CONTINUOUS_OUTFLOWINGex.y,z) ..••.........•.......•.....•......... 146 
Convex (x) (' x i. convex') •.••......•.•.....•...................... 78 
dex, y) (. the distance between x and y') ..........•..••............. 81 
dCM(x,y> ('the distance between x and y in centimeters') ......... 110 
OC(x. y> (. x is diaconnected fro. y') .•.........•.•••••...•.•...... 43 
DECREASE ex. y) e'x decreases over y') ............................. 110 
Disconnectedex) e'x is disconnected') .....................•....... 63 
Disconnect&d-Periodex> ('x is a disconnected period') ........•.•.. 92 
diff(x.y> ('the difference (or relative complement> 
bett.reen x and ,') .•••••.•.••••..•••••••••..••••.•. 54/55 
DlGES1"S <x, y. z) •..•..•..•.•••••.......•.••.•. , ..• ,................ 13!5 
DIGESTION_VACIJOLECx> .•.•.••..•..•.................•....•......•.. 131 
Doubly_Connected (x) ('x is doubly connected'> ..•.••.•.••••...•.•.. 82 
DR (x. y> (. x ia discrete fro. y') ..•.••.........•.•••.............. 43 
DURING(x, y> •.•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.• ,................... 89 
DURING-' (x, y> •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••• 89 
E (x. y, z) (. Y 18 as near to x as z') •.....••..•.....•..•..•...•...• 86 
ECex,y> e'x is externailly connected with y') •.•.•••.....•.•.....• 46 
EE - the bottom element of Le 1nterpreted ae "nonsens." .•.•..•.... 32 
EMPTYCx,y> (IX 1s empty at or throughout y') .................•... 109 
ENGULFS (x, y, z) ..................••...........................•... 134 
ENZYME_VACUOLE or ENZYME_VACUOLE(x> •.•.......•..•.••..•..•...•... 131 
EQUAL ex. y> Cx is identical with y' > ..•....••.........•..••.......• 43 
EVENT or EV£NTex) ................................................. 103 
EXOCYTOSIS(x. y> ...•..........•...•.................•.......•..... 136 
E)CJ)ELS(x, '/. z) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ,.... 136 
ext <x> (. the exterior of x') .•..••...••.........•..•.............. 60 
EXT-DIAMETRCx,y,z) (' Cball) x and (ball> yar. 
externally diametrical to Cball> z') .....•.. 84 
EXT_TANGENT(x,y> c· (ball) x ia externally 
tangential to (ball> y') ..........•........... 84 
FF - an element of L. interpreted aa "fal •• " ...••••••..•.•.•.•.•.• 32 
final (X) C" the final mo .. nt of x' > .......................•........ 92 
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FINISHES (x. 'I) .••....•...•.....••••••.••••..•...•.....•...•.....•.• 89 
FINlSf£S-l (x, y) ....•.....•...•..•.•..•.•.••...•..••..••. I • • • • • • • •• 89 
FOOD or FOOD <x> •.•.•..•....••••..•••.•.•.•...••......• ,.......... 119 
FOOD_VACUOLE or FOOD_VACUOLE ex) ....•............................. 131 
FORCEJUMP or FORCE_P(JMp(x) ••••..•.•.....•...•.......•...•....... 151 
freesurfac:e(x) "-
•••••••••• t ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , • , U,9 
Hard (x) •.•••••••.•.•••••.•••••.•••••••.••••.•..•.....•.•.•.•.•... 106 
Hollow(x) (I x i. hollow') .•.•••••....•.•.••....................... 80 
IH(x, 'I> (' x ia inc1dent in 'I') •.••..•....•...•.•............... 69/70 
INCREASE (x, 'I> (I X increaaes over 'I') ••••.•.•.•..•...•••..•••.•.•• 110 
IHCREASE_INJRESSURE CX, 'I) •••••••••.•••••••••.••••.••••.•.•.•.•.•. 111 
INFLOWI"NOCx. ,. z) ••••••••.•••••••••••••••• ,....................... 145 
iniUalCx) (Ithe iniUal lIOaent of x' > ............................ 91 
INSIDE(x, 'I) C' x 1a 1naide ,') •.••.••••.•••.••..•.....•....•....•.• 76 
inside(x) C' the inside of x') ..................•...•.............. 78 
int Cx) (I the interior of x') ...................................... 60 
INT-DIANETR(x.'I,z) C' (ball) x and (ball) 'I are 
internall'l diametrical to <ball) z') ....... 8. 
INTERVAL or INTERVAL ex) .......•..........•.•...•.............•. 39, 90 
INTERVAL\PERIOD_UNIVERSE or INTERVAL\PERIOD_UNlVERSE(x) ....•.•...• 39 
INT_TANGENTIAL(x.'I) (I (ball) x ia internally 
tangenUal to (ball) y') •..••.......•...•.. 8. 
IN_VALVE ex) ...................................................... 1'1 
I_INSIDECx, 'I) ('x ia juat inside 'I') .............................. 76 
I_OUTSIDE(x,y> ('x is just outaide 'I') .•.•.•••..........•••.••..•• 16 
L. - the epec1al Boolean aort lett1ce used in LLAMA ..•.•.......... 32 
Lc - the relational lattice based on the relation C(x,y> .•.......• 50 
LIQUID(x) .••.•..•... , ........•••.....••..•...•...•........ , •. ,... 1'5 
L. - the eort lattice used in LLAMA .••....•.••........•........... 31 
ManHoldCx) C'x 18 a Cquaa1-) _nHold' > .•...•....•........•..•..• 64 
MEASURE or MEASURE (x) ........•...•.........•............•........ 110 
MEETS (x. ,) (I X .. eta y') ...............•.................•.....•••. 89 
MEETS (x, y. z) ..................... , ........................... , . . .. J33 
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MOVESJWAYJRON(x, .,. z) ........................................... 136 
MOVES_TOWARD (x, "z) .............................................. 133 
Mult1ply_Connected<x) ('x is multiply connected') ................. 81 
tEETS-l <x, y> ••.•••••••••.••. I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 89 
tIC>rEJlT or MC>MEHTCx) ••••• ,...................................... 39,90 
MUCH-SMALLER_'I1fAJI(x, 'I) .•.••.......••.•...•...•••.•.••....•...•... 119 
N(xt y. z) (' y 1. nearer to x than z') .............................. 86 
NEXT(x.y,z.u) ('atata x 1. the next atate 
i..ed1atel, followtng atate ,. that 
obtains between z end u') .....•................... 117 
next (x) ('the next aoment (in time) after x') ..................... 91 
NTP(x.y) (tx 1. a nontangential part of y') ....................... 46 
NTPI(x.y) (·x is the identity nontangent1al part of y') ........... 49 
NTPP(x.y) (·x i8 a tangential proper part of y') .................. 46 
NUCLEARJMEMBRANE or HUCLEAR-MEMBRAHE(x) .......................... 130 
NULL or NULL (x) ••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.••.•••••••••••••••••• 38. 5' 
NULL (x. y) •.•••••••••.•.••.••••.•••••.••..........•.. t • • • • • • • • • • •• 111 
NULL U REGION ••••••••• ,.................. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 53 
NUMBER or NUMBER (x) ..........•...•...•.•..............•..•.•.•. 38/39 
N'TP-1 <x, y> ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••....•••••••••••••••••• 49 
N'TPP-l (x. y> ••••••••• , •.•••••.••.••••••••••.••••••••••••••••• t •••• t .49 
NTS(x.y) (·x i8 nontansent1ally surrounded by y') ................. 73 
O(x, y> (. x overlaps ,/') •...•.••..•.••.••.•.•.•••...•••............ 43 
OBTAINS(x.y) (IX obtains throughout or st period yl) ••••••••••••• 103 
OBTAINS",. (x. y) (I x obtains at yl) .••.......•...................•. 112 
OBTAINSw,,-.Cx, ,) (·x obta1n8 within ,') ..••..•.............•.•... 112 
OBTAINSn.. (x. y> (. x obteins throughout 'I') •.••.••.•...•..••.•.•... 112 
OCCURS(x.y) ('x occur. during period ,') .•...•...............•... 103 
Open (x) (. x 1a open') •••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••• 60 
~LOVII(;(x. '/. z) •.••.••••.••••.••••••••.•••.• I • , •••••••••••••••• 
OUTSIDE (x, y) (. x i. out81de ,/') .....••.......•.......•.•.....•.... 76 
outside (x) (' the outaide of x') .•...•.•..•...•••.••••••••......... 78 
OLn"_VALVE(x) •••••••••••••••••••••• , ••••••••• , •••.•••••••••••••••• 
OVERLAPS(x,y) .•..•.•..............•........................•...... 
OVE:RLAPS-l (x, 'I> •.•••••.••.•..•.••••••••••.••••••••••••.••••••••••• 
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147 
89 
89 
pex,y) ('x i. a part of y') ..•.................................... 43 
PARTIALLY-.SURROUNDED{x, y> ..•.....•............................... 134 
PERIOD or PERlOO(x) •••...•.•.....•............................. 39,90 
PERIOD_UNIVERSE or PERIOD_UNIVERSE{x} .......................... 39,55 
PHAOOCYTOSISex, y} ••......•.....•................................. 136 
PHYSOB or PHYSOB(x) ........................................ 38/39, 119 
PP(x, y) (' x i. a proper part of y' > •••••••••.•••••••••••.••••••••• 43 
P-INSIDE(x,y) ('x i. partially inside y') ......................... 76 
P~(x> ('the pre. sure of x in .t111bars') 110 
p~(x,y)('the pres.ure of x at .aaent y') ............•........... 111 
poex, y> e' x partially overlaps y') •..•.........................•.. 43 
POINT or POINT(x) .....••.•.•••••.............................•.. 38/39 
PORTAL (x) (' x is a portal') .•.••................................. 141 
PORTAL(x, y> (' x 18 a portal of y.)................................ 141 
PORTAL(x,y,z) ('x is a portal of y during time z') ............... 142 
prod(x,y) ('the product (i.e. the intersection) 
of x and y') ..•.................................... 54/55 
Proper_RegionCx> ('x i. a proper region') ......................... 68 
P-1 (x. y> .....•..••...•......•..••.•..•..•................. f • • • • • •• '9 
PP-' (x, 'I> •. , .•........... "., ...•..••.............. ,............... 49 
REGION or REGION(x) •.............................................• 38 
RIGIfT(x. y> ....................................... ,................ 211 
RIGID(x) ........................................ ,................ 151 
ROTATE_RIGHT_UP(x,y> ('x rotate. towards the right and 
upward throughout period y') .............. 211 
S - the set of sort symbol. (corresponding to 
.anadic predicate.) that are used in the sort lattice ......•• 3() 
SEALED (x, y> •....•..••......•.•...•.•..••......................... I" 
SEALED_INSIDE(x. y, z) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 151 
SEPARATED{x,y> ('x is separated froll y'> .....................•...•. 63 
SHUTCx, y) (' x is shut during ti_ y') ......•..••.•••.••....•••.•• 144 
akinCx) (' the skin of x') •...............................•.....•.. 83 
SOLID (x) (' x is solid' > •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1'4 
sort .............................................................. 32 
space(x.y> ('the space of x at (moment) y') - see also xly ....... 105 
SPATIAL or SPATIAL (x) ........••....•.......................•...... 39 
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SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE or SPATIAL\SPATIAL_UNIVERSE(x) ........... 39 
SPATIAL_UNIVERSE or SPATIAL_UNIVERSEex) ........................ 39.55 
SPHERE(x> (. x is a sphere') •.......•••............................ 85 
STARTS(x. y) •.•.•.•••...•••.•••.•.•...•.......•.•...•.•...••...••.• 89 
Str1ng(x) (. x 1s a str1ng') ....................................... 68 
SUIl(X. y> (. the sua of x and y') ..........•...•...•...•............ 54 
SUll(X. '/, %) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 134 
STARTs-t (x, '/) ..........................................•.......... 89 
STATIC (x, '/, z) •.........••..............•...... I •••••• , •••••• t •••• 145 
STATE or STATE (x) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 103 
ti.-<x) (·the teaporal duration of x·) ........................... 111 
TP(x.y) ('x is a tangenUal part of y' > ..............•............ 46 
TPICx.y> ('x 18 the identity tangential part of y') ............... 49 
TPP(x.y) ('x 1a a tangential proper part of y') ................... '6 
TPPa (x. 'I> ..•..•....•...•...........•...................•. ,........ 73 
TPPp(x,y) (·x is a pOint-connected, 
tansential proper part of y') ......................... 73 
TP-' (x, '/) ......................................................... '9 
TPP-' (x, y> ......•......•.....•.•.•........ I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• '9 
TS(x,,/) (IX 1a tangentially surrounded by 'I') •...•.•••..•.••.....• 13 
T58 (x. y> ............................ , ............. , •. ,............. 74 
TSp<x,y> (IX is point connected and 
tangent1ally surrounded by 'I') •.......•.......•....•... 73 
TT - an element of L. interpreted a8 "true" ...........•........... 32 
t,.,. ................................................. I' •••••••••••• 32 
u. (. the spatial uniyerse') ....•.•.•.•............•..•.•.•.•••• 39,54 
UT (. the period uniyerse') .•.....•...............•.............. 39,54 
UU - the top eleaent of L. interpreted a. 
"either true or false" •.....................•.......••..•.... 32 
VACUOLE(x) .....•.........................................•....••. 
VACUOLE~RANE (x) ......................................••..•.•. 
valve(x, y> .................... " ................................ . 
V-S1RING(x) ....................................................•. 
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131 
132 
143 
207 
VATERP1AX (x> ........................•.....•....................... 131 
V_INSIDE (x, y> (' x 18 wholly inside y') ....................•....... 76 
V_OUTSIDE(x,y) (·x i& wholly outside y') .......................... 76 
xly - abbreviational notation for the function space(x,y) 
(·the apace occup1ed by <physical body) x at moment y') .... 105 
x:~ - term x i8 of sort ~ (in the context of a particular wff) .... 35 
~At(X,y,Z) - X 1e in relation. to y at moment z .......•......... 111 
e ... A)C (x, y, z) ..... , .................. , ....................... , . . . .. 116 
~Th(X,y,Z) - X is in relation ~ to y throughout z ................ 111 
.Wt""<x,y,z) - x i8 in relation. to y within z .................. 111 
~(x,y,z) - x 18 in relation ~ to y at or throughout period z ..... 108 
,eR) ............................................................. 110 
• (x. y> ..... , .......•..•.....•. , ........•.. f • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 108 
~,~l, .. ,tn,~n+l - .atavariables standIng for sort symbols 
which are elelD8nte of S ••..•••.••••••••••.•••••. 32 
T - the top ele .. nt of a given lattice ......•...........•..... 31,50 
~ - the bottom element of a given lattice .•.•...•.•.........•. 31,50 
U - the leaat upper bound binary lattice operator ................• 31 
n - the greateat lower bound binary lattice operator .......•...... 31 
I - the relative coaplement binary lattice operator ..•...•........ 31 
!;;- (reflexive) aubsort relation .....................•......... 30/31 
c: - proper sub80rt relation ................•.....•...•..•....•.... 31 
4--. - legitimate end direct transitions between 
nalD8d states.............................................. 123 
o C' zero') ........................................................ 87 
........ , ... , .......... " ........................................... .. 81 
< •••••••••.••••..•••.....•••.•...•••••.•.•.•••.•••••••.•••.••..•.• 87 
................................................................. 81 
> •••••..••.•••••••••••.•....••..••.•..•..•.•.•.•.•••.•••••.•.••••• 87 
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Appendix B: Proofs f8enersI> 
Proofs of all the theorems cited 1n the text are collated below. First the 
theorem is cited, and then the proof 1s given. In the 1nterest of space, 
Iloat of the proofs 11at the set of axioms, def1n1tions and l .... as that 
were used. The general proof method used 1s proof by contrad1ction. Full 
proofs, 1.e. where each 1nference step 18 Ilade explicit, are reserved for 
1nforaativ. theoreas only. In this case clausal form 1s used 8S the main 
representational language, and b1nary resolution, factor~ and 
pare.odulation are the rules of 1nference used. Where paramodulation 18 
used 1n a proof, th1s is indicated as follows. In the case of a s1Jllple 
listms, the tera "'par_od. II is added to the stipulated set ofaxiolls, 
def1nitions and lema8s used. In the case of a full proof, the sa •• 
expression appears appended to the set of ancestor clauses used. Although 
binary resolution has been chosen to make proof. easy to scan, lemaas are 
frequently used to keep the listings to a reasonable lqth. 
Bracketed entries e.g. CAD, CO 1>, <Tt> and CCl) respectively refer to 
the Ilain list ofax1olls, definitions and theorems/lemmas and conjectured 
theorems that appear 1n the text. Non bracketed numerals are reserved for 
the clause sets used and generated 1n the proof only. In th1a case, 
arbitrary constants (or ground terms) used in the proofs are •• lected fro. 
the set {a,b,c, ... } 
As a general rule, wff's of the fora " :def. " are 1n1t1ally 
translated as " ~ ,', ',at> =def.1Y['Cy>]' as ''Ix[Yc,om)', and '3bc[tCx»' 
as '3x[t<x> '" 'dy[t<y> ... EQUAtCy,x>)]' prlor to the translation 1nto dauNl 
form. 
Ti£OREMS: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<Tt) ~x -De(x,x) 
frOID: AI, Dl 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T2> 'Ix[OC(x,y> ... DCCy,x» 
froll: A2, Dl 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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----------------------------------------------------------------------(T3) Yx P<x,x) 
fro.: D2 
<T4) Yxy[ [P(x,y> 1\ P(y,x») .. EQUAL<X,y>] 
frOll: D3 
---------------------------------------------------------------------(1'5> Yxyz[[PClC,y> 1\ P(y,z)] .. pex,:>] 
fro.: D2 
<T6) \Ix EQUAL <X,x) 
fro.: 02, D3 
<T7) \Ixy(EQUAL(x,y) .. EQUAL(y,x» 
fro.: D3 
<Ta) \lxyz[(EQUAL<X,y> 1\ EQUAL<y,z>] .. EQUAL(x,z)] 
fro.: D3. 15 
<1'9) \Ix ~PP(x.x) 
fro.: 04 
<Tl0) ~y[PP<X,y> .. ~ppey.x> 
fro.: D4 
<Tll) ~yz[[pP<x.y) 1\ PP(y.z>] .. PP<x.z>] 
fro.: 04. 15 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T12> ~ OClC,x) 
fro.: D2. D!5 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T13) ~y[O<X,y> .. O<y,x)j 
fro.: D5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T14) ~ ~DR<x,x) 
fro.: D2. 05, D6 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T15) ~y[DRClC,y)" DRCy.x) 
froll: 05, D6 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T16) ~ ~PO(x,x) 
fro.: D2, D7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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----------------------------------------------------------------------(Tl1) 'lxy[PO(x.y>" POCy,x» 
froll: 05. 07 
<T18) 'Ix -ECCx,x> 
frOll: 02, 05, D8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T19) Vxy[ECCx,y>'" EC<y,x)] 
frOll: A2. 05, D8 
<T20) 'lxy(TPCx,y> ... TP(x,x)] 
from: 02, D9 
<T21> 'lxy[[TPex,y>" TP(y.x>] .. EQUALCx,y>] 
froll: 03, D9 
<T22) 'lxy[(NTP(x,y> " NTP(y,x>] .. EQUAL (x,y)] 
froll: 03, 010 
<T23) 'lxyz((NTP<x.y>" NTP<y,z>] .. NTPCx,z)] 
frOll: 08, 010, T!5, 132 
<T2() 'Ix .. TPP <x,x) 
from: 02, 011 
<T25) Vxy[TPPCx,y> .. -TPP(y,x>] 
from: Dl1, 121, 124 peraaod. 
<T26) 'Ix "NTPPCK,x> 
frOll: 02, D12 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T27> Yxy[NTPPCK,y>" "NTPpey,x)] 
frOll: 012, T22, T26 peraaod. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------(T28) Yxyz[(NTPPCK,y>" NTPP(y,z)] .. NTPPCx,z>] 
froll: 03, 010, 012, 1'5, T23 paraaod. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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<T29) Vxy[ .. ECClr,,) ..... [cex,,> ..... O(x,,>]] 
(1) ~y["EC{x,y) .. [C(x.y> ..... O(I:,y)]] 
Refutation set: 
1 C (x,x) (froll AI) 
2 .. C(x,,> v C(y,x> (froll A2) 
3 .. P(x,,> v -C(z,x) v C(z,y> (froll 02> 
.. ..oex,,) v PCf3Clr,y>,x> (frOil 05) 
5 .. 0 ex,y> v P (f3 Clr,y>,,> (frOil D5) 
6 "C<x.y> v OClr,y> v EC<X,,) (fro. 08) 
7 -EC(a,b) 
8 .. C (a, b) v .. O(a,b) 
9 C(a,b) v O(a,b) 
Proof: 
10 .. CCa,b) v O(a,b) ancestors: 7,6 
11 0 <a,b) ancestors: 10.9 
12 .. C (a,b) ancestors: 11,18 
13 P(f3(a,b),e> anc_tors: 11.4 
14 P(f3(a,b),b) ancestors: 11,5 
15 -CCz,f3(a,b» v C(z,b) ancestors: 14,3 
16 .. C(a,f3 (a,b» anoeatora: 15,12 
17 "C(z,f3(a,b)) v C(z,a> anc:eators: 13,3 
18 "C«(3 (a,b),a) ancestors: 16,2 
19 "C«(3Ca,b),f3(a,b» ancestore: 18.17 
20 null ancestors: 19,1 
(11) ~[[C<x,y) ..... O(x.y>] .... EC<x.,» 
Refutation set: 
1 -EC<X,y) v CClr,y> (froll 08) 
2 "ECex,y)" "OCx.y> (from 08) 
3 ... C <a,b) v 0 Ce.b) 
4 -0 (a.b) v C <a,b) 
5 EC(a,b) 
Proof: 
6 CCa,b) ancestOl"8: 5,1 
7 .. 0 Ca,b) anceatora: 5,2 
8 O(a,b) ancestors: 6.3 
9 null ance.tors: 8,9 
n.b. clause .. 1s one clause of the set generated (roll the negation of (11) 
but 1s not used in the proof - Yxy[O(x,y) .. C<x,y>J 1s a theareJl. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- 249 -
mo) Vxy[~3z[EC(z.x)] .. [Pu:.y> .... Vu[O(u,x> -+ O(u,y)]] ) 
(1) Yxy[~3z[EC(z,x)] .. [P<x,y> -+ Yu[O(u,x) -+ O(u,y>]JJ 
frca: 05, 1'5 
(11) Yxy[~3z[EC(z,x>] -+ [Yu(OCu,x) -+ O(u,y>1 -+ P(x,y>]] 
frca: 08, T30.le_l 
<T30.1ellaat> Yxy(O<x,y> -+ C<X.y>] 
frca: At, A2, D2, D5 
<T31) Yx[NTP<X,x) ~ ~3y[EC(y,x>JJ 
(1) Yx(NTP(x,x> .. "'3y[ECcy,x>)) 
Refutation .et: 
1 ~NTP<x,y) v ~Be (z,x) v .. SC Cz,1> <frOil 010) 
2 NTPCa,.> 
3 EC<b,a) 
Proof: 
, ~ EC Cz,a) ane .. tara: 2,1 
5 null anee.torr. ',3 
(11) Yx[~3y[EC(y,x)] .. NTPCx,x>] 
Refutation .et: 
1 ~P(x,y) v NTPCx,y> v Be C(5 <X,y>,x) (froll D10) 
2 PCx,x) Cf'roIl T3) 
3 "EC(y,a> 
, .. NTPCa,a> 
Proof: 
5 "PCa,a> v ECC" (a,a>,a> ancestors: ',I 
6 EC(f5 (a,a),a> ancestors: 5,2 
7 null 6,3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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<T32> Vxyz([NTPCx.y) 1\ CCz,x)l ~ OCz,y)] 
Refutation .et: 
1 -P<X,y) v -C(z,x) v CCz,y) (fro. 02) 
2 "O<X,y> v P(f3Cx.y),x) «(rOIl OS) 
3 -O<x,y> v P(f3Cx,y),y> ({rOIl OS) 
4 .. P<z.x> v "PCz,y> v OCK,y> (froe OS) 
5 -C<x,y> v OCx,y) v ECCK,),> (fro. DB) 
6 -flI'P(x,y) v PCK,y) (fro. DI0) 
7 -NTPCK,y) v -EC(z,x) v -EC(z,y) (froa D10) 
8 .. P<x,y) v -P(y,z> v PCK,z> (fro. 1'5) 
8' -O<x,y) v O(y,x) <T13) 
9 NTPCa,b) 
10 Cec.a> 
11 "'0 (e,b> 
Proof: 
12 P(a,b) ancestors: 9,6 
13 "'&:(z,a) v -ECCz,b) ancestors: 9,7 
14 ... CCz,a) v CCz,b) ancestors: 12,1 
15 CCc.b) anceeton: 1',10 
16 O(c,b) v EC(e,b) ancestor.: 15,5 
17 EC(c.b) ancatora: 16,1 
18 ... ECCe,.) anceetors: 17,13 
19 ... C(e,a) v O(c,a) aneeetona: 18,5 
20 OCe,a) anc .. tors: 19,10 
21 P(f3 (c,a),c) ancestora: 20,2 
22 P(f3 (c,a),a) ancestors: 20,3 
23 "PCa,z) v P(f3 (c,.),z) ancestors: 22,8 
2' P(f3 (c,a),b> ancestors: 23,12 
25 -P(f3 (c,a),x) v 0 (x,c) ances t ora: 24,4 
25' OCb,c) anceston: 25,2' 
26 O(c,b) enceatora: 25',8' 
27 null encestors: 26,11 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T33> Vxy[TPICK,y) ~ TPlex,x)] 
fro.: 03, 09, D13, T3 paraaod. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T34) Vxy[NTPI<x,y) ~ NTPI<X,x>] 
frca: D3, DI0, D14, T3 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T3!n Vxy[TPI<x,y> ~ TPI<y,x» 
(rOIl: D3, 09, D13, para.od. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T36) 'hcy[NTPICx,y> ~ NTPICy,x)] 
frca: D3, DI0, D14 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T37) 'hcyz[ [TPlex,y> 1\ TPICy,z>] ~ TPICx,z)] 
frOll: D3, 09, D13 paraJDOd. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T38) ~[[NTPI<X,y> 1\ NTPI<y,z>] ... NTPI<X,z>] 
fro.: 03, 010, DI4, peraaod. 
<T39) "" -C<coaplCx>,x) 
fro.: A2, 022, 13 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T40) Vx PP<inta),clCx» 
fro.: AS. 04, 03, T40.1e1Ul82, T40.1eJDllla6, pera.od. 
-----------------~------------
<T40.leau1> Vx PCint <X),x) 
fro.: 02, 010, 028 
<T40.leaae2) Vx P(x,cl<x» 
froa: 02, 029, T39, 140.18Il1Da1 
<T40.leaae3) Vx PCintCx),cl(X» 
fros: 15, T40. leaae 1 , T40.leall82 
(C40.l.eaae4) Vxy[O<x,y> ... ° (:lnt (x),int <y» ) 
<T40.1eaae5) Vxy[O(x,y> ... O(1nt <x>,y)] 
fro.: 05, 1'5, 140.1e_al, C40.1elllla4 
<T40.1eau6) -EC(1nt <X>,y) 
fros: A2, 08, 028, 132, T40.1 .... 85 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T41> Vxy[P<y,cl(X» -t ° (y,1nt (x»] 
Refutation .et: 
1 EC <el (x>,cl<c:oapl<x») <froll A8 > 
2 -EC<X,y> v -Oa,y> <fro. 08) 
3 -P<z,x) v .. P<z,y> v O(x,y> (frOil 05> 
4 o <y.1nt (x» v P(y,cl<compl<x») (froll 142> 
5 P <a,cl (b» 
6 -O(e,tnt Cb» 
Proof: 
7 PCa,cl<co.pHb») ancestors: 6.' 
8 -PCa,y> v OCclCb),y) ancestors: 5,3 
9 O(cl(b>,cl<c:oapl<b») ancestora: 8,7 
10 -EC (cl<b),cl<collpl Cb») ancestors: 9,2 
11 null ancestors: 10,1 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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<T42) Yxy[-O(y,1ntcx» .. PCy.cl<cOIlpl<xm] 
frOll: 02. DB, 029, nO.1eaJ1a6, T42.lemllal 
(T42.le •• el> 'Ix EQUAL(cOIIplCcomplCx»,x> 
frOll: 02, 03, T6. 022, para.od. 
<T43) Vx[Open<x> v ClosedCx> v Clopen(x» 
frOll: 033 
(T44> Vx(Open<x> .. -Cloaed(x>] 
fro .. : A8, 032, T19, T49 parUlOd. 
(T45) Vx[CI08ed(X) .. -Clopan(x» 
fro .. : 033 
(T46) Vx[Open(x> .. -Clopen (x» 
fro .. : 033 
(T47) Vx3y[EC(cl<x),y>] 
frOll: A8 
<T48) Open(Ua) 
frOll: 02, 03, D5, 08, 023, 028, D31, Tl, T40. lemma 1 , T49 
<T49) Vx(OpenCx> +--+ -3y[EC(y,x>]] 
(1) 'h[OpenCx) .. -3y[EC(y.x>)) 
(11) 'h[-3y[EC(y,x>] .. OpenCK» 
<T49.lem_1> Yxy[NTPCK,y) .. P<x,tnt<)'») 
from: 02, 028 
------------------------------(T49.lemM2) Yxy[P(x,lntCy» .. NTP(x,y>} 
(T49.1eJUl83) Vx[OpanCx> ... NTPCK,X>] 
fro .. : 03, 031, T49.l.eauaa2 
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------------------------------
CT49.1elllDa4) Vx[NTPCx,x) .... Open<X») 
(rOIl: 03, D31, T'0.1e11J181, T49.1e1Ul81 
CT49.1eau!D Vxyz{{pCx,y) " NTP(y,z» .... NTP(x,z>] 
frOll: 02, 05, 08, 010, 1'5 
CT49.1ellaa6> NTPCtntCx>,x) 
frOll: 08, 010, 028, T32, T40.laIuaal 
<T50) Vx[Closed<X> .... 3y[ECey,x>] J 
frOll: T«, T49 
<1'51> Yx[ClopenCx> ... 3y[EC(y,x>] J 
fro.: 033, T49 
<1'52) Vx [Atoll (x> ... Open ex>1 
frOll: 02, 010, 028, 031, 038 
<1'53) Vxy[[Ato.Cx>" Ato.ey> " C<x,y>] .... EQUALex,y)] 
frOll: 1)5, 08, 038, T7, T8, T49, 1'52 
<1'54) Vxy([Ato.<X> " PCx,y>] .... NTP(x,y>1 
frOll: 010, T49, 1'52 
<1'55) Vxy(O<x,y> ....... 3z[Atoll(z) " P<Z,x> " P(Z,y>]] 
(1) vx,[O(X,y> .... 3z[Atoll(z) " P(z,x> " P(z,y>]] 
frca: A10, 05, AI0, 1'5 
(11) vx,[3z[AtOllCz) " P(z,x) " P(Z,1>J .... oex,y>J 
froe: A10, 05, D38 paraaod. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------(1'56) Vxyz[CCz,int<X> ....... 3u[AtOlllCu> " P(u,x> " C(u,z)J] 
(1) ""z[C(z,int (x) .... 3u[Atoll(U> " P(u,x) " C(z,u)]J 
frOll: 010, 028 
(11) VxyZ[3u[Atoa(u) " P(u,x> " C<z,u>] .... CCz,int<x>] 
frOll: 028, 038, T49.l.eaIla3, 1'52 par8mod. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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<1'57> Vxy[EQUAL(x,y> .. YZ[Atoa(z> .. [P(Z,x> .... P(z,y>]]) 
froll: AlO, 038 paraaod. 
(C58) Yxy[EC(x,y) .. Yzu[[Ato.(z) " AtOll(u) " P<Z,x) " peu,y>] .. "'EC(z.u>] 
(C59> Yxy[[C_AtoaClt> " C_Atoa(y» .. [DCClt.y> v EC(x.y> v EQUAL(x,y>] 
<T6O) Yxy[ [CJtoaClt> " C_Atoll(Y> " OClt.y>] .. EQUAL(x.y>] 
frOll: 05. D38. T60.1 .... 1. paraJlOd. 
<T6O.le .... 1> Yx[C_Ata.Clt> .. Ato.(int ex»] 
from: D31. 032, D38. D39, 1'5, T30. leaa.l , T32. T41, T40.1emaal. T40.1elllllla2, 
T44. 1'52. C60.le_a2, C60.leJaaa3, C60.1ellUl.4. paraaod. 
<C60.lea •• 2) Yxy[O(tnt<x>,tnt ey> .. o<x.y>1 
(C60.1ea.a3> Yxy(AtomClt) " O(x.y» .. PClt.y>] 
(C60.lea •• '> Yxy[PClt.1nt(y> -+ trrP(x,tnt(y»] 
<T61) Yx3y[IN(y.x>] 
from: AI, All 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T62) Yxy[DC(x.y> ....... 3z[IN(z.x> " IN(z.y>]] 
(1) 'lxy [DC Clt.y> .. -3z[IN(z,x> " IN (z,y>] J 
from: All. Dl 
(11) YxyC ... 3z[IN(z,x) " IN<z.y>l .. DC<x.y>] 
frOll: At. All, Dl 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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<1'63) Yxy[O<x,),> ~ 3z[IN(z,1nt (x» " IN(z,1nt<y»]J 
(1) 'lxy[O<x,y> -+ 3z[IN<z,tnt<x» " IN<Z,tnt(y»]] 
fro.: All, T30.1eaaal, 1"63.1 •••• 1 
(11) Yxy[3z[IN(z,1nt<x» 1\ IN<z,1nt<y»] -+ O(x,),» 
frOll: All, 05, D28, 1'5, T32, T4O.1 .... 1 
<T63.1 •••• U Yxy[O<x,y> ~ O(1nt<x>,1nt<y») 
frs3.1e ... 2) Yxyz [[NTP(x,y> " P(y,z» ~ NTP (x,z>] 
frOll: 08, OlD, 1'5, T63.1ealD83 
<T63.1 .... 3) Yxyz( [P<x,),> "O(z,x» -+ O(z,y» 
----------------------------------------------------------------------(T64) Vxy[P(X,y> ~ Vz[IN<z,x> ~ IN<Z,y>]] 
e1> 'hy[P<x,y> ~ Yz[IN(z,x> -+ IN(z,y>]] 
from: A12 
(11) Yxy[Vz[lN(z,x> ~ INez,y») -+ P(x,),» 
froa: All, D2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T65) Vxy[EQUAL<X,,> ~ Yz[IN(z,x) ~ IN (z,y» ) 
(1) Yxy[EQUAL<X,y> ... Vz[IN(z,x) ~ IN (z,y» ) 
froa: A12, D3 
(11) 'hy[Yz[IN(z,x) ..... IN(z,y>] ~ EQUAL(x,y>] 
froa: All, 02, 03 
----------------------------------------------------------------------(CS6) Vxy[EC(x,y> ~ 3z[IN<Z,x> " IN<Z,y>] " 
-3u[IN(u,tntcx» " IN(u,lnt <)'»]J 
----------------------------------------------------------------------(T67) Vx -INSIDE(x,x> 
froa: 049, T14 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T68) INSIDE <X,y> ~ -INSIDE<y,x») 
fro.: Al7, 06, 049 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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<T69) Yxyz[[DR(x.y> " DRCy,z) " DR<x,z> " 
INSlDE<x,y> " DfSIDECy,z») ~ INSIDECx,z>] 
frOll: Al6, 06, D49 
<T70) Yx ~OlTI'SIDE <x,x) 
frOll: 05, D6, T3, T77 
(T71> Yxy[INSlDEex,y> +-+ [LlNSDE(X,y> v W_INSIDECx,y>]] 
(1) Yxy[INSIDE(x,y> .. [LINSIDE<x,y> v W_INSIDE(x,y>)) 
frOll: 049, 054, 055, T118 
<11> Yxy[[LINSIDE<X,y> v W_INSIDECx,y>] .. INSIDE<X,y>] 
(172) Yxy[OUTSIDE<x,y> +-+ [l_OUTSIDE<X,y> v W_OOTSIDE<X,y>]] 
(1) 'lxy[OUTSIDE<X,y> ~ [l_OUTSIDEClC,y) v W_OUTSIDEcx,y)] ] 
frOll: Dl, 06, 08, 050, 051, 052 
frOll: 01, 06. 08. 050. 051, 052, T30.1eaaal 
<T73) INSIDEex.y> .. ~OUTSIDE<X,y>] 
frca: 05, 06, 049, T3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
frOll: 049, 053 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T75) Yxy[INSlDECx.y> .. PCx,tn.ideCy»] 
frca: 02, 056 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T76) Vx)'[OUTSIDE<X,y>" P<x,outa1de<y» 
frOll: 02, 057 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T77) Yx pez,conv(x» 
froll: A15, D2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T78) 'Ix -MEETS <x,x> 
frOll: A4, D74 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<T79) Yxy [MEETS<x,y> ..... MEETSCy.x» 
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frca: A4, A5, D15 
<TaO) Vxyz[MEETSCx,y> 1\ MEE1'S<y,z>] .. -MEETS<x,z» 
frca: A5, D14 
<Tal> Vx[PERIOD(X> .. 3y(MOMENT<y> 1\ P(y,x>]] 
frca: A4. A10. D38. De1, paraaod. 
(C82> Vx[MONENTCx> ..... [Atoaex> 1\ PERIOD (x» ] 
<C83> Vx[[P_INSlDE<x.y> v INSIDE(x.,>] .. -Caw.x(y>] 
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ARJ8DClb: C: TIle relational lattice Lc (proof.> 
Below are aasellbled together a set of proofs that define the properties 
of the relational lat tice Le. A diagrallmatic representation of lattice Le 
is illustrated in Figure 3. lbe proof method follows that used in 
Appendix B. 
THEOREMS: 
<TI00) 'lxy[PP<x.y> ..... [TPP<x.y) v NTPP<x.y>]] 
(1) 'lxy[PP<x.y> .. [TPP<X.,> v IITPP(x.y>]] 
frOll: D.c.. 09. 010, 011, 012 
(11) 'lxy [[TPP (x.y> v NTPP (x.),>} .. PP(x,),> ) 
fro.: D.c., 09. 010, 011. 012 
(TI0!) 'lxy[TPP<X.y> ..... NTPP<x.y>] 
frOll: 09, 010, 011, 012 
<TI02) Yxy[TP(x.y> ..... [TPP(x,y> v TPICx.y>)] 
(1) Yxy[TP<X,y> .. [TPP<x,y> v TPI<x.y>]] 
fro.: 011. 013 
(11) Yxy[[TPP(x,y) v TPI<X.y>] .. TP{x,y>] 
trOll: 011. 013 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
<T103) Yxy[TPP<x,y> .. "'TPI<x,y>] 
frOll: 011. D13 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<TI04) Yxy[tp-l <x,y> ..... [TPP-' (x,,> v TPICx,)'>]] 
(1) 'hcy[TP-l <x,y> .. [TPP-' <Xly> v TPICx,y>]] 
frOll: 09, 011, 013, 017, D19, 135, Tl00 
(11) Yxy[[TPP-' <x,y> v TPICx,y>] .. TP""' (x.y>] 
frOll: 011, 013. D17. 019, T35 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
<TI05) 'lxy[,-pp-l <x.y> .. "'TPICz,y>] 
fro.: Dll, 013, 019, T35 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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<TI06) ~y[NTP(x,y) +-+ [NTPP<x,y> v NTPI<x,y>]] 
(1) ~y[NTP(X,y) +-+ [NTPP(x,y> v NTPI<x,y>]] 
from: 012, Dl' 
(11) ~([NTPP(x.y> v NTPI<x,y>] ~ NTP<X,y>] 
froa: 012, D" 
<T107> ~[NTPP(x,y> ~ .. NTPI<x,y» 
froa: 012. D1' 
<T108> tn'P-' <X.y> +-+ [NTPP-I <x.y> v NTPI<x.y>J] 
(1) N'J'p-1 <x,y> -+ [NTPp-1 <X,y> v NTPI<X,y>]] 
fro.: 012. Dl'. D18. D20 
(11) ~[[NTPP-I (x,y> v NTPI<x,y» -+ NTP-' <X,y>] 
from: DU, Dl'. 1>18. 020, T36 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T109> ~[NTPP-I <X.y> -+ -NTPI<x,y>] 
(rOIl: 012. D". 020. T36 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T110> VlCy[PP-l <X,y> +-+ [1Pp-l <x,y> v NTPP-' <x,y>]) 
(1) ~y[pp-l <x.y> -+ [TPP-l <x.y> v NTPP-I (x,y>]] 
frOll: 016, D19. 020, 1100 
(11) ~y[ [TPP-l <x.y> v NTPP-' <x,y>] -+ pp-l <x.y>] 
from: 016. D19. 020. 1100 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<TUD ~[TPP-l <x.y> -+ .. N'J'Pp-' <x,y>] 
froa: 019. 020, 1101 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T112) 'Ix)'[EQUAL(x,y> +-+ [TPI<X.y> v NTPHx,y>Jj 
(1) 'dxy[EQUAL(x,y> -+ [1PI<x,y> v NTPI<x,y>] J 
from: 03, D9, DI0, 013, Dl' 
(11) \Ixy[ [1Pl(x,y> v NTPI<X.y>] -+ EQUAL(x,y>] 
fro.: 03, 013, Dl' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T113> Yxy[TPI<X,y> -+ -NTPI<X,y>] 
froa: 09, 010, 013, D14 
(Tl14> Yxy[O<x,y> ~ [PO<x.y> v P<X.y> v P-' <x,y>} 
(1) Yxy[O<x,y> -+ [PO<x,y> v P(x,y> v P-' (x,y>] 
frOll: 07. 015 
(11) Yxy[[PO<x,y> v P<X.y' v p-1 <x.y>] -+ O(x,y» 
frOll: 05. 07, 015, T3 
<Ttl5) 'lxy[PO<x,y> -+ -P<x,y>] 
fro.: 07 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T116> Yxy[PO(x,y> -+ -P-l <x,y» 
frOID: 07. 015 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<TU6> Yxy[OR<X,y> ~ [EC<X,y> v OC(x,y>]) 
(1) 'lxy[DR<X,y> -+ [EC(x,y> v DC<x,y>J] 
frOll: 0 I, 06, D8 
(11) Yxy[ [EC(x,y) v DC(x.),>] -. DR<X,y>] 
fro.: Dl, 06, De, 130.1eIlll81 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T117> Yxy[EC<x,),> -+ -DC(x,y» 
(rOIl: 01, D8 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T118> Yx,[P<x.y) ..... [TP<x,y> v NTPex,y>]] 
(1) Yxy[pCx,y> -. [TPex,,> v ""p<x.y>JJ 
froa: 09, 010 
(11) Yxy[[TP<x.y> v NTP<x,y» -. P<x,y» 
fro.: 09, 010 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<TUg> Yxy[TP(x,y> -+ -NTP<X,y>] 
from: 09, 09, DI0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
<1120> Yxy[p-1 (x.y) f--o+ [,-p-1 <x,y> v N'J'P-I <x,y>]] 
(1) Yxy[p-I (x.y> .. [TP-' (x,y> v NTp-I (x.,>] J 
fro.: 015, D17. 018, TH8 
(11) Yxy[ ['J'p-1 <x.y> v N'J'p-1 ex.y>] .. P-' <x.y>1 
froa: D9. 010. 015. 017. 018 
<1121> Yxy[TP-1 <x,y> ..... NTP-' <x.y>] 
froa: 017, D18. T119 
<1122> Yxy[P<X.y> f-+ [pp<X.y> v EQUAL (x.y>] ] 
(1) Yxy[P<x.y> .. [pP(x,y> v EQUALCx.y>]] 
froa: 03. D4 
(11) Yxy[ [pP(x.y> v EQUAL(x.y>] .. P(x,y>] 
froa: 03. D4 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<1123> \hcy[PP<X,y> .. -EQUAL(x.y>1 
fro.: 03, 04 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<T124> \hcy[p-I (x.y> f--o+ [pP-1 Cx.y> v EQUAL(x.y>)) 
(1) \fxy[p-1 (x.y> .. [pp-l ex,y> v EQUAL (x.y>] J 
froa: 03, 04. D15. 016 
(11) Yxy[ [pp-1 <X.y> v EQUALCx.y>] .. P-' (x.y>] 
fro.: 03. 04. 015. 016 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<1125> Yxy[pP-l (x.y> .. -EQUAL(x,y>] 
froa: 03, D4, D16 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<1126> Yxy[cex,y> f-+ [oex,y> v EC<x,y>)) 
(1) \fxy[CCx,y> .. (O(x,y> v EC(x,y>]] 
froa: 08 
(11) Yxy[[O(x,y> v EC(x,y>] .. C<x.y» 
froll: 08, T30.1ellul 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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<1127> Vxy[O(x,y> ~ -EC(x,y>] 
froll: OS 
<1128> Vxy[C<x,y> v DR(x,y>] 
froa: 06, T30.1ellllel 
<1129> Vxy[DC<x,y> v EC(x,y) v PO<x,y> v TPP(x,y> v NTPP<x,y> v 
TPP-' (x,y> v NTPP-' <X,y) v TPI<x,y) v NTPI<x,y>] 
froa: 05, D1, T116, Tl00, T110, T112, T122, T124 
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